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For radicals, structural domination – e.g., sexism, racism, or classism – refers to the 
disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In recent years, a growing number of critical 
theorists have drawn on sociological and anthropological work to argue that the entrenchment of 
structural domination is largely due to agents’ socialisation into these practices. This thesis is 
sympathetic to this approach, but argues nonetheless that it stumbles over its own account of the 
contradictory character of socialisation. For if socialisation is contradictory – if agents should be 
expected to frequent not only social milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating practices, but 
also milieux that challenge these schemas – then it is unclear how exactly their socialisation in these 
practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. To solve this problem, the thesis 
suggests that we should pay closer attention to the various influences which structural domination 
itself has on socialisation. The thesis identifies three such influences, depending on the case at hand: 
a segregating influence, such that agents do not frequent the milieux that challenge the schemas of 
dominating practices; a standardising influence, such that there are too few of these milieux for 
agents to gain critical insight from them; and a repressive influence, such that the critical insights 
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This thesis is concerned with the ways in which socialisation can entrench structural domination. As 
such, it is a work of critical theory, in the broad sense: its ‘task is to illuminate […] injustice in ways 
that provide a basis for resistance’ (Haslanger 2020b, 1; see also Horkheimer 1972 [1937], Geuss 
1981). Specifically, it aims at stimulating the emancipation of those social groups who are dominated 
by some of our current social practices and institutions – those who ‘can’t breathe’.  
These words, made into a political slogan by the Black Lives Matter movement in honour of 
George Floyd, neatly capture the experience of structural domination: the constant insecurity that 
comes with vulnerability, the continuous need to anticipate who or what may harm you, the structural 
inability to relax that obtains when social practices of residential segregation, biased hiring, or 
educational disadvantage render one particularly vulnerable – to police brutality, for instance, and 
death by asphyxiation. 
Black people like Floyd are not the only group who cannot breathe today: women and workers 
find themselves in a similar situation. Among other groups, these three constitute the ‘big three’ of 
structural domination (Mills 2000, 445; see also Filling unpublished, 1). As members of these groups, 
agents find themselves socially disempowered, either directly or as a result of a history of injustice 
towards them (Haslanger 2004, 117): even when they are not at the mercy of a specific policeman, a 
particular husband, or a single boss, their ability to resist some white, some man, or some capitalist 
is impaired (Filling, ibid., passim). 
This can be remedied. Social practices and institutions ‘don’t just exist of and by themselves’, 
after all: agents impose them on themselves ‘by participating in them’ or ‘accepting them without 
protest’, as Raymond Geuss has put it (1981, 60). So why do we participate in dominating practices, 
or at any rate fail to change them? Why do we entrench structural domination? For example, why are 
there relatively few BLM activists, and how can we increase their numbers? 
Part of the explanation has to do with repression, no doubt, as well as various collective action 
problems (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21). But for critical theorists, the failure to remedy structural 
domination is largely due to ideology, and more precisely to our socialisation into dominating 
practices: specifically, to the process by which the milieux in which these practices are enacted teach 
or inculcate us their schemas – their ideologies – as they embody or actualise them, which in turns 
prevents us from criticising or challenging them (Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010; 
see also Sewell 1992). 
Now, owing largely to Emile Durkheim’s The Rules of the Sociological Method (1968), until 
recently socialisation was conceived on the model of ‘traditional prejudices’, from which the 
enlightened theorist would free the ‘common man’ (1968, 31; cf. Horkheimer 1972, 192). Thus Louis 
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Althusser famously insisted, in For Marx, on an ‘epistemological gap’ between the social scientist 
and social consciousness (1996, 33–47). And even Pierre Bourdieu sometimes criticised ‘the illusion 
of immediate knowledge’, as in The Craft of Sociology (Bourdieu et. al. 1991, 13; see also Celikates 
2006). 
But this view is mainly behind us. As many have argued, following Karl Mannheim’s Ideology 
and Utopia (1936; see also Geertz 2000, and Celikates 2006), it faces a paradox: since nothing 
guarantees that the theorist is not herself in the grip of her socialisation into dominating practices, 
either she does not know better than the common man, or the common man knows more than the 
Durkheimians suggest. And since the first horn of the dilemma seems to render critical consciousness 
impossible, many have chosen the second.    
Thus Anthony Giddens makes it one of his ‘leading theorem[s]’ that ‘every social actor knows a 
great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member’ (1979, 
5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319). And as Robin Celikates approvingly 
comments, the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and others rejects ‘the idea that social rules are 
imposed behind the backs of ignorant actors’ (2012, 165, referencing Boltanski 1990a; see also 
Lemieux 2018, 16–17). 
Importantly, a fundamental reason behind this shift is the recognition of the contradictory 
character of (contemporary) socialisation: critical consciousness, agents’ as well as theorists’, is 
possible because we typically frequent not only milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating 
practices, but also milieux that challenge them. As William Sewell has put it, our ‘cultural worlds are 
commonly beset with internal contradictions’ (Sewell 2005, 53; see also 1992, 16, and Phillips 2006, 
2007), and it is these contradictions which enable us, agents as well as theorists, to criticise our 
practices (Haslanger 2017a; cf. Lemieux 2018, 17).1 
Yet this shift, I suggest, creates a major problem for critical theory. In particular, it poses an 
important challenge to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to 
ideology, and more precisely to our socialisation into dominating practices: as critical theory has 
checked its pretension to criticise ‘from above’, or at any rate from the ‘right side’ of a deep 
epistemological gap, it has deprived its account of socialisation of much explanatory power regarding 
the entrenchment of structural domination. 
For if socialisation is contradictory – if we should be expected to frequent not just social milieux 
that confirm the schemas of these practices, but also milieux that challenge them – then it is unclear 
how exactly our socialisation into these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural 
 
1 As Young insisted, ‘norms can come from nowhere else’ (1990, 5). 
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domination. In other words, why would agents participate in dominating practices, or accept them 
without protest, if the rules of these practices are not imposed in some sense ‘behind their backs’? 
Faced with this problem, some have tended to minimise the role played by socialisation in the 
entrenchment of structural domination by emphasising other ways in which compliance is secured 
(e.g., Scott 1985, Abercrombie et al. 1980; see also Martinez-Alier 1971). Thus James Scott, for 
instance, has insisted on the ‘grudging resignation’, as opposed to the ‘ideological support’, that may 
result from the experience of structural domination (1985, 325). But while there is much to be said 
for this kind of approach, we should not abandon the view that socialisation into dominating practices 
is another important factor in the entrenchment of structural domination. For this view, I argue in this 
thesis, has the resources to solve the problem. 
More precisely, it does so provided we pay closer attention than its current proponents do to the 
‘tainted origin’ of contemporary socialisation in structural domination (cf. Geuss 1981, 21), and 
specifically to the corresponding influences of structural domination on contemporary socialisation: 
from the segregating effects of the division of labour (e.g., Young 1990), to the standardising logic 
of market domination (e.g., Graeber 2001, 2005), to the repressive forces of ideological apparatuses 
that never merely function by ideology (e.g., Althusser 2014 [1970]). 
Drawing on this literature, I argue in this thesis that structural domination should serve as more 
than a mere explanandum. It should be our explanans as well. For it itself does explanatory work, I 
argue, by shaping our contradictory socialisation in different ways, each of which goes some way to 
explain our failure to criticise dominating practices. If socialisation into dominating practices 
entrenches structural domination, I contend, it is because structural domination itself has a certain 
influence on socialisation – a segregating, a standardising, or a repressive influence, depending on 
the case at hand. 
I make this argument as follows. In chapter 1, I introduce the radical conception of structural 
domination I will rely on throughout, by contrasting it with the prominent republican conception as 
recently articulated by Philip Pettit (1999; see also Quentin Skinner 1998 and Frank Lovett 2010). 
On both views, social practices play a crucial role in structural domination: they impair some agents’ 
ability to resist others. But the views disagree on what exactly this disempowering role amounts to. 
On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over her, meaning that, as 
the practices disempower her, they facilitate others’ domination over her. On the radical view we owe 
to Iris Young (1990), Nancy Fraser (1993), or Sally Haslanger (2004), by contrast, to dominate 
someone is to impair her ability to resist others, which means that the practices themselves dominate 
her when they disempower her, whether or not others have arbitrary power over her as a result. This 
holds even for the kind of indirect arbitrary power which Pettit sometimes hints at (e.g., 2012, 63). 
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In chapter 2, I turn to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our 
socialisation into dominating practices, and I present in more details the problem I emphasised above. 
For while this view is promising, the account of socialisation it relies on needs to be amended if it is 
to explain the entrenchment of structural domination: the proponents of this view (henceforth the 
PSCs, for ‘proponents of the socialisation conception’, e.g., Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, and 
Einspahr 2010) seem to neglect the fact that theirs is an account of contradictory socialisation, where 
its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness, and, further, social change. To 
solve this problem, I argue, we should pay attention to the various influences which structural 
domination has on socialisation. 
In chapter 3, I turn to the first of these influences. Building on the PSCs’ reading of socialisation 
into dominating practices in terms of ideology, I amend their account of socialisation in light of the 
literature on this topic. Focusing on racism specifically, I draw on the Marxist claim that ideology 
has its tainted origin in the division imposed by structural domination between the practices of the 
dominant groups and those of the dominated groups. In this connection, I argue that in this case it is 
only because structural domination has a segregating influence on socialisation that socialisation can 
entrench structural domination. If white professionals entrench the domination of the biased hiring 
practices that dominate their black employees, for instance, it is because this domination has 
segregated white professionals and black employees into two groups who live such different lives 
that white professionals do not frequent the milieux that would enable them to question the schemas 
that guide their biased hiring practices. 
This solution is not the whole story, however, as I argue in chapter 4. As testified by socialisation 
into the market, structural domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation. 
But I avail myself of the PSCs’ reading of socialisation into the market in terms of the ideology of 
the market, or fetishism, to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic. Here I draw on 
those who, unlike the PSCs, understand fetishism not as the ideology of the market, but as the 
impersonal domination both capitalists and workers suffer in the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 
2017, Vrousalis 2017). Based on this analysis, I suggest that the PSCs once again neglect the influence 
of structural domination on socialisation, but that in this case it is because this influence is 
standardising, not segregating, that socialisation can entrench structural domination: workers and 
capitalists fail to question the commodity schema at the heart of the market because, as market 
domination encourages them to make commodity exchange the standard across many milieux in order 
to maximise profit, it deprives them of the milieux that would help them realise that they are doing 
the commodifying themselves. 
Sometimes, however, structural domination has neither a segregating nor a standardising 
influence on socialisation, as testified by the socialisation of dominated groups. Thus in chapter 5, 
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finally, I build on the PSCs’ reading of the socialisation of dominated groups as disciplined through 
ideological apparatuses to amend their account in light of the literature on this third topic. Here I 
focus on sexism, and draw on Althusser’s often overlooked remark about the ‘double functioning’ of 
ideological state apparatuses, ‘predominantly by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression’ (2014 
[1970], 251). I argue that the PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on 
socialisation: in this case, I argue, it is only because structural domination has a repressive influence 
on socialisation that socialisation can entrench structural domination. This influence is such that, 
through physical repression, the dominant groups may psychologically repress what the dominated 
groups learn in their own milieux that would help them challenge the dominant cultures. In some 
philosophy departments for instance, female students fail to question what Kathy Miriam (2007), 
following Adrienne Rich (1986), has called the law of male sex-right, because the domination of this 
implicit law may enable male students to repress the critical insights female students have learned 
from their women’s studies classes (see also Saul’s ‘What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy’ 
blog, 2021).  
This three-fold amendment, I suggest, is what might help us rescue the socialisation conception 
of entrenchment. In the conclusion to this thesis, I will argue that this amendment implies a slightly 
different basis for resistance than the PSCs suggest. If challenging our socialisation into dominating 
practices will prove difficult unless we first minimise the various influences of structural domination 
on socialisation, then these influences, not socialisation, should be our primary targets. Thus we 
should not directly target socialisation into the market, for instance, but aim first at the standardising, 
commodifying processes that prevent us from thinking critically about the market. But I will return 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RADICAL CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION IN THREE KEY CASES 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the ways in which socialisation can entrench structural domination. This 
will be the focus of chapters 2 to 5. In this first chapter I introduce the radical conception of structural 
domination I rely on throughout. I do this by contrasting this conception with one of the most 
prominent accounts in the literature, namely, the republican conception as recently articulated by 
Philip Pettit (1999; see also Skinner 1998, and Lovett 2010). 
Structural domination is a social phenomenon: it concerns social groups, such as classes, races, 
or genders. Importantly, these groups are not to be understood as ‘subjective identities’, but rather as 
‘axes of structural inequality’: ‘[t]hey name structural positions whose occupants are privileged or 
disadvantaged in relation to one another due to the adherence of actors to institutional rules and norms 
and the pursuit of their interests and goals within institutions’ (Young 2005, 21; see also Einspahr 
2010, 15, and Pettit 1999, 124, where he references Young 1990, chapter 2). 
These institutions, or social practices more generally, are ‘collective enterprises’, in which agents 
coordinate around (e.g., use, allocate) resources on the basis of shared schemas such as rules and 
norms (Haslanger 2004, 104, and 2017c, 21–3; see also Einspahr 2010, and Sewell 1992).2 The 
market is one such practice; so is the police brutality condemned by the Black Lives Matter 
movement, and so is the sexual abuse recently denounced by the #metoo campaign. 
For both republicans such as Pettit (1999) and radicals such as Iris Young (1990), Nancy Fraser 
(1993), and Sally Haslanger (2004), these and other social practices play a crucial role in structural 
domination: they impair some agents’ ability to resist others. But the views disagree on what exactly 
this disempowering role amounts to. 
On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over her, which means 
that, as the practices impair some agents’ ability to resist others, they facilitate others’ domination 
over them. On the radical view, by contrast, to dominate someone is to impair her ability to resist 
others, meaning that the practices themselves dominate her when they disempower her, whether or 
not others have arbitrary power over her as a result. This holds even for the kind of indirect arbitrary 
power which may be enjoyed by those who can mitigate the effects of these practices (see Pettit 2012, 
63). 
 
2 Institutions are a kind of social practice, whose schemas are formalised (e.g., into explicit rules, as opposed to vaguer 
scripts or norms). Schemas include rules and norms, but also the scripts, concepts, and frames of thinking which 
anthropologists have brought to light. Resources are things of all sort, including other agents and other schemas, 
understood as, for example, conceptual resources (see e.g., Haslanger 2017c, and Sewell 1992). I will return to social 
practices in more detail below and in the following chapters (see especially chapter 2). 
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To illustrate each of the three ways in which the radical view departs from its republican 
counterpart, I focus on three cases. In the first case, republicans argue that an agent dominates another 
due to a social practice, while radicals insist that the practice itself dominates. In the second case, 
radicals make the same claim, but no one is directly dominated according to republicans, since the 
practice does not confer direct arbitrary power to anyone. In the third case, the radical diagnosis 
remains unchanged, but here republicans cannot suggest that some enjoy indirect arbitrary power 
either. 
I argue as follows. In the first section, I present the republican interpretation of the three core 
features of domination: unfreedom, unequal power, and duration. For republicans, to dominate 
someone is to have arbitrary power over them, typically because a social practice impairs their ability 
to resist. This means that, when you are structurally dominated, on this view, you are unfree from a 
specific member of another group, who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as 
long as the practice remains unchanged. For you are unfree from arbitrary interference just in case 
someone can harm you intentionally, at will, and with impunity; and someone is in a position to do 
that just in case he can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him at any 
time. Finally, since being in this position depends on the practice, his domination over you lasts as 
long as the practice remains unchanged.  
In section II, I turn to the radical interpretation of the same three core features of domination. For 
radicals, when a practice disempowers you, it is the practice itself that dominates you. While those 
who could change this practice would dominate you in its place if they could be expected to foresee 
its effects, the fact that they cannot be expected to do this means that they do not dominate you. 
Crucially, neither do those who acquire power over you as a result of your disempowerment, 
regardless of whether this power is arbitrary: they are part of the dominant group, but since they do 
not disempower you, they do not dominate you. On this picture too it is from them that you are unfree, 
this is so whether or not they actually interfere, and your unfreedom lasts as long as the practice 
remains unchanged. But the fact that their power over you need not be arbitrary means that you may 
be unfree from a different member of their group at each stage rather than from the same member 
throughout, none of whom need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you cannot resist 
(including punish) him specifically. 
With this in mind, I then present three cases to highlight these key differences between the two 
views. In the case I offer in section III, republicans argue that an agent dominates another due to a 
social practice, while radicals insist that the practice itself dominates. In this case, as a member of the 
dominated group, you are unfree from a specific member of the dominant group, who owes her ability 
to interfere with you to a social practice which she can be expected to foresee impairs your ability to 
  14 
 
resist her specifically at each stage.3 That she can be expected to do this sets her apart from those who 
could change this practice, since, unlike her, they cannot be expected to foresee its effects. In this 
case, republicans argue that she dominates you, on the grounds that she has arbitrary power over you: 
she can interfere with you intentionally, at will, and with impunity, since she can be expected to 
foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) her at each stage. Radicals, by contrast, move beyond 
what Fraser calls the ‘dyad’ in which a dominator and a dominated agent are involved (1993) to insist 
that the practice itself dominates: while those who could change this practice would dominate in its 
place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, the fact that they cannot leaves only the practice 
to blame. Even if white managers have arbitrary power over their black employees, for example, for 
radicals it is the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy that do the dominating. 
In section IV, I turn to the second case. In this case, the practice does not enable anyone to 
arbitrarily interfere with another directly, as it did in the first. Here you are unfree from a different 
member of the dominant group at each stage: a few of them can be expected to foresee that the practice 
impairs your ability to resist some member of their group at each stage, but none of them can be 
expected to foresee which particular agent you cannot resist, and when. This is because you can resist 
a number of members of that group at each stage, and none of them has any way to know whether he 
belongs to this subgroup. In this case, radicals still insist that you are dominated by the practice itself, 
for the same reason as above: those who could change the practice cannot be expected to foresee its 
effects, and the few members of the dominant group who can be expected to do this could not change 
the practice by themselves. But for republicans you are not dominated, and this is because no member 
of the dominant group has arbitrary power over you or any member of your group: no member of this 
group can interfere with you at will and with impunity, since even if a few members of this group can 
be expected to foresee that members of your group could not resist some member of their group at 
each stage, no member of their group can be expected to foresee which member of your group could 
resist which member of their group at each stage. Thus radicals suggest that female students are 
dominated by the implicit law of male sex-right in effect in hyper-masculine philosophy departments, 
for instance, without any male students having arbitrary power over them as a result (see e.g., Miriam 
2007). 
Here, republicans may argue that the few members of the dominant group who can be expected 
to foresee the effects of the practice on the members of the dominated group can indirectly dominate 
 
3 Here as below it is ‘in some respect’ that she can interfere with you and that you cannot resist her. Likewise, here as 
below it is ‘as a member of a group and only as such’ that one’s ability to resist is impaired or that, conversely, one can 
interfere with others. This formulation abstracts from the way in which one’s membership in a group (e.g., women) 
interacts with one’s membership in other groups (e.g., worker or capitalist, black or white, lesbian or straight). The point 
of this formulation is not to ignore the phenomenon of intersectionality but, on the contrary, to gain insight into the lived 
experience of those who belong to intersecting groups ‘by having the analytical tools to distinguish them’, as Haslanger 
puts it (2012, 9; cf. Crenshaw 1989). I ignore these two caveats for purposes of presentation. 
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those they know, if they fail to mitigate these effects on them. So in section V, I turn to a case that 
does not even display this kind of indirect arbitrary power. In this case, a social practice impairs the 
ability of the members of your group to resist some member of the dominant group at each stage, as 
above, and you are unfree from various members of that group in turn. But here not even a few 
members of that group can be expected to foresee that the practice has this effect on you. In this case, 
radicals insist once again that the practice itself dominates, on the same grounds as above that those 
who could change the practice cannot be expected to foresee its effects. But for republicans, no 
member of your group is even indirectly dominated, since no member of the other group who could 
indirectly interfere with you at will and with impunity could do so intentionally: none of them can be 
expected to foresee that the practice whose effects they fail to mitigate impairs the ability of the 
members of your group to resist some member(s) of their group. Thus for example the labour market 
dominates workers, according to radicals, by organising a systematic transfer of resources from 
workers to capitalists which no capitalist can be expected to foresee (e.g., Young 1990). 
Note that all I do in this chapter is introduce the radical conception of domination I rely on in this 
thesis, by contrasting it to its famous republican counterpart. In particular, I do not argue in favour of 
this conception against the republican one, but only use the latter as a counterpoint to clarify the 
former. Nor do I try to offer an exhaustive analysis of all cases in which radicals might argue that 
structural domination obtains. I only present three of them, which are chosen because they are crucial 
to our understanding of the way in which the radical conception differs from the republican one. 
These three cases will form the basis of my analysis in the next chapters of the ways in which 
socialisation can entrench domination. 
 
I. THE REPUBLICAN CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION 
In this first section I present the republican interpretation of the three core features of domination: 
unfreedom, duration, and unequal power. For republicans, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary 
power over them, which (usually) occurs because a social practice impairs their ability to resist. This 
means that, when you are structurally dominated, on this view, you are unfree from a specific member 
of another group, who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as long as the practice 
remains unchanged. For you are unfree from arbitrary interference just in case someone can harm you 
intentionally, at will, and with impunity; and someone is in a position to do that just in case he can be 
expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him at any time. Finally, his domination 
over you lasts as long as the practice remains unchanged since his being in this position depends on 
the practice. 
The republican view can be traced back to Cicero, and has recently been revived by Quentin 
Skinner, Philip Pettit, and Frank Lovett in particular (1998, 1999, and 2010, respectively). Today it 
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can claim much support in the literature, even among scholars we might think of as radicals (e.g., 
Einspahr 2010). On this view, and in Philip Pettit’s words, ‘[o]ne agent dominates another if and only 
if they […] have sway over the other, in the old phrase, and the sway is arbitrary’ (1999, 52). 
Additionally, ‘[i]t is usually because of the ways a society is organized […], that some people have 
such power in relation to others that they dominate them […]’ (2012, 63). Witness ‘the salient 
vulnerability classes in contemporary society: […] those groups who are rendered particularly 
vulnerable by virtue of gender or ethnicity or colour or sexual preference […]’ (1999, 124, referencing 
Young 1990, chapter 2).4 
This has implication for the republican interpretation of the three core features of domination: 
unfreedom, duration, and unequal power. On this view, you are structurally dominated just in case 
you are unfree from a specific member of another group who can be expected to foresee that you 
cannot resist him at each stage of a certain period, this period lasting as long as the practice remains 
unchanged. Let me elaborate. 
I start with unfreedom. The claim that to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them 
means that when you are dominated, you are unfree from a specific agent, to whose will you are 
subjected for the duration of your domination. Since in addition this agent need only have arbitrary 
power over you, you are unfree from him even if he does not exercise this power. Like liberals, 
republicans believe that an ‘interference […] always has to be more or less intentional in character’ 
(Pettit 1999, 52), but unlike liberals, they believe that in order to be unfree it is sufficient that this 
agent can interfere with you, even if he never does. As Quentin Skinner puts it, the ‘essence’ of 
republicanism is the rejection of the ‘servitude’ of the slave whose master ‘could interfere at will and 
with impunity’ but may well be benevolent (2008, 97, his emphasis). 
The same core republican claim implies a certain reading of the second feature of domination, 
namely, duration. For this claim entails not just the modality of interference but also its temporality: 
there must be a stage at which you are vulnerable to a specific agent, and at least one further stage at 
which he would interfere should he so desire (Filling unpublished, 12). Since in fact he can interfere 
not just at will but also with impunity, we should add at least a third stage: you are dominated not 
only when you are vulnerable to him and when he might interfere, but also when he would escape 
punishment should he interfere. Indeed, since he could interfere thanks to a social practice that impairs 
your ability to resist him, the period during which you are dominated typically lasts as long as this 
practice remains unchanged (see e.g., Einspahr 2010, 12–3).5 
 
4 Here the concept of social group is ‘a tool for theorising structures more than subject’ (Young 2005, 22, quoted in 
Einspahr 2010, 15; see introduction above). Both Einspahr and Pettit draw on Young. 
5 More precisely, on this view he dominates you as long as the practice is not changed in such a way that either it no 
longer impairs your ability to resist him at each stage or he no longer can be expected to foresee you cannot resist him at 
each stage. (For both radicals and republicans, he no longer dominates you if the practice changes in such a way that it 
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Let us now turn to the third feature of domination: the superior power derived from the practice, 
which, for republicans, must be arbitrary. As we will see in more details in the next section, the many 
agents who could change the practice for the better cannot usually be expected to foresee that it 
impairs your ability to resist a specific agent for the duration of the relevant period. By contrast, it 
must be the case that this specific agent can be expected to foresee this, if he is to have arbitrary 
power over you: only then can he interfere with you not just intentionally, but also ‘at [his] own 
whim’, and without ‘being exposed to sanctions’ from you or others who would help you (Pettit 1996, 
580 and 587; see also Gourevitch 2013, 600). If he cannot be expected to foresee that you cannot 
resist him at each stage of the period, his power over you ‘isn’t arbitrary – it’s aleatory’, as Filling 
aptly puts it (unpublished, 38). 
In addition to this account of direct arbitrary power, republicans have recently hinted at a form of 
indirect arbitrary power. Thus, for Pettit in particular, ‘the way things are organized in a society […]’ 
need not merely ‘constitute a structure or pattern that facilitates the [arbitrary] invasion by some 
people of the choices available to others’, as we saw above. It may also ‘amount to an indirect, 
structural form of invasion, we might even say, as distinct from the direct, personal form of invasion 
that it occasions’ (2012, 44).6 To the extent that ‘we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with 
hindrances that reflect the will of another as to what you should do’ (2012, 39), this suggests that 
someone indirectly dominates you when they can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs 
your ability to resist them or someone else but nonetheless fail to mitigate these effects, provided they 
do so at will and with impunity.7 The thought seems to be that even if they could not change the 
practice by themselves they could still do something, and to this extent should be held responsible for 
their failure to do so. Thus any of Rome’s citizens would indirectly dominate slaves, Gourevitch 
suggests, to the extent that they ‘engaged in […] the capture and punishment of runaway slaves […]’ 
for example (2013, 601).8 
 
no longer impairs your ability to resist him at each stage, but for republicans neither does he do so even if the practice 
only changes in such a way that he no longer can be expected to foresee you cannot resist him at any stage.) 
6 Put differently, there are two kinds of indirect, structural domination for Pettit. As I read him, however, the first kind is 
the typical case of republican domination (see also Gourevitch 2013 on the way in which even the classical master’s 
domination depended on the social practices of slavery). 
7 Pettit writes: ‘A hindrance that invades your choice between options has to be triggered by your seeking to satisfy your 
will in that choice, rather than materializing for independent reasons. And while that triggering condition can be fulfilled 
in the presence of a will that competes with your own will for control of what you do, it is hard to see how it could be met 
otherwise. Your seeking to satisfy your will in a choice is hardly likely, for example, to trigger the appearance of a natural 
obstacle to your getting your way. For these reasons we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with hindrances that 
reflect the will of another as to what you should do’ (2012, ibid.).  
8 Gourevitch argues that Pettit’s account cannot accommodate this case because, on Pettit’s view, ‘[a]n agent interferes 
intentionally when he knows, or at least ought to have known, that he has the power to interfere in the choices of a known, 
specific agent’ (ibid., 600, his emphasis), while ‘Roman citizens had no knowledge of and no direct hand in determining 
which specific slave would be subject to which specific master’ (ibid., 601). But Pettit could still argue that by engaging 
in the capture and punishment of runaway slaves, for example, they indirectly dominated their own slaves who had not 
run away (whom they know).  
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So much for the republican conception of domination. On this conception, when you are 
dominated, you are unfree from a specific agent who can be expected to foresee that the practice 
impairs your ability to resist him at each stage of a certain period, this period lasting as long as the 
practice remains unchanged. The key points I made here will be further illustrated in the three cases 
below. Before I do this, however, I turn in the next section to the radical conception of domination. 
 
II. THE RADICAL CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION 
For radicals, when a practice disempowers you, it is the practice itself that dominates you, not those 
who could change the practice, nor those who acquire power over you as a result, whether or not this 
power is arbitrary. So, while on this picture too you are unfree from those who are empowered by the 
practice, the fact that their power over you need not be arbitrary means that you may be unfree from 
a different member of their group at each stage, rather than from the same member throughout, none 
of whom need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you cannot resist (including punish) him 
specifically. In this section, I elaborate on these claims. 
The radical view can be found in Marx (Capital, I) and in much feminist work (see e.g. Young 
1990, Fraser 1993, Haslanger 2004). It is common among activists and critical theorists, though often 
the former only gesture at it and the latter sometimes focus on oppression instead (e.g., Frye 1983, 
Young 1990, chapter 2).9 While for republicans domination is subjection to arbitrary power, for 
radicals domination is disempowerment. This means that, for radicals, the practice responsible for 
disempowering you dominates you. Some agents acquire power over you as a result, but they do not 
dominate you, even if their power is arbitrary: they are part of the dominant group (Haslanger 2004, 
110–11), but since they could not change the practice without the help of many others, they cannot 
be said to disempower you themselves. Neither can those many other agents, for they cannot usually 
be expected to foresee that the practice disempowers you: as Young puts it, your disempowerment is 
typically only ‘a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning 
people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic 
hierarchies and market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life’ (Young 1990, 
41).10  This leaves only the practice to blame: domination, for Young, ‘consists in institutional 
 
9 Oppression is often understood as the experience of domination, so that one will say for instance that ‘relations and 
structures of domination […] oppress the majority of the population’ (e.g., Mills 2000, 441). Others use ‘oppression’ and 
‘domination’ interchangeably (e.g., Haslanger 2004, Jugov and Ypi 2019). Inasmuch as one insists on separating 
oppression and domination, there seems to be two ways to do this: either both can be structural and oppression is about 
the impairment of self-realisation while domination concerns the impairment of self-determination (e.g., Young 1990); 
or both are about self-realisation (or cognates, like power-to) as requiring self-determination (power to resist power over), 
but only oppression is structural (e.g., Frye 1983). Here I follow Young’s way of distinguishing between the two, but 
unlike Young I focus exclusively on domination. 
10 Here Young is writing about oppression rather than domination, but she makes this point about both (see 1990, chapter 
1). 
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conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the 
conditions of their actions (1990, 38; see also Haslanger 2004, 104 and passim). 
The radical interpretation of the three core features of domination – unfreedom, duration, and 
unequal power – follows from this core claim. If, for radicals, domination is typically something a 
practice does as it impairs your ability to resist, not something that agents do when they can wield 
arbitrary power over you, then you may be unfree from a different member of the dominant group at 
each stage rather than from the same member throughout, and no member of that group needs to be 
in a position to foresee when he is the one that you cannot resist (including punish). 
Here, as in the discussion of the republican view, I go through each feature of domination in turn, 
but this time I start with duration, as there is not much to add in this respect. We saw above that the 
republican claim that someone’s arbitrary power over you is usually due to a social practice entails 
that the period during which you are dominated lasts as long as this practice remains unchanged. In 
the same way, the radicals’ claim that domination is typically what the practice itself does implies 
that your domination lasts as long as those who could change this practice fail to do so. Thus in 
Marx’s words, for example, ‘[t]he silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the 
domination of the capitalist over the worker’ as ‘[t]he organisation of the capitalist process of 
production […] breaks down all resistance’: […] it is possible to rely on his dependence on capital, 
which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them’ 
(Capital I, 1976, 899, my emphasis). 
But while radicals offer the same interpretation as republicans of the duration of domination, their 
view differs when it comes to unfreedom and unequal power. To start with unfreedom, the claim that 
to dominate someone is typically what the practice does as it impairs their ability to resist means that 
radicals believe, like republicans, and unlike liberals, that you are unfree just because you can be 
interfered with, even if no one actually does. For Fraser, for instance, women are dominated to the 
extent that they are ‘rendered vulnerable’, even if no man exploits their vulnerability (1993, 174). But 
the absence of an arbitrariness requirement entails that while some member of a dominant group must 
be able to interfere with you at each moment of your domination, you need not be unfree from a 
specific member of that group for the duration of your domination (see Filling unpublished, 30). At 
the limit, the practice may impair your ability to resist a different member of that group at each stage. 
Thus Fraser argues, drawing on Susan Okin, that ‘labor markets that disadvantage women’ render 
them vulnerable ‘first’ to various suitors ‘by anticipation of marriage’, ‘[n]ext […] within marriage’ 
to their husband, ‘and finally, […] by separation or divorce […]’, to another series of suitors who 
might exploit the ‘precipitous drop in women’s and children’s standard of living’ that usually follows 
(1993, 174, see Okin 1989, 138). 
  20 
 
I turn finally to unequal power. Since the radicals’ central claim that to dominate someone is 
typically what the practice itself does as it impairs their ability to resist carries no arbitrariness 
requirement, whoever can interfere with you at any given moment of your domination need not be in 
a position to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him for the duration of your domination. 
As we just saw, the practice need not have this effect on you. But this claim also entails that he need 
not even be in a position to foresee whether you will be vulnerable to him at some point, or, if you 
are, when exactly that might be: it may just be a matter of luck which member of his group you cannot 
resist at each stage. Thus to return to Fraser’s example: before marriage and after divorce, women are 
only vulnerable to unwanted suitors when they have run out of opportunities to say ‘no’, and no suitor 
can be expected to foresee when that will be, or indeed whether that will occur at all. 
This, then, is how the radical conception of structural domination contrasts with the republican 
one. For republicans, we saw, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them. This usually 
occurs because a practice disempowers them, and it means that to be dominated is to be unfree from 
a specific agent who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as long as the practice 
remains unchanged. For radicals, by contrast, to dominate someone is to disempower them, which 
means that they are dominated by the practice itself, whether or not anyone has arbitrary power over 
them. Importantly, the absence of an ‘arbitrary power’ requirement means that you may be unfree 
from a different member of the dominant group at each stage of the relevant period, none of whom 
need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you are unfree from him instead of another. 
 
III. THE FIRST CASE: BLACK EMPLOYEES 
From this section onward, I turn to three cases of domination to highlight the differences between 
these two views. The case I present in this section is designed to emphasise that, when republicans 
argue that an agent dominates another because of a social practice, radicals usually insist that the 
practice itself dominates. 
I mentioned above the analysis of gender domination which Fraser builds from Okin. But it is not 
the only kind of domination that ‘is today being transformed by a shift from dyadic relations of 
mastery and subjection to more impersonal structural mechanisms’ (1993, 180). As Young has 
argued, for instance, ‘dominating racism involv[ing] direct mastery’, which prevailed as long as ‘race 
status rules’ privileged whites over blacks, has now receded: it is being replaced by a ‘metaracism’ 
where ‘almost all traces of a commitment to race superiority have been removed, and only the 
grinding processes of a white-dominated economy and technology account for the continued misery 
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of many people of color’ (1990, 141, drawing on Kovel 1970).11 Such metaracism may still facilitate 
direct mastery, but for radicals, this direct mastery is not where the action is. 
Imagine that you are a black employee, bossed around by a white manager who knows that you 
are likely never to enjoy her status in the division of labour.12 She has enough experience to trust the 
biased hiring practice of her white-dominated economy to limit blacks like you to more or less menial 
tasks, either in her firm or in any future job you might get: she knows that the many white 
professionals in charge of hiring decisions think that blacks are unreliable when it comes to ‘deadline-
sensitive professional work’ (Haslanger 2017a, 4).13 These white professionals, by contrast, cannot 
be expected to foresee that their hiring decisions prevent you from enjoying a professional status in 
the division of labour: your disempowerment is only an effect of ‘the grinding processes of a white-
dominated economy’ in which they are only ‘doing their job, or living their life’ (Young 1990, 141 
and 42). 
In this case, you are unfree from a specific member of a group, as long as she can directly interfere 
with you at each stage of your domination, thanks to a social practice which she could only change 
with the help of many others but which, unlike them, she can be expected to foresee impairs your 
ability to resist her at each stage. Specifically, you (and other black employees) are unfree from your 
white manager to do your work as you please, as long as she can order you about, thanks to a biased 
hiring practice she could only change with many other white professionals, but which contrary to 
them she can be expected to foresee prevents her black employees from ever enjoying her status in 
the division of labour. In this case, republicans argue that the practice facilitates the domination of 
your manager, a specific agent, over you. By contrast, radicals insist that the practice itself dominates. 
Let us start with republicans, who focus on you and your white manager. Republicans argue that 
she dominates you, and they make this claim on the grounds that she has arbitrary power over you: 
she can interfere with you intentionally, at will, and with impunity, since she can be expected to 
foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) her at each stage. In this respect, she is just like 
Pettit’s ‘husband who can beat his wife for disobeying his instructions and be subject, at most, to the 
mild censure of his neighbours’ (1999, 58). Just as the husband can trust his neighbours to impose 
neither ‘filters’ nor ‘penalties’ on the ways he behaves towards his wife in his own home (ibid.), the 
white manager enjoys confidence in the impairment of your ability to rise to her level in the firm’s 
hierarchy. As we saw, she knows that the many white professionals in charge of hiring decisions think 
 
11 Young also mentions Kovel’s ‘aversive racism […] of avoidance and separation’ (ibid.). This will prove relevant in 
chapter 3, where I argue that the segregating influence which domination has on agents’ socialisation into dominating 
practices explains why agents reproduce these practices and entrench domination. 
12 For examples of how managers might make life hell for employees, see e.g., Gourevitch 2018. For an excellent 
discussion of the division of labour between professionals and non-professionals as it intersects with race and gender, see 
Young 1990, 56–8 and chapter 7. 
13 As she notes, this is typically because, being poor, they ‘can’t afford childcare, depend on public transportation, and 
often hold more than one job’ (ibid.). I will return to this case in chapter 3. 
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that black employees cannot be trusted with deadlines. That she could not change this practice by 
herself is irrelevant on the republican view. 
For radicals, by contrast, it is crucial. This is why she does not dominate, on their view. If she 
could change this practice by herself, she would dominate you, since she would disempower you. But 
she cannot, so she does not. Yet neither do those who can change it dominate you, since unlike her 
they cannot be expected to foresee that the practice disempowers you: to blame them would be ‘to 
assign moral responsibility excessively widely’, as Clarissa Hayward would put it (2006, 161–62). 
The practice, however, disempowers you all the same. As Haslanger has it, ‘we don’t need a smoking 
gun’ to tell that it does (2004, 105). So while those who could change this practice would dominate 
you if they could be expected to foresee that they disempower you by failing to change it, the fact 
that they cannot be expected to do that leaves only the practice to blame. Thus radicals conclude that 
the practice itself dominates you. In other words, they look beyond your white manager’s direct 
mastery over you to focus instead on the metaracist white-dominated economy that facilitates this 
direct mastery (see Young 1990, 141; cf. Fraser 1993). 
In this first case, then, the two views differ as follows. Republicans argue that a specific agent 
dominates you because a social practice gives him direct arbitrary power over you. Radicals, by 
contrast, insist that the practice itself dominates you, because those who could change it cannot be 
expected to foresee that it disempowers you. 
 
IV. THE SECOND CASE: FEMALE PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS 
While the previous case was an instance of the core republican case, the case I offer in this section 
departs somewhat from republicanism: the practice in focus here does not enable anyone to arbitrarily 
interfere with another directly, so for republicans no-one is directly dominated. As for radicals, they 
offer the same diagnosis as above. 
Return to Fraser. In arguing that ‘[the master/subject dyad] is insufficiently structural to account 
for male dominance in late-capitalist society’, Fraser focuses on Carole Pateman’s (1988) analysis of 
the sexual contract (1993, 180). For Pateman, the sexual contract is a liberal ‘means of creating social 
relationships’ which promises women the right to use their body as they see fit, but which nevertheless 
institutes what she calls, after Adrienne Rich (1983), a ‘law of male sex-right’, which organises the 
‘orderly access by men to women’s bodies’ (1988, 5 and 2). As Fraser reads Pateman, this orderly 
access consists in ‘a series of male/female master/subject dyads’ which we need to look beyond, to 
social practices and structural processes (1993, 173). Fraser’s practices of choice are ‘sex-segmented 
labor markets, gender-structured social-welfare policy regimes, and the gender division of unpaid 
labor’ (ibid., 175). But let me follow Kathy Miriam in focusing on the law of male sex-right itself, 
and more precisely on the way in which it renders female students vulnerable to unwanted sex (2007). 
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For the way in which ‘men’s implicit right to have sexual access to [women]’ disempowers female 
students is quite different from the way Pateman suggests it disempowers wives (Miriam 2007, 224). 
In both cases, the male and female students, and the wives and husbands, who could put an end to 
this implicit law cannot be expected to foresee its effect: in particular, there are too few male and 
female students taking feminism classes. But while Pateman suggests that in some US jurisdictions 
the law of male sex-right impairs the ability of wives to resist the same agent for the duration of their 
domination, namely, their husband (1988, 7), female students, by contrast, are not rendered vulnerable 
to the same male student for the duration of their domination.14 Rather, in their case, the law of male 
sex-right typically impairs their ability to resist various male students in turn. Specifically, it 
encourages male students to harass female students until at each stage they can no longer resist any 
more of them, having resisted too many before (see Miriam 2007, 22; see also Filling unpublished, 
31–41 on sexual harassment more generally).15 Faced with unwanted advances, female students can 
say no, make an excuse, or fight if it comes to that. But eventually their energy runs out, and they 
find themselves vulnerable to the next approach.16 Or so the evidence suggests in philosophy, for 
instance – ‘the oldest of the humanities [but] also the malest […]’, as Jennifer Saul has put it (2013, 
see also her blog, 2021). 
In this case, as a female student you are unfree from a different member of a dominant group at 
each stage, a few of whom can be expected to foresee that a practice impairs your ability to resist 
some member of their group at each stage, but none of whom can be expected to foresee that he is 
the one whom you cannot resist. For you would have been able to resist him had you not exhausted 
yourself resisting others before. Specifically, you (and other female philosophy students) are unfree 
from some male student to do what you want with your body as long as some male student can force 
himself upon you at each stage because an implicit law of male sex-right encourages male students 
to harass female students until at each stage they can no longer resist any more of them. The few who 
take feminist classes can be expected to foresee this, but the vast majority cannot. In this case, radicals 
argue that you are dominated by the practice itself, just like they did above. But republicans do not 
find anyone with direct arbitrary power to focus on. 
 
14 Thus in South Carolina for instance, it would seem that a wife’s having unwanted sex with her husband while drugged, 
or drunk, does not qualify as rape in the eyes of the law (see e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marital_rape_in_the_Un
ited_States#South_Carolina, last accessed 09/04/2021). Here, the law of male sex-right impairs the ability of wives to 
resist their husband for the duration of their domination, much like the white-dominated economy from the previous 
section impairs the ability of black employees to resist their white manager.  
15 As Miriam writes, ‘[…] the assumption that men have a right of sexual access to women and girls allows for specific 
acts of coercion and aggression to take place’, even if ‘[a]s a background understanding of heteronormativity’, it ‘is not 
synonymous with those acts’ (2007, 225). 
16 Ulli Lust’s award-winning graphic novel Today is the Last Day of the Rest of Your Life (2013) offers a gripping 
description of the way women can eventually give in to some man’s unwanted advances after resisting several men’s. In 
such conditions, he need only be slightly better looking. 
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This time let us start with radicals. Radicals insist, for the same reason as above, that the members 
of your group are dominated by the practice itself: while the many agents who could change this 
practice would dominate in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, the fact that they 
cannot leaves only the practice to blame. That they cannot be expected to foresee the effects of the 
law of male sex-right is indicated by Kathy Miriam’s description of this right as an ‘implicit right to 
have sexual access to [women]’ (2007, 224, my emphasis). Jennifer Einspahr makes the same point 
when she characterises it as a ‘background assumption’ (2010, 13, my emphasis).17 Like other men 
and women today, those who could change the law of male sex-right ‘hardly notice their participation 
in practices that sustain male privilege and power, and even, sometimes, take them to be central to 
their identities’, as Haslanger puts it (2017b, 150). That a few particularly curious students taking 
feminist classes can be expected to foresee its effect does not make any difference: they could not 
change it without those who lack their insight. Yet this practice sustains male privilege and power all 
the same. 
While radicals offer a similar diagnosis as above, republicans do not. For republicans can find no 
direct master/subject dyad to zoom in on. On this view, no female student is dominated, because no 
male student has arbitrary power over any of them: no male student can interfere with any female 
student at will and with impunity, since even if a few male students might be expected to foresee that 
female students could not resist (including punish) some male student at each stage, no male student 
can be expected to foresee which female student can resist (including punish) which male student at 
each stage. For as Miriam insists, following Pateman, while female students lack sexual freedom from 
domination, they retain sexual agency (see 2007, 225; see also Einspahr 2010, 13).18 Indeed, freedom 
from some sexual interferences, to the extent that they can not only pretend to be asleep, as Miriam 
suggests (ibid., 222), but also fight or report some male students before they give in, having exhausted 
their (will)power to resist. Thus in order to have sex with them, as John Filling describes, any male 
student ‘must bide [his] time, husband [his] resources, devise fool-proof strategies, and demonstrate 
perfect execution. Even then [he] loses far more than [he] wins, [his] few victories depending on 
 
17 Both follow Adrienne Rich (1986 and 2004). See also Miriam 2007, 225: ‘[…] by sex-right we are not talking about a 
juridical right, nor are we claiming that all people explicitly believe that men have a right to women’s bodies – although 
some still do’. 
18 Jennifer Saul’s blog on women in philosophy (‘What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy’, 2021) contains various 
testimonies of female students resisting their sexual assaulters, some of whom are even professional philosophers. For 
instance, with a male student: ‘When I was a first-year graduate student, five or so years ago, I went to a large party hosted 
at a house where a few male graduate students lived together. Toward the end of the evening, I went to get my coat in one 
of the bedrooms in the house. As I was reaching to get my coat off the floor, one of these grad students came up behind 
me and grabbed my breasts. In shock, I didn’t move, I didn’t breathe. This person proceeded to grope me for a couple 
more seconds before I turned around and pushed him away and bolted out of the room’ (‘On being groped’, February 
2013). Or again, this time involving a professor: ‘On the way back to the APA, he said he was going to his hotel room to 
show me a book on women philosophers which he thought might interest me. I accompanied him to the room, where he 
proceeded to wrestle me onto the bed saying “don’t worry, it’s okay, this is okay.” Thanks to my martial arts training, I 
fought him off and fled the room’ (‘Dear APA, thanks for the memories’, November 2010).  
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forces [he] can neither control nor predict. […] Their power isn’t arbitrary – it’s aleatory’ 
(unpublished, 38).19 
In this case, then, the implicit law of male sex-right does not give anyone direct arbitrary power 
over another – here at least it seems to organise a rather disorderly ‘access by men to women’s 
bodies’, contra Pateman (1988, 2). For this reason, while republicans argue that this law itself 
dominates female students, republicans would not see it as the kind of ‘customary practice’ which, in 
Pettit’s words, ‘can indirectly facilitate the worst forms of […] domination in a society’ (2012, 63). 
  
V. THE THIRD CASE: THE MARKET 
Notice, however, that republicans might argue that, in the case above, those who can but who do not 
mitigate the effects of the practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power. Recall from the first section that 
someone dominates you indirectly when they can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs 
your ability to resist them or someone else, but nonetheless fail to mitigate these effects at will and 
with impunity. Those few surprisingly feminist male students who can be expected to foresee that the 
law of male sex-right impairs the ability of female students to resist some male student at each stage 
are a case in point: they fail to mitigate the effects of this law on the female students they know, and 
no one even blames them for it, not to mention stronger forms of resistance and punishment.20 Female 
students resist (including punish) the direct interference of some of them, as we saw above, but not 
this kind of indirect interference. For this reason, the law of male sex-right ‘may amount to an indirect, 
structural form of invasion’, in Pettit’s words, ‘as distinct from the direct, personal form of invasion 
that it occasions, where ‘we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with hindrances that reflect 
the will of another as to what you should do’ (2012, 44 and 39). By way of contrast, in this section I 
present a case where republicans cannot even suggest that those who can but who fail to mitigate the 
effects of the practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power as a result: here, no one can be expected to 
foresee the disempowering effects of the practice at issue, viz. the market. 
Imagine that you are a worker. For radicals, economic relations too have shifted ‘from dyadic 
relations of mastery and subjection to more impersonal structural mechanisms’, in Fraser’s words 
(1993, 180). Indeed, they have for some time now. While ‘in precapitalist societies domination [was] 
overt and accomplished through directly political means’, as Young writes, ‘[c]apitalist society, on 
 
19 Filling is writing about men and women in general, but the case applies to male and female philosophy students in 
particular – indeed, particularly well, this environment being, as many have noted, ‘hypermasculine’ (e.g., Haslanger 
2008, 217). 
20 Note also that, while female students could also mitigate the effects of the law of male sex-right, and to this extent can 
also indirectly interfere with themselves or other female students, they would not indirectly self-dominate (should 
republicans be interested in this kind of auto-domination), since they cannot mitigate the effects of this law at will and 
with impunity: as David Graeber points out, ‘it is widely noted, for instance, that rates of sexual assault increase 
dramatically at precisely the moments when women begin challenging “gender norms” of work, comportment, or dress’ 
(2015, 60), and the law of male sex-right is one of these gender norms. 
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the other hand, removes traditional juridically enforced class distinctions and promotes a belief in the 
legal freedom of persons’ (1990, 47). At the same time, though, it lets the market organise 
‘exploitation’, understood as the systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that 
impairs the ability of workers not to work for some capitalist (ibid., 48). In other words, the market 
puts workers and capitalists in the same position relative to each other as the law of male sex-right 
did with female and male philosophy students. The difference is that workers and capitalists are not 
in the same position relative to the market as students are relative to the law of male sex-right. As 
philosophy students with access to feminist classes, female students and at least a few male students 
can be expected to foresee that this law impairs the ability of female students to resist some male 
student at each stage. By contrast, workers and capitalists as such cannot be expected to foresee that 
the market organises a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that disempowers 
workers. As Young and others have suggested, the market explains why there can be class domination 
in the absence not just of the kind of ‘legally […] sanctioned’ group distinctions that are also absent 
in hyper-masculine philosophy departments, but even of any ‘normatively sanctioned’ group 
distinction like the law of male sex-right: class domination is a ‘mystery’ which no class can be 
expected to unravel (see e.g., Young 1990, 48). Indeed, the exact workings of exploitation remains a 
mystery for many Marxist scholars themselves. 
In this case, as in the previous one, you are unfree from a different member of the dominant group 
at each stage because a social practice impairs the ability of members of your group to resist some 
member of the other group at each stage. But here, not even a few members of the dominant group 
can be expected to foresee that the practice has this effect on you, any more than those who could 
change this practice can. Specifically, as a worker the market impairs your ability not to work for 
some capitalist at each stage by organising a systematic transfer of resources from workers to 
capitalists, but here not even a few members of any of the classes that could put an end to the market 
can be expected to foresee that it has this effect on you. In this case as in the previous two cases, 
radicals argue that the practice that disempowers you, the market, dominates you. But here 
republicans cannot suggest that those who can but fail to mitigate the effects of this practice enjoy 
indirect arbitrary power as a result: no one can be expected to foresee the disempowering effects of 
the market. 
Let us once again consider radicals’ explanation first. Radicals insist that the practice itself 
dominates you, on the now familiar grounds that those who could change it cannot be expected to 
foresee that it disempowers you. As we saw Young suggest, the absence of both legally and 
normatively sanctioned class distinctions makes class domination a ‘mystery’ (1990, 48).21 Marx 
 
21 Again, this is not to say that no worker or capitalist foresees that the market organises a systematic transfer of resources 
from workers to capitalists – only that they cannot be expected to. 
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himself makes a similar point when he writes that ‘[t]he silent compulsion of economic relations sets 
the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker’: ‘[i]n the ordinary run of things, the 
worker can be left to the “natural laws of production” […]’ (Capital 1976, I, 899, my emphases). It 
all happens somehow behind the back of workers and capitalists, noiselessly – indeed so much so that 
they often regard structural domination as merely the way things are (see Filling unpublished, 23–
26). They may even come to think that the market ‘operates like a force of nature’, much like Pettit 
does when, of a bank that is withholding a loan, he writes that it ‘is merely doing what banks have to 
do […]’ (2014, 50–51; see also Lovett 2010, 41–42, and 69).22 
Indeed, it is for the same reason that Pettit and other republicans do not find any power of arbitrary 
interference to focus on, direct or indirect. Here as above they would not find any direct power of 
arbitrary interference because no capitalist could get workers to work for her at will and with 
impunity: no capitalist can be expected to foresee which worker could work for (or quit) which 
capitalist at each stage. But here republicans would not find any indirect power of interference either, 
for any capitalist who could indirectly interfere with her workers at will and with impunity (by failing 
to mitigate the disempowering effects of the market on her workers) could not do it intentionally: no 
capitalist, we just saw, can be expected to foresee that the market impairs the ability of workers to 
resist some capitalist in this respect at any stage.23 As Pettit puts it, the property distribution organised 
by the market has ‘the aspect of an environment akin to the natural environment’: while ‘it will 
certainly affect the range or the ease with which people enjoy their status as undominated agents, and 
it may warrant complaint on that account, […] it will not itself be a source of domination […] so far 
as it is the cumulative, unintended effect of people’s mutual adjustments’ (2006, 139). Each capitalist 
may well indirectly interfere with each worker at will and with impunity, as they fail to mitigate the 
disempowering effect which the market has on them. But this does not qualify as indirect domination 
by republican standards, since none of them can be said to intend this indirect interference. The market 
only ‘facilitates the [arbitrary] invasion by some people of the choices available to others’ (2012, 44). 
Unlike the law of male sex-right as understood by feminist male students, it does not amount to ‘an 
indirect, structural form of [arbitrary] invasion […] distinct from the direct, personal form of 
[arbitrary] invasion that it occasions’ (ibid.). 
In this third and final case, then, republicans cannot even suggest that those who can but who fail 
to mitigate the effects of the practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power as a result: no one can be expected 
 
22 I look in more detail at something like this kind of naturalisation when I focus on fetishism in chapter 4.  
23 Note that insofar as for republicans an interference is by definition intentional, from a republican perspective we should 
say that while each capitalist may indirectly worsen the choice set of workers at will and with impunity by failing to 
challenge the market, this does not count as an indirect interference by republican standards, since none of them can be 
expected to foresee that the market impairs the ability of workers not to work for some capitalist at each stage. 
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to foresee the disempowering effects of the practice. Here there is no domination at all for republicans. 
But there is for radicals.  
This concludes my introduction to the radical view of structural domination. I have not argued in 
favour of this conception against the republican one, but only used the latter as a counterpoint to 
clarify the former. Nor have I tried to offer an exhaustive analysis of all cases in which radicals might 
argue that structural domination obtains. I have only presented three of them, which are crucial to our 
understanding of the way in which the radical conception differs from the republican one. 
These three cases will form the basis of my analysis in the next chapters of the ways in which 
socialisation can entrench structural domination. For while the many agents who could but fail to 
change dominating practices do not themselves dominate, we will see that they still play an important 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTRADICTORY SOCIALISATION: A PROBLEM FOR THE SOCIALISATION 
CONCEPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I offered an account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social 
groups by social practices. In this chapter, I turn to the widespread view that the entrenchment of 
structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into these practices (e.g., Haslanger 2017a, 
Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010). I argue that while this view is promising, the account of socialisation 
it relies on needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. The 
proponents of this socialisation conception of entrenchment (henceforth, the PSCs) seem to neglect 
the fact that theirs is an account of contradictory socialisation, where its contradictions should in 
principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change. 
I argue as follows. In section I, I focus on the entrenchment of structural domination. We saw in 
the previous chapter that for radicals, to dominate someone is to disempower them, where typically 
social practices themselves do the dominating. In particular, those who could change these practices 
cannot usually be said to dominate, to the extent that they cannot be expected to foresee the effects 
of these practices. Yet even if those who could change these practices do not themselves dominate, I 
suggest, it is important to realise that they still entrench structural domination as they fail to change 
them. To illustrate this claim I return to the white professionals and their black employees, the male 
and female philosophy students, and the workers and capitalists we met in the previous chapter. The 
white professionals who could but do not change the biased hiring practice that impairs the ability of 
black employees to rise to their manager’s level in the division of labour entrench the domination of 
black employees. Likewise, the male and female philosophy students who could but do not challenge 
the law of male sex-right that impairs the ability of female students to not have unwanted sex with 
some male student(s) entrench the domination of female students. And finally, the same goes for 
workers and capitalists: as they could but do not change the market, which organises a systematic 
transfer of resources from workers to capitalists, one that impairs the ability of workers to resist some 
capitalist(s), they entrench the domination of workers. 
But why is it that those who could change these practices fail to do so? In section II, I turn to the 
view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into 
dominating practices. On this view, those who could change these practices fail to do so largely 
because they are taught the schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these practices are 
enacted. If, for example, the female philosophy students who could challenge the law of male sex-
right in effect in their department do not challenge it, on this view, it is because the behaviour of their 
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fellow male students at college parties confirms this law to them. Likewise, the workers and capitalists 
who could organise production and exchange differently fail to do so because what they exchange at 
work confirms the schema that things are commodities simpliciter. And if the white professionals do 
not change their biased hiring practice, in the same vein, it is because they too find some justification 
at work for its schema that black employees just are unreliable. 
Yet this view, I argue in section III, faces the problem which I will spend the rest of the thesis 
attempting to solve: if, as the proponents of this view suggest, socialisation is contradictory, then it is 
unclear how socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination. For on this 
view, those who could change these practices should be expected to frequent not just milieux that 
confirm their schemas, but also milieux that challenge them, which makes it unclear exactly how their 
socialisation into these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. Thus on this 
view, the workers and capitalists who could, but do not, organise production and exchange differently 
should be expected to exchange not only commodities in the workplace but also favours with 
neighbours, and gifts with friends or family. This confuses the role played by their socialisation into 
the market in the entrenchment of its domination. Likewise, the white professionals who could change 
their biased hiring practice should be expected, not just to deal with apparently unreliable black 
employees, but also to experience the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black 
employees, and so it is unclear how exactly their socialisation makes them reproduce this practice. 
The same goes for the female students who could but do not challenge the law of male sex-right: they 
should be expected to frequent not only college parties, but also feminist classes, which should help 
them challenge this law. 
Finally, in section IV, I consider and reject three purported solutions to this problem, before 
suggesting the beginning of the solution that I will develop in the rest of this thesis. If socialisation 
into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, I argue, it is not because all milieux 
confirm the schemas of these practices, or because the challenges raised by some milieux go 
unnoticed, or again because these challenges do not prompt critical thinking. Rather, as we will see 
in the following chapters, it is because structural domination itself enables socialisation to entrench 
domination, by having various influences on socialisation: a segregating, standardising, or a 
repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at hand. The socialisation of white 
professionals in their biased hiring practice can only entrench the domination of this practice over 
black employees, for instance, because this domination has segregated white professionals and black 
employees into two groups, who live such different lives that white professionals do not experience 
the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black employees. Similarly, the socialisation 
of workers and capitalists in the market can only entrench the domination of the market because this 
domination encourages them and their workers to make commodity exchange the standard not just at 
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work, but also with neighbours and friends, in order to maximise profit. And the socialisation of 
female philosophy students in the law of male sex-right can only entrench the domination of this law, 
finally, because this domination enables male students to repress what female students learn from the 
women’s study groups that should help them challenge this implicit law.24 
 
I. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION 
I focus in this section on the entrenchment of structural domination, the term I use to refer to the 
important role played in domination by those who could, but do not, change dominating practices, 
even if they do not themselves dominate. To illustrate this role, I return to the male and female 
philosophy students, the white professionals and their black employees, and the workers and 
capitalists we met in the previous chapter. 
In that chapter, I introduced the radical conception of structural domination by contrasting it to its 
widespread republican counterpart. On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary 
power over them, thanks to a social practice that disempowers them. On the radical view, by contrast, 
to dominate someone is to disempower them, meaning that the practice itself dominates them, 
whether or not anyone has arbitrary power over them as a result. Importantly, while those who could 
change this practice would dominate in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, they 
cannot be expected to do this, and so they do not dominate. 
  Return for example to the black employees from the previous chapter, whose white manager 
can order them around at will and with impunity, thanks to a biased hiring practice that impairs their 
ability to ever rise to her level in the division of labour. While republicans focus on their white 
manager, radicals look beyond her to the biased hiring practice that disempowers them. The many 
white professionals who could change this practice do not themselves dominate, on their view, since 
they cannot be expected to foresee that the practice impairs the ability of black employees to ever rise 
to her level in the division of labour. 
The same goes for the two other examples I focused on in the previous chapter: the female 
philosophy students whose ability not to have unwanted sex with some male student is impaired by 
the law of male sex-right in effect in their department, and the workers whose ability not to work for 
some capitalist is impaired by the systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that is 
organised by the market. Unlike the black employees from the previous example, no one has arbitrary 
power over them, not even indirectly in the case of the workers.25 But like the black employees, they 
 
24 Male students, for their part, are ‘segregated’ from such classes, much as white professionals are ‘segregated’ from the 
milieux that would help them correct their ideological schemas (see chapter 3).     
25 Both male students and capitalists lack direct arbitrary power over, respectively, female students and workers, since 
they cannot be expected to foresee which member of the dominated group will be unable to resist which member of their 
(dominant) group at each stage. A few male students enjoy indirect arbitrary power over the female students they know, 
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are dominated by the practice that disempowers them (the market or the law of male sex-right). They 
are not dominated by those who could change this practice (workers and capitalists or male and female 
students), and this is because the latter cannot be expected to foresee its effects.26 
It does not follow, however, that those who could but fail to change dominating practices do not 
play an important part in structural domination. Even if they do not themselves dominate, they still 
entrench structural domination as they fail to change these practices. We saw in the previous chapter 
that domination spans an extended period of time; specifically, it lasts as long as the relevant 
practice(s) remain unchanged. Thus even if those who could change dominating practices do not 
themselves dominate, their role in structural domination remains crucial: when they fail to change the 
dominating practices, they make domination last. Put differently, they entrench domination as they 
fail to change these practices. 
Return once again to the white professionals from the example above. Even if they do not 
themselves dominate black employees, they could change the biased hiring practice that impairs the 
ability of black employees to rise to their manager’s level in the division of labour. But they fail to 
change this practice. And as long as they do, they make the domination of black employees last. In 
other words, they entrench the domination of black employees, even if they do not dominate these 
employees.  
Likewise, the male and female philosophy students who could but do not challenge the law of 
male sex-right, which impairs the ability of female students not to have unwanted sex with some male 
student, entrench the domination of female students, even if they do not dominate them (or 
themselves, in the case of female students). The same goes for workers and capitalists: as they could 
but do not change the market, whose systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists 
impairs the ability of workers to resist some capitalist(s), they entrench the domination of workers, 
even if they do not dominate them (or themselves, again, in the case of workers). 
Now, for anyone interested in minimising structural domination, this raises a crucial question. 
Why exactly do those who could change dominating practices entrench the domination of these 
practices? Why do workers and capitalists fail to change the market, so that it stops organising a 
systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists? Why do male and female students in 
philosophy fail to revoke the law of male sex-right? Why do white professionals fail to rectify their 
biased hiring practices? Repression, no doubt, is part of the reason, as are collective action problems 
 
we saw in the previous chapter, insofar as they can be expected to foresee the effects that the law of male sex-right has 
on them but still fail to mitigate these effects at will and with impunity. By contrast, no capitalist enjoys indirect arbitrary 
power over their workers: they cannot be expected to foresee the effects the market has on them, the systematic transfer 
of resources by means of which it does this being a mystery (see Young 1990, 48).  
26 Put differently, they cannot be assigned moral responsibility. But this is not to say that they are entirely off the hook. 
While they do not dominate, they entrench domination, and to this extent incur political responsibility (see Young 2011, 
Hayward 2006, Jugov and Ypi 2019). 
  33 
 
(see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21, and Haslanger 2017b, 160). But in the next section I focus instead on 
the view, widespread in critical theory, that the entrenchment of structural domination is also largely 
due to our socialisation into dominating practices. 
 
II. THE SOCIALISATION CONCEPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL 
DOMINATION 
On this view, those who could change these practices fail to do so largely because they are taught the 
schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these practices are enacted. Put differently, these 
milieux confirm or justify these schemas to them. 
Most proponents of the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to 
our socialisation into dominating practices frame this view in terms of ideology. On this 
understanding, ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are 
socialised into them: to what Stuart Hall calls ‘the concepts and language of practical thought 
which stabilise a particular form of power and domination’ (1996, 24, quoted in Haslanger 2017b, 
149; see also Celikates 2016, Haslanger 2017a).27  On this view, as Sally Haslanger puts it, 
domination can be ‘repressive, that is, forced upon individuals through coercive measures’ but it 
is also largely ‘ideological, that is, enacted unthinkingly or even willingly by the subordinated or 
privileged’ (Haslanger 2017b, 149; see also Celikates 2016, 21).28 I will focus on ideology in the 
next chapter, but the problem should be framed in terms of socialisation. This is so for two reasons. 
First, not all the proponents of the view under discussion formulate it in terms of ideology (e.g., 
Einspahr 2010). Second, the sociologists they draw on for their account of socialisation do not tend 
to frame their views in this way either (e.g., Sewell 1992, Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1977). 
I start with this account of socialisation, before turning to its application in what I have called 
the socialisation conception of structural domination. This account of socialisation is largely 
William Sewell’s (1992), who himself draws on Anthony Giddens’s conception of structures and 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus (Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1977). As Sewell puts it, one 
of its main advantages is that it ‘overcomes the divide between semiotic and materialist visions of 
[social practices] (1992, 1).29 Social practices, on this view, are ‘collective enterprises’ in which 
agents coordinate around (e.g., use, allocate) resources on the basis of shared schemas. Schemas 
can be beliefs, rules, scripts, or ways of thinking. Resources can be virtually anything, including 
 
27 Not all the proponents of this view would follow Haslanger (2004) in saying that the practices themselves dominate, 
hence the definition of ideology as ‘the schemas of unjust (e.g., dominating) practices’. Einspahr (2010), for instance, 
would rather say that they only cause domination. As we saw in chapter 1, I follow Haslanger in this respect.  
28 Haslanger speaks of ‘oppression’ here, but by she uses the term interchangeably with ‘group domination’ (see e.g., on 
the next page, 2017b, 150, or 2004, 1).  
29 Here and below, I will follow Haslanger in speaking of ‘social practices’ when Sewell speaks of ‘structures’ (see 
Haslanger, 2017c, 21). 
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other agents and schemas (Haslanger 2004, 104; see also 2017c, and Sewell 1992, 7–9).30 On this 
analysis, to be socialised into social practices is to be ‘t[aught]’ or ‘inculcate[d]’ their schemas by 
the milieux in which they are enacted, because these milieux – or the resources they consist in – 
‘embody’ or ‘actualise’ their schemas (Sewell 1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c, 22 and 
2017a, 7).31 This in turn explains why social practices can be seen as ‘mutually sustaining schemas 
and resources’, as Sewell puts it (1992, 19).  
More precisely, socialisation is the last step of a three-step process. First, agents who coordinate 
around resources thanks to schemas modify the material environment in accordance with these 
schemas.32 To borrow an example from Sewell, ‘the extent and kinds of resources generated by [and 
making up] a factory will depend on whether it is owned by an individual capitalist or by a workers’ 
cooperative – in other words, on rules defining the nature of property rights and of workplace 
authority’ (1992, 12). As a result, second, the milieux in which these practices are enacted come to 
embody, or actualise, the schemas thanks to which the practices are enacted. As Sewell continues, ‘a 
factory is not an inert pile of bricks, wood, and metal. It incorporates or actualises schemas’ (ibid., 
13). But what this means in turn is, third, ‘that the schemas can be inferred from the material form of 
the factory. The factory gate, the punching-in station, the design of the assembly line: all of these 
features of the factory teach and validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract’ (ibid., 13). That is, 
they socialise agents into this schema.  
The reason why agents turn their social practices into ‘mutually sustaining schemas and 
resources’, then, is that ‘[since] resources are instantiations or embodiments of schemas, they 
therefore inculcate and justify the schemas as well’ (ibid., 19 and 13). With this account of 
socialisation in mind, let me now turn to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination 
depends largely on agents’ socialisation into dominating practices. 
As noted above, most proponents of this view frame it in terms of ideology, where ideology 
refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised in them. Consider 
Haslanger’s discussion of racism, for example. ‘What explains the presence and persistence of 
[…] racist beliefs [and other such psychological processes]? It would seem that explanatory work 
is being done by the idea that we (collectively) “absorb” ideology through socialization’: ‘[t]o 
become a participant in the social domain, one must learn how to differentiate signal from noise 
in order to communicate and coordinate’, and ‘[s]ignals depend on information encoded in material 
 
30 On this view, institutions are a kind of social practice, whose schemas are formalised (e.g., into explicit rules, as opposed 
to vaguer scripts or norms).  
31 Put differently, agents are caught up in ‘material-symbolic feedback loops’ where resources are effects of schemas and 
schemas effects of resources (Einspahr 2010, 8; see also Sewell 1992, 13). As Haslanger argues, the crucial role played 
by these loops on this understanding of social practices and socialisation does not sit well with the standard models of 
individualist social ontology (Haslanger 2020c; cf. List and Spiekermann 2013). 
32 As Young puts it, ‘the accumulated effects of past actions and decisions have left their mark in the physical world’ 
(2011, 55). 
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things, relations, and processes’ (2017a, 8 and 7). In other words, ‘[w]e learn about race and what 
different races “deserve” by looking around us’ (ibid., 17). 
Likewise, Robin Celikates endorses the same account of ‘the structural dimension of ideology’ 
(2016, 10). Thus he writes, for example, that ‘[t]he fact that many people perceive and navigate 
the world in ways that are mediated by binary gender schemas manifests itself in the layout of 
social space (including built social space), which in turn actualizes and confirms the corresponding 
schemas (only think of toilets in most public buildings)’ (ibid., 9). 
Not all proponents of this view frame it as ideology critique, however. Consider Jennifer 
Einspahr, who endorses Bourdieu’s claim that ‘the close correspondence between structure and 
agency (or in Bourdieu's terminology, field and habitus [and in ours, milieux (and their resources) 
and schemas]) allows conditions of domination to persist because they become embedded in 
individuals at the level of everyday practice’ (2010, 6). ‘In other words’, she continues, ‘agents 
tend to reproduce the given structures because they have been produced and habituated by those 
very structures’ (ibid.; see also 5).33 Thus ‘women were denied access to education based on their 
purported irrationality’, for example, ‘but women were in fact being made ‘irrational’ precisely 
because they were being denied access to education’ (ibid., 7).34  
Other examples abound. If the female philosophy students we met earlier fail to challenge the 
law of male sex-right, on this view, it is because the behaviour of their fellow male students, in 
particular, confirms it to them. This often happens at college parties: as a contributor to Jennifer 
Saul’s famous blog reports, for instance, ‘one of [the] grad students [who had organised the 
party] came up behind me and grabbed my breasts. […] [He] proceeded to grope me for a couple 
more seconds before I turned around and pushed him around and bolted out of the room’ (Saul 
2021; see also Miriam 2007, 212–13).35 In these cases, as Kathy Miriam would put it, they ‘see 
themselves as making decisions in a situation where one factor seems to have been (tacitly) decided 
on in advance and is thus nonnegotiable, namely, men’s right to have sex with them’ (ibid., 222). 
This also socialises male students into this implicit law, ‘wholly absorbed in their own 
gratification’ as they are (ibid., 224). 
The same goes for the white professionals who could but do not change the biased hiring 
practice that dominates black employees. As Haslanger suggests, they too find justification for its 
schema that blacks cannot be trusted with ‘deadline-sensitive professional work’ because, for 
 
33 All these authors speak more or less interchangeably of socialisation and ‘material-symbolic feedback loops’ (Einspahr 
2010, 7; see also Celikates 2016, 9, and Haslanger 2017a, 17, all of whom draw on Sewell 1992, 13). Though the concept 
of a feedback loop is enlightening in its own right, the concept of socialisation has the advantage of focusing on the core 
of the loop: the agents themselves, who both learn the schemas from the resources and enable the resources to teach the 
schemas (by organising them thanks to these schemas).  
34 As Einspahr notes (ibid.), this argument was first made by Mary Wollstonecraft (2004 [1792]). 
35  This story is accessible at https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/on-being-groped/ (last 
accessed 09/04/2021). I already mentioned it in chapter 1. 
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structural reasons, blacks might indeed be less likely to meet deadlines at work than whites (2017a, 
4).36 Likewise for the workers and capitalists who could challenge the market: if they fail to do so, 
on this view, it is because what they exchange at work confirms the current way of organising 
production and exchange. ‘[T]he punching-in station’, for example, does not just ‘teach and 
validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract’, as we saw Sewell write: it also inculcates the 
schema that things, including their very own ability to work, are nothing more than commodities 
(1992, 13). 
On the socialisation conception of entrenchment, then, the entrenchment of structural 
domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices: while repression and 
collective action problems no doubt play a role, those who could change these practices fail to do 
so largely because they are taught the schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these 
practices are enacted. As we will see in the next section, however, this view faces an important 
internal problem – the problem which I will spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve. 
 
III. THE PROBLEM 
The account of socialisation on which the socialisation conception of entrenchment relies needs to be 
amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. More precisely, I argue in this 
section that those who put forward this view seem to neglect the fact that on this account socialisation 
is contradictory, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, 
further, social change. Specifically, on this view those who could change dominating practices should 
be expected to frequent not just milieux that confirm the schemas of these practices, but also milieux 
that challenge them, which makes it unclear how exactly their socialisation into these practices 
contributes to entrenching structural domination. 
This problem is internal to the socialisation conception of entrenchment: as the proponents of this 
view define socialisation, it is unclear how socialisation can explain the entrenchment of structural 
domination. To be clear, I do not have a problem with the way in which they define socialisation. I 
only want to insist that they do not pay enough attention to the way in which, on this very definition, 
it is contradictory, and for this reason allows, in principle, for social change. More precisely, what 
we saw above of Sewell’s analysis of socialisation is only one part of the story: the other part shows 
that more work is needed to explain how socialisation can entrench structural domination, and the 
proponents of the socialisation conception endorse both parts. I will now elaborate on this internal 
problem. 
 
36 As she notes, this is typically because, being poor, they ‘can’t afford childcare, depend on public transportation, and 
often hold more than one job’ (ibid.). I will return to this case in chapter 3.  
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Return to Sewell. As we saw above, the reason why social practices consist in ‘mutually sustaining 
schemas and resources’, he writes, is that ‘if resources are instantiations or embodiments of schemas, 
they therefore inculcate and justify the schemas as well’ (1992, 19 and 13). But as he immediately 
goes on to insist, ‘their reproduction is never automatic. [They] are at risk, at least to some extent, in 
all of the social encounters they shape – because [they] are multiple and intersecting, because schemas 
are transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably’ (ibid., 19). 
Put differently, agents may be taught the schema of a given practice by some milieu in which it is 
enacted, as we saw in the previous section, but chances are that another milieu in which a second 
practice is enacted will teach them otherwise. This in turn should enable them to question, perhaps 
even change, the first practice thanks to the second. For as Sewell puts it, ‘the schemas to which actors 
have access […] can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context 
in which they are initially learned’ (ibid., 17). 
Let me take things one step at a time. What must be emphasised first is that, as Haslanger herself 
remarks, ‘[i]ndividuals grow up, study, work, play, and live in different contexts that rely on different 
social practices. These practices involve different presuppositions, modes of interaction, and 
conceptual repertoires. Not all of them are consistent’ (2017a, 11, referencing Sewell 2005, 52–58). 
For not only is it ‘no longer plausible to claim that the world is composed of ‘societies’ with their 
own ‘cultures’, as Haslanger writes elsewhere (2017b, 153; see also Philips 2006, 2007), even the 
‘cultural worlds’ that remain, in Sewell’s words this time, ‘are commonly beset with internal 
contradictions’ (Sewell 2005, 53; see also 1992, 16). As Haslanger points out, for example, ‘women 
who work both inside and outside the home often recognize that the expectations and modes of 
interaction in these two contexts are quite different; in other words, there is a different culture at work 
than at home […]’ (2017a, 11).37 
Now, this would not be a problem for the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is 
largely due to socialisation, second, if actors were unable to transpose their ‘wide range of different 
and even incompatible schemas’ from one milieu to another (Sewell 1992, 17). But they are. As 
Sewell continues, ‘[i]n ordinary speech one cannot be said to really know a rule simply because one 
can apply it mechanically to repeated instances of the same case. Whether we are speaking of rules 
of grammar, mathematics, law, etiquette, or carpentry, the real test of knowing a rule is to be able to 
apply it successfully in unfamiliar cases. Knowledge of a rule or a schema by definition means the 
ability to transpose or extend it – that is, to apply it creatively’ (ibid., 17–18). In other words, it is not 
 
37 Indeed, even the cultural worlds we might have taken to be relatively homogeneous are eminently contradictory. To 
borrow an example from Sewell, ‘[o]ne need look no farther than the central Christian symbol of the Trinity, which 
attempts to unify in one symbolic figure three sharply distinct and largely incompatible possibilities of Christian religious 
experience: authoritative and hierarchical orthodoxy (the Father), loving egalitarianism and grace (the Son), and ecstatic 
spontaneity (the Holy Ghost)’ (2005, 53; see also 1992, 16). 
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as though the schemas which we learn from a milieu in which a given practice is enacted cannot 
provide us with insight about another milieu organised according to another practice. They can.38 
Insofar as ‘there is a different culture at work than at home’, Haslanger herself suggests, ‘[…] women 
often notice how changes both at home and at work could make each milieu better, such as more 
flexible scheduling at work and more fair and explicit divisions of labor at home’ (2017a, 11). 
It is for this reason, third, that the reproduction of social practices ‘is never automatic’, as we saw 
Sewell insist above (1992). This is why ‘[they] are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social 
encounters they shape’ (ibid.). Borrowing from another anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, we can 
say that to be socialised into social practices is to stand in relation to them like the ‘odd-job man’ 
(bricoleur) does to the jobs he has to do: as Haslanger comments, we ‘us[e] whatever tools are 
available in new and unexpected ways’ (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 17, Haslanger 2017b, 154; see also Balkin 
1998, 24).39 And when the old ways are no longer ‘empowered or regenerated by resources’, as 
Sewell concludes, they are eventually ‘abandoned and forgotten’, just as ‘resources without cultural 
schemas to direct their use […] eventually dissipate and decay’ (1992, 13; see also Einspahr 2010, 
5). 
In short, then, on Sewell’s account socialisation is contradictory, and its contradictions should in 
principle allow for critical consciousness, and eventually social change. As Einspahr approvingly 
comments, ‘Sewell argues that [social practices] shape our possibilities for action in important ways, 
but never in a way that is fixed or closed, where [social practices] are not susceptible to change. In 
particular, the transposability of schemas creates the possibility that the exercise of agency will 
produce change […]’ (Einspahr 2010, 5; see Sewell 1992, 13; see also Celikates 2016, 20).40 Or as 
Haslanger puts it: ‘the fragmentation of social life and the inevitability of occupying multiple social 
roles provides opportunities for leveraging insights from one practice to critique another or for subtly 
shifting practices and norms’ (2017a, 11). 
But this, I want to emphasise now, is a problem for the view that the entrenchment of structural 
domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices. More precisely, if those who 
could change dominating practices should be expected to frequent, not just milieux that confirm the 
 
38 Sewell’s claim that ‘[k]nowledge of a rule or a schema by definition means the ability to transpose or extend it’ suggests 
that there are two ways agents may gain critical insight on one milieu from another, depending on whether the two milieux 
‘are similarly shaped’, as Bourdieu puts it (Sewell 1992, 17, Bourdieu 1977, 83). Either the two milieux are of similar 
shape, and agents only have to extend the schema from the one to the other: in Sewell’s term, to generalise it, where ‘[t]o 
generalise a rule implies stating it in more abstract form so that it will apply to a larger number of cases’ (1992, 17n9). 
Or the two milieux are not similarly shaped – as Sewell notes, this must be determined on a case by case basis – in which 
case agents will have to transpose the schema from the one to the other, where this ‘implies a concrete application of a 
rule to a new case, but in such a way that the rule will have subtly different forms in each of its applications’ (ibid.). 
39 See also Lessig 1995, 949n19 on social construction. 
40 Einspahr adds: ‘Sewell defines agency as “entailing the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts”, a 
capacity “inherent in the knowledge of cultural schemas that characterise all minimally competent members of society”’ 
(ibid., quoting him at 1992, 13).  
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schemas of these practices, but also milieux that challenge them, then it is unclear how the 
confirmation these agents find for these schemas can explain why they fail to change these practices. 
Public toilets may well actualise and confirm a binary gender schema, as we saw Celikates suggest 
(2016, 9). But private toilets, which are not gender segregated, should challenge this schema; and this 
complicates the role played by socialisation in the entrenchment of a strict gender divide. 
The same goes for the three examples I emphasised above. Return for instance to the workers and 
capitalists who could challenge the market but do not, allegedly, because what they exchange at work 
inculcates into them the schema that things – even their very own labour power – are nothing more 
than commodities (1992, 13). With the two sides of Sewell’s account of socialisation in mind, we 
should expect them to exchange not only commodities in the workplace, but also favours with 
neighbours, and gifts with friends or family. Yet insofar as the schemas according to which gifts or 
favours are exchanged contradict the schema that things are nothing more than commodities, we are 
left wondering how exactly their socialisation at work can explain why they fail to challenge the 
market.41 
The same goes for the white professionals who could but fail to change the biased hiring 
practice that dominates black employees because the black employees they frequent at work might 
indeed fail to meet deadlines, as we saw Haslanger suggest (2017a, 4). On Sewell’s account of 
socialisation, they should be expected not just to deal with apparently unreliable black employees, 
but also to experience the hurdles that explain the latter’s apparent unreliability: being reliant on 
public transports, working surrounded by children, or having more than one job, etc. (see 
Haslanger, ibid.). If so, however, it is unclear what work their socialisation in the workplace is 
really doing in the explanation of the entrenchment of their biased hiring practice.  
A similar worry arises with respect to female philosophy students, who would be more inclined 
to challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department if the behaviour of their fellow 
male students did not confirm this law to them. At college parties in particular, men’s right to have 
sex with them may seem ‘to have been (tacitly) decided on in advance and [to be] thus 
nonnegotiable’, as we saw Miriam put it (2007, 222). But this cannot be the whole story, any more 
than it is in the examples above. As Miriam emphasises, the same female students may well be 
‘self-defined feminists, many of whom have taken women’s studies classes and have some analysis 
of the relation between rape, male power, and women’s oppression’ (ibid., 223, original emphasis). 
The same point applies to male students, if to a lesser extent, insofar as we should expect a few 
 
41 The gift schema is the basic ‘communist’ schema of ‘from each according to their means, to each according to their 
needs’. As to the favour schema, it can be described by the colloquial phrase ‘you owe me one’, where ‘one’ is a rough, 
inexact, up-to-us equivalent of the help given (see Graeber 2011, chapter 5). Both schemas differ from the commodity 
schema, where only mathematically strict equivalents are exchanged, at a price which is not up to any of the exchangers 
but determined by the market. 
  40 
 
(particularly curious) male students to attend such classes. Either way, it is unclear how exactly 
their socialisation at college parties can explain why they fail to challenge the law of male sex-
right. 
It seems to me, therefore, that the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely 
due to our socialisation into dominating practices faces an important problem: those who propound 
this view seem to neglect the fact that on the account of socialisation they rely on, socialisation is 
contradictory, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, 
further, social change. 
I spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve this problem. I will end the next section 
suggesting how I intend to do this. Before I do that, however, let me first consider and reject three 
purported solutions.  
 
IV. SOME SOLUTIONS, REJECTED, AND THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER ONE 
If our socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, I argue in this last 
section, it is not because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, or because the challenges 
raised by some milieux go unnoticed, or again because these challenges do not prompt critical 
thinking. Rather, I suggest, it is because structural domination itself has a certain influence on 
socialisation: a segregating, standardising, or repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the 
case at hand. In other words, structural domination enables socialisation to entrench structural 
domination, in a loop.  
The first purported solution goes as follows: If our socialisation into dominating practices can 
entrench structural domination, it is because these practices are all there is, so that all our milieux 
confirm their schemas. According to this solution, socialisation is not contradictory after all, or not 
to any significant extent: we might be able to question their schemas, but only with schemas from 
milieux that are part of the problem, and so only with problematic results. There might be social 
change as a result, but not change away from structural domination. Something like this solution is 
suggested by Louis Althusser, for example, and by those who understand ideology as a ‘totality’ that 
operates at the abstract level of the ‘system’, or society as a whole (Althusser 2014 [1970]; see also 
Celikates 2016, 4).42 The more nightmarish visions of the Frankfurt School – its ‘one-dimensional 
man’, in particular – go in this direction as well (Marcuse 2002; see also Leopold 2018, section 4.3.). 
To focus on an example dear to both Althusser and the Frankfurt school, and to return to workers and 
 
42 This is also how Steven Lukes reads Michel Foucault, whom he takes to suggest that ‘we are all subjected subjects, 
“constituted” by power, that the modern individual is the “effect” of power’, and that as a result ‘it no longer makes sense 
to speak […] of the very possibility of people being more or less free from others’ power to live as their own nature and 
judgment dictates’ (2005, 107). This is not the place to focus on Foucault specifically, but it is worth noting that the 
proponents of the socialisation conception themselves draw on Foucault and reach different conclusions (see e.g., 
Haslanger 2019). 
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capitalists, one might think for instance that they all ‘identify themselves’ with advanced capitalist 
society, as Marcuse puts it, and ‘have in it their own development and satisfaction’ (Marcuse 2002, 
13).43 
This solution, however, cannot be on the table. For one, more recent social theory has moved 
away from this ‘totalising’ understanding. As David Graeber has insisted, for instance, ‘[e]ven in our 
own market-ridden society there are all sorts of domains – ranging from housework to hobbies, 
political action, personal projects of any sort – […] where one hears about “values” in the plural sense 
[…]’, as opposed to the economic value, singular, that rules over the workplace (2001, 56; see also 
2011, chapter 5). For this reason, ‘a society of happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a 
nightmare’, as Raymond Geuss famously put it, ‘not a realistic view of a state of society which is at 
present possible’ (1981, 83–4; see also Celikates 2016, 20). The proponents of the socialisation 
conception agree. As Haslanger writes, ‘[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology 
[i.e., the epistemologically inaccurate schemas of dominating practices] functions as a total system 
governing society as a whole’ (2017b, 161). Or in Celikates’s words: such ‘distortions and blockades 
will in most cases turn out to be partial rather than total so that in almost all realistic scenarios there 
will be oppositional forms of consciousness, experience and practice […]’ (2016, 20; see also 4). 
So much for the first purported solution. Let us turn, then, to the second: Socialisation into 
dominating practices can entrench structural domination not because all milieux confirm the schemas 
of these practices, but rather because agents are not conscious of the challenges that are raised by 
some milieux. After all, as we saw Iris Young argue in the previous chapter, domination is ‘a 
consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary 
interactions’ (1990, 41).44 And when Haslanger writes that in order ‘[t]o become a participant in the 
social domain, one must learn how to differentiate [materially encoded] signal from noise in order to 
communicate and coordinate’, she adds that in order ‘[t]o become a fluent participant, this 
differentiation must occur spontaneously, “unthinkingly”’ (2017a, 8 and 7). What this suggests, one 
might conclude, is that whatever insight agents may draw from contradictory milieux will often go 
unnoticed. To return for example to white professionals: perhaps they do ‘experience’ the hurdles 
faced by their black employees (e.g., they may also be reliant on undependable public transportation), 
but this ‘experience’, being unthinking, does not help them challenge their schema that black 
employees just cannot be trusted with deadlines. 
But this would be mistaken as well. From the fact that agents may unthinkingly differentiate signal 
from noise within one milieu, it does not follow that they do so across milieux, or indeed that the 
 
43 There are of course various differences between Althusser’s and Marcuse’s understandings of ideology. This is not my 
focus here, but I will have more to say about Althusser in particular in chapter 5. 
44 Here Young is writing about oppression specifically, but as noted in chapter 1 she makes the same point about 
domination (see 1990, chapter 1).  
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‘hitch’ between any two (contradictory) milieux typically goes unnoticed. As we saw Haslanger 
herself remark, it is ‘the fragmentation of social life and the inevitability of occupying multiple social 
roles [that] provides opportunities for leveraging insights from one practice to critique another’ 
(2017a, 11, my emphases). Conversely, while some schemas or aspects thereof might indeed ‘be 
relatively unconscious’, as Sewell suggests, they are the ones whose application gives rise to 
relatively few hitches as they ‘are present in a relatively wide range of institutional spheres, practices, 
and discourses’ (1992, 22).45 To return to my example: while at work white professionals may 
spontaneously think that black employees are unreliable full stop, they will not do so spontaneously 
on their way to work if their commute is plagued by undependable public transports. More generally, 
when agents frequent some milieu that challenges the schemas of dominating practices, they will tend 
to be aware of it. Celikates suggests as much when he praises Luc Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology 
on ‘the rejection of the idea that social rules are imposed behind the backs of ignorant actors’ (2012, 
165, referencing Boltanski 1990a). In the same vein, it is one of Giddens’s ‘leading theorem[s]’ that 
‘every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he 
or she is a member’ (1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319).46 If structural 
domination is often due to our ‘unconscious assumptions and reactions’, as we saw Young put it 
(1990, 41), this must be explained, rather than assumed as a basic feature of socialisation. 
Consider, finally, a third purported solution: Socialisation into dominating practices entrenches 
structural domination neither because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, nor because 
the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, but rather because the challenges raised by some 
milieux do not motivate agents to thwart conventions. On this proposal, even if agents gain insight 
from a practice about another, they tend to remain too caught up in the schemas of the latter to 
‘leverage’ this insight for critical purposes. Thus Haslanger suggests, drawing on Virginia Valian 
(1998, chapter 6), that agents may ‘[d]isappear the difficult cases’, or ‘[a]llow exceptions to [them]’, 
in order to resolve ‘[s]chema clashes’ (2008, 212–13). Female philosophy students, for example, 
might seem to disappear their experience of women’s studies classes that clashes with their 
expectation that men have a right of access to their bodies.47 As Celikates wonders, ‘is the assumption 
that there are [oppositional forms of consciousness and actually existing practices of critique and 
resistance] not naïve? (2016, 19). 
It is not, he suggests – and I concur. Social movements, for one, testify to this. As Haslanger 
herself puts it, they ‘demonstrate ways in which our conceptual resources are inadequate and 
 
45 I will return to a related issue in chapter 4.  
46 For Giddens, some of this knowledge ‘exists on the level of the unconscious’. But ‘[m]ore significant for [his analysis 
of social action]’ are ‘practical consciousness’ and ‘discursive consciousness’ (ibid.). 
47 Haslanger focuses on male students and staff here.  
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undertake to improve them’ (2020a, 1).48 Indeed, ‘[c]hang[ing] the schemas’ is another way for agents 
to resolve clashes (2008, 213). To return to female students in philosophy: ‘I’ve been contacted as 
recently as this year by graduate student women’s groups and individual women’, Haslanger reports, 
‘to help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their programs’, including 
‘alleged sexual harassment’ (2008, 211). Social movements, however, are only the tip of the iceberg. 
As Sewell remarks, ‘current scholarship is replete with depictions of “resistance” […], particularly 
resistance o[f] a decentered sort – those dispersed everyday acts that thwart conventions, reverse 
valuations, or express the dominated’s resentment of their domination’ (2005, 54–55). In fact, chances 
are that some of those everyday acts escape the attention of most observers: ‘[c]ritique and resistance 
[…]’, as Celikates insists, ‘do not always find their ways into the official archives, accounts and news 
stories’ (2016, 19). If James Scott’s ‘hidden transcripts’ are to be trusted, for example, there is much 
more ‘resistance’ than meets the eye (1990; see also 1985). When agents gain insight from a practice 
about another, therefore, they also seem to ‘leverage’ this insight for critical purposes. At any rate, 
we can conclude with Celikates that ‘[t]here is at least reason for doubt’ (2016, 19).  
None of these three purported solutions solves the problem, therefore: if socialisation into 
dominating practices entrenches structural domination, it is neither because all milieux confirm the 
schemas of these practices, nor because the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, nor 
again because these challenges do not prompt critical thinking. On the account of socialisation which 
the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment rely on, then, the contradictions of our 
fragmentary socialisation make it unclear how exactly socialisation can entrench structural 
domination. 
It is this problem that I spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve, on behalf of the 
socialisation conception of entrenchment. What might help us in this regard? As we saw above, most 
proponents of the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our 
socialisation into dominating practices frame this view in terms of ideology. But the literature on 
ideology, and what Geuss has called ideology’s ‘tainted origin’ in structural domination (1981, 21), 
points to various solutions, from the influence of the division of labour and similar forms of 
segregation, to the standardisation that comes with the market, to the role of discipline in ideological 
apparatuses that work not just by ideology, but also by repression (see Althusser 2014 [1970]). 
Drawing on this literature, I argue in the following three chapters that structural domination should 
not merely feature in the analysis as that whose entrenchment is to be explained by socialisation. It 
should also serve as that which itself does explanatory work to the extent that it shapes our 
contradictory socialisation. More precisely, if socialisation into dominating practices entrenches 
 
48 So does the law itself, Haslanger adds: ‘consider the evolving legal definitions of “rape” and consequent changes in 
sex education and contestation over practices of consent’ (ibid.). 
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structural domination, it is because structural domination itself has a certain influence on socialisation 
– a segregating, standardising, or repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at 
hand.49 In the next three chapters, I return to each of the examples I started with to illustrate each of 
these three possible influences. 
In chapter 3, I focus on the white professionals whose biased hiring practice dominates black 
employees. If they entrench the domination of this practice, I argue, it is because this domination has 
segregated white professionals and black employees into two groups, whose lives are so different that 
white professionals do not experience the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black 
employees. For this reason, they cannot draw on this insight to question the ideology of their biased 
hiring practice. 
In chapter 4, I consider the workers and capitalists who could but fail to change the market. Their 
socialisation into the market can only entrench the domination of the market, I argue, because the 
domination of the market encourages them and their workers to make commodity exchange the 
standard not only at work but also with neighbours and friends, in order to maximise profit. As a 
result, there are not enough milieux to enable them to question the ideology of the market, or 
fetishism. 
In chapter 5, finally, I return to the female philosophy students who fail to challenge the law of 
male sex-right in effect in their department. Their socialisation into this law entrenches its 
domination, I argue, because its domination enables male students to repress, psychologically, the 
critical insights which female students learn from women’s studies classes. Here there are enough 
milieux to inform their critical consciousness, and they are not segregated from them. But the insights 
they draw from them are repressed by what Louis Althusser calls the secondary, repressive 
functioning of ideological apparatuses (2014 [1970]). 
In the next chapter I start with the critical theory literature on ideology at its most general. This 
will help me highlight the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, and how it 






49 As David Graeber has insisted, in particular, ‘systematic inequalities ultimately backed up by the threat of force 
[…] invariably produce […] lopsided structures of imagination’ (where ‘imagination’ refers not to ‘the production of 
free-floating fantasy worlds’, but rather to the schemas according to which ‘we make and maintain [social] reality’, (2009, 
516 and 523). One might read my analysis of what I call the three influences of structural domination on socialisation as 
an account of three Graeberian ‘structures of the imagination’: (1) structures in which some agents do not frequent the 
milieux that would enable them to question the schemas of dominating practices, (2) structures in which there are too few 
of these milieux for agents to gain critical insight from them, and (3) structures in which the critical insight agents gain 
from these milieux is psychologically repressed by physical repression by the dominant groups. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IDEOLOGY AND THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL 
DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION 
 
 
My argument so far can be summarised as follows. In chapter 1, I offered an account of structural 
domination as group disempowerment by social practices. In chapter 2, I turned to the view put 
forward by the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment (the PSCs) that the 
entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into dominating 
practices. I argued that, while this view is promising, the account of socialisation which the PSCs rely 
on needs to be amended if it is to fully explain the entrenchment of structural domination. 
In this third chapter, I build on the PSCs’ reading of socialisation into these practices in terms of 
ideology to amend their account in light of the literature on this topic. Focusing on racism specifically, 
I draw on the Marxist claim that ideology has its tainted origin in the division between the practices 
of the dominant groups and those of the dominated groups that is imposed by structural domination. 
In this connection, I suggest that sometimes socialisation can only entrench structural domination 
because structural domination has a segregating influence on it. This segregating influence is such 
that agents, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group (though to a lesser extent in the 
latter case, as we will see), tend not to frequent the milieux of the other group that would enable them 
to question the schemas of dominating practices. 
I argue as follows. I start with the PSCs’ reading of socialisation into dominating practices in 
terms of ideology. On this view, ideology refers to the epistemically mistaken schemas of dominating 
practices, which agents are taught by the milieux in which these practices are enacted, which in turn 
leads them to reproduce these practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger e.g., 2017a, 
Celikates 2016).50 Returning to an example I introduced earlier in the thesis, I suggest that the biased 
hiring practices of white professionals are guided by the epistemically mistaken schema that black 
employees are unreliable. This schema is epistemically mistaken because, while some black 
employees might be unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, there are structural reasons 
for this which are left out by the schema: they often cannot afford childcare, depend on unreliable 
public transports, or hold more than one job. Yet the apparent unreliability of black employees in 
 
50 Not all the PSCs would follow Haslanger (2004) in saying that the practices are dominating (or ‘oppressive’, as she 
puts it: as we saw above, she uses oppression and group-domination interchangeably). Einspahr (2010), for instance, 
would rather say that these practices do not themselves dominate but only cause the domination of the dominated groups 
by the dominant groups. As we saw in chapter 1, I follow Haslanger in this respect, and for this reason adopt this 
formulation. 
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these settings nevertheless teaches the schema to white employers, which in turn leads them to 
reproduce their biased hiring practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger 2017a, 4). 
But as an account of socialisation, I argue in the next section, this view faces the problem I 
identified in chapter 2. If socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does, then those who are in the 
grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them correct their ideology (see Sewell 
1992, Haslanger 2017a, and Einspahr 2010). If so, however, then it is unclear how they can be in the 
grip of ideology at all, and how ideology can lead them to reproduce dominating practices. Returning 
to our example, there is nothing in the PSCs’ account of socialisation to suggest that we should not 
expect white professionals not only to work with possibly unreliable black employees, but also to 
take public transportations, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, and thus correct 
from this experience the incomplete schema that black employees are unreliable simpliciter. 
In order to solve the problem, I then, in section III, draw on an important line of Marxist thinking 
to argue that socialisation does not quite work in the way the PSCs suggest it does, because it may be 
under the segregating influence of structural domination. More precisely, I argue that those who are 
in the grip of ideology do not correct it because structural domination, as a historical process 
exemplified in particular by the division of labour and racial segregation, has divided them into two 
kinds of groups – dominant groups and dominated groups – who do not frequent each other’s milieux. 
Returning to my example, I suggest that white professionals do not correct the schema that black 
employees are unreliable simpliciter because, as whites and as professionals, they do not actually 
depend on public transports (or not as much), work surrounded by children, or hold more than one 
job, as their black employees do. 
Yet this, I argue in section IV, cannot be all there is to the segregating influence of structural 
domination on socialisation. For the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant 
group, often need to cross the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group, insofar as they depend 
on its members (hooks 1992, Graeber 2015). As in our example, blacks, for instance, often need to 
work in white firms if they are to find professional jobs. The white professionals they work for, by 
contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they need to take public 
transportation, work surrounded with children, or hold more than one job. This suggests that if those 
who are in the grip of ideology do not correct it, it is because, as members of a dominant group or of 
a dominated group, they do not frequent each other’s milieux unless they need to. Insofar as the 
members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to frequent the milieux 
of the other group, this entails that the segregating influence of structural domination is weaker on 
their socialisation than it is on that of the members of a dominant group, and so that they are less 
vulnerable to ideology than the members of a dominant group. While the white professionals in our 
example fail to correct their schema that their black employees are unreliable simpliciter, their black 
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employees, by contrast, may learn from their experience working for them that there are structural 
reasons for their apparent unreliability in this milieu. 
Finally, in section V, I defend this analysis against an objection. For one might think that it is 
unclear why agents can be in the grip of ideology at all, insofar as they have likely read, watched, or 
heard reports of what would help them correct it, even if they have not experienced any of it first-
hand. One might wonder for instance how white professionals can hold the schema that black 
employees are unreliable simpliciter when their black employees no doubt tell them that, when they 
are unreliable, it is for the structural reasons which they have learnt from their experience working 
for them. The answer to this objection, I suggest in this final section, is that frequenting a milieu is 
necessary to challenge a schema which is supported by frequenting another. If white professionals do 
not depend (as much) on public transport, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, 
for instance, the explanations of their black employees will not change their mind, or if they do change 
their mind, they will do so only in a superficial way ready to give under pressure (Lai et al. 2016, also 
Anderson 2010). 
Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for my amendment of the PSCs’ account of ideology in 
terms of socialisation in dominating practices. In particular, I do not defend the PSCs’ account of 
ideology against competing accounts in the literature, or attempt a detailed exegesis of Marx’s 
evolving account of ideology. I only argue that the PSCs neglect the segregating influence of 
structural domination on socialisation, despite its being necessary to explain how socialisation into 
dominating practices (i.e., ideology) can entrench structural domination. 
 
I. THE PSCs’ ACCOUNT OF IDEOLOGY 
I start with the PSCs’ account of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices. On this 
view, ideology refers to the epistemically mistaken schemas of dominating practices, which agents 
are taught by the milieux in which these practices are enacted, which lead them in turn to reproduce 
these practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger e.g., 2017a, Celikates 2016). To 
illustrate this view, I return to the vastly incomplete schema that black employees are unreliable, 
which I introduced in chapter 1: as we saw Haslanger argue, white professionals reproduce their 
biased hiring practices largely because they are taught this schema by the deadline-sensitive 
professional settings in which they frequent black employees (2017a, 4). 
To begin with, note that the PSCs’ understanding of ideology in terms of socialisation into 
dominating practices differs from the common understanding of the term. In everyday discourse, the 
term ‘ideology’ is typically used to refer to partisan political views. On this understanding, liberalism, 
socialism, and conservatism are ideologies (Freeden 1996, Shelby 2014). The term is sometimes 
given a negative connotation, as the partisan character of the doctrines is thought to stand in the way 
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of more pragmatic decision-making (Shelby 2014, 66 and 66n8, Freeden 1996, 17; see also Sartori 
1969 and Bell 1962).51 But either way, ideologies on this understanding belongs primarily to party 
politics. 
On the PSCs’ understanding of the term, by contrast, it primarily concerns the broader realm of 
social practices and agents’ socialisation into them. Here as well, however, ideology bears a negative 
stigma, for it designates specifically the schemas of the dominating practices, insofar as agents are 
socialised into them (see Celikates 2016, 14, Haslanger e.g., 2017a). In doing this, the PSCs follow 
the Marxist understanding of ideological schemas as having three related features: first, they entrench 
structural domination, second, they are epistemically deficient, and, third, crucially, they have a 
‘tainted origin’ in structural domination (Geuss 1981, 21; see also Shelby 2003, and Celikates 2016).52 
Indeed, for the PSCs, ideology entrenches structural domination because it is epistemically deficient, 
and it is epistemically deficient because agents learn it from dominating practices (see e.g. Haslanger 
2017a, Einspahr 2010, Celikates 2016).53 
To return to an example introduced in chapter 1, Haslanger describes the disempowerment of 
blacks relative to whites that constitutes racial domination as caused by practices of ‘residential 
segregation, police brutality, biased hiring and wage inequity, and educational disadvantage’ (2017a, 
16–17). In particular, the epistemically deficient schema that black employees just are unreliable is 
crucial to the decisions made by the predominantly white professionals in charge of hiring processes. 
Importantly, this schema does not come from nowhere, but has a tainted origin in white professionals’ 
experience of black employees tasked with ‘deadline-sensitive work’: due to a lack of resources, 
black employees might confirm this schema (ibid., 4). This is the ‘systematic looping of schemas and 
resources’ (ibid., 17), which we saw socialisation explain in chapter 2. 
But let us consider each feature in more detail. First, schemas entrench structural domination just 
in case dealing with resources according to them reproduces the group disempowerment constitutive 
of structural domination. To quote Celikates again, on this view, ‘ideologies are seen as playing a 
necessary, or at least supporting, role for the stabilisation and legitimation of social power relations, 
i.e. for their more or less smooth reproduction’ (2016, 14). For example, as white professionals treat 
black employees according to the schema that they are unreliable, they keep denying them the 
 
51 Due to the efforts of Michael Freeden in particular, this negative usage has become somewhat less prevalent in recent 
years: the role of such doctrines in helping agents make sense of a somewhat messy political reality has been increasingly 
recognised (e.g., 1996). Such usage remains widespread, however (Shelby 2014).  
52 Only the first and third features distinguish ideology from cultural schemas in general, for all schemas are epistemically 
deficient in the capacious sense at issue in the first feature: all schemas are incomplete, insofar as they are all 
simplifications of an otherwise too complex reality. 
53 Geuss focuses on the Frankfurt School, and argues that on their view ideology has its tainted origin in ‘reasons which 
[agents] could not acknowledge’ in their society (1981, 20, 22). I focus on the PSCs, who have a different understanding 
of ideology’s tainted origin, viz., in dominating practices. Like the Frankfurt School, and according to Geuss all 
‘interesting theories of ideology’, the PSCs ‘assert some connection between two or more of the three [features]’ (1981, 
22). Indeed the PSCs connect all three features, as the Frankfurt School does (Shelby does too; see e.g., 2003, 164). 
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resources attached to professional employment (including, as we will see shortly, those required to 
become reliable), and reproduce the disempowerment of blacks, or more generally non-whites, that 
constitutes racial domination.54 
Second, schemas are epistemically deficient when they are straightforwardly false, but not only 
then. It is sufficient that they should be incomplete. As Celikates puts it, ideologies need not consist 
in ‘false beliefs’ only, since ‘one-sided reductions of complexity’ may be ideological as well (2016, 
14; see also Haslanger 2017a and Shelby 2003, 166).55 The white professionals’ schema that their 
black employees are unreliable, for instance, may not be false in quite the same way as the schema 
that black employees are genetically untrustworthy.56 While the latter is straightforwardly false, for 
the PSCs the falsehood of the former is sometimes best described as a terrible incompleteness: some 
black employees might prove unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, but there are 
crucial structural reasons for this which the schema leaves out – they may be unable to afford 
childcare, depend heavily on public transport, or hold more than one job (Haslanger 2017a, 4). 
Third, and crucially, schemas, according to the PSCs, have a tainted origin because agents learn 
them from the milieux in which dominating practices are enacted. These schemas ‘come into 
existence against the background of social power relations and could only have been acquired under 
these specific social conditions […]’, as Celikates puts it (2016, 14).57 To return to our example, it is 
their dealings with black employees whose lack of resources might prevent from being reliable at 
work that teach white professionals the schema that black employees just are unreliable (see 
Haslanger 2017a, 17). This last, crucial feature completes the loop between schemas and resources 
which we saw socialisation explain in the previous chapter, and which constitutes for the PSCs the 
key to the entrenchment of structural domination (Haslanger 2017a, 17, 2017b; see also Celikates 
2016). Deprived of crucial resources, black employees might ‘actualise’, in Sewell’s word, the 
 
54 Recall from chapter 1 and 2 that on the PSCs’ view, ‘resources’ in this sense includes other agents (e.g., Haslanger 
2017c). 
55 As suggested in n. 52 above, this understanding of epistemic deficiency is so capacious that virtually all schemas are 
epistemically deficient, since all of them simplify reality to some extent. This is not a problem: ideology’s role in 
organising specifically unjust (e.g., dominating) practices, together with its tainted origin in these very practices, still 
distinguishes it from schemas in general. 
56 As many have noted and as we saw in chapter 1, this kind of genetic ‘dominative racism’ has receded in favour of the 
‘aversive racism’ and ‘metaracism’ I focus on here (Kovel 1970). As Young aptly describes them, ‘aversive racism is a 
racism of avoidance and separation’, while in metaracism ‘almost all traces of a commitment to race superiority have 
been removed, and only the grinding processes of a white-dominated economy and technology account for the continued 
misery of many people of color’ (Young 1990, 141). Where dominative racism is still prevalent, in addition, it now 
‘emphasises the ineradicable cultural pathology of blacks rather than their biogenetic inferiority’ (Shelby 2003, 168–69). 
57 See also Celikates’ comments (mentioned in chapter 2) on ‘the layout of social space (including built social space), 
which […] actualizes and confirms [binary gender schemas] (only think of toilets in most public buildings)’ (2016, 9). In 
the same vein, but relative to race, recall Haslanger’s claim that ‘[w]e learn about race and what different races “deserve” 
by looking around us’ (Haslanger 2017a, 17; see also Shelby 2003, 165). As I argue in what follows, the difference 
between their account and my amendment is that, while they focus on the milieux in which dominating practices are 
enacted, I suggest that we should focus on the division between the milieux of the dominant groups and those of the 
dominated groups. 
  50 
 
schema that they are unreliable, and for this reason ‘teach’ or ‘inculcate’ this schema to white 
professionals (1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c, Einspahr 2010). 
For the PSCs, then, ideology refers to the epistemically deficient schemas of dominating practices, 
insofar as agents are socialised into them – and more precisely, refers to these schemas insofar as 
agents learn them from the milieux in which these practices are enacted, and therefore reproduce 
these practices and entrench structural domination. Yet because of its account of socialisation, I argue 
in the next section, this view faces the problem I identified in chapter 2. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM 
Indeed, I argue in this section, if socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does (Haslanger 2017a, 
Einspahr 2010, Celikates 2016; see also Sewell 1992), then those who are in the grip of ideology 
should also frequent milieux that would help them correct their ideology. If so, however, then it is 
unclear how they can be in the grip of ideology at all, and unclear how ideology can lead them to 
reproduce dominating practices and entrench structural domination. Returning to our example, there 
is nothing in the PSCs’ account of socialisation to suggest that we should not expect white 
professionals not only to work with apparently unreliable black employees, but also to take public 
transportation, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, and so correct the 
epistemologically deficient schema that black employees are unreliable simpliciter. 
We saw in the previous section that agents are in the grip of ideology, according to the PSCs, 
when they fail to change a dominating practice because the milieux in which this practice is enacted 
confirm its schema to them. If white professionals entrench racist hiring practices, on this view, it is 
because the black employees they meet at work might confirm the terribly incomplete schema that 
they are unreliable simpliciter. But if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then it is 
unclear why those who are in the grip of ideology fail to correct their epistemically deficient schemas. 
For on the PSCs’ account of socialisation, they should be socialised into other practices that should 
help them do that. 
More precisely, it is unclear why those who are in the grip of ideology do not happen to test their 
epistemically mistaken schemas not just in milieux that confirm them, but also in milieux that would 
prove them to be epistemically deficient. This, crucially, is because in general agents ‘have access to 
heterogeneous arrays of resources’, as we saw the PSCs argue in the previous chapter, some of which 
are not organised ideologically (Sewell 1992, 17; see also his 2005, and Einspahr 2010, 5). As Sally 
Haslanger insists, ‘[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology functions as a total 
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system governing society as a whole’ (2017b, 161).58 To return to our example, as things stand we 
should expect white professionals to test the schema that blacks are unreliable simpliciter not just 
against their black employees, who might confirm it, but also against their own experiences of 
depending on public transports, working surrounded by children, or juggling with several jobs, all of 
which challenge it. 
And if we should expect agents to test this schema not just against milieux that confirm it but also 
against milieux that challenge it, then we should expect them to correct this schema accordingly. For 
agents should not be expected to be ‘judgmental dopes’ who cannot put two and two together, as 
Harold Garfinkel famously put it (1984, 75; see also Sewell 1992 and Celikates 2016, 22).59 Thus 
white professionals should be expected to infer from their own experiences of lacking affordable 
childcare, depending on public transportation, or holding more than one job that, when their black 
employees are unreliable at work, it is for these very reasons. In other words, they should correct the 
‘one-sided reductio[n] of complexity’ of which they are guilty (Celikates 2016, 14). 
If they can self-correct in this manner, however, then it is unclear how agents can be in the grip 
of ideology at all, and how ideology can have them reproduce dominating practices and entrench 
structural domination. If white professionals should be expected not just to work with black 
employees who might confirm the schema that they are unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional 
settings, but also to frequent the milieux that explain why black employees might confirm this 
schema, then how exactly can white professionals fail to correct this schema and, further, challenge 
their biased hiring practices and the unjust division of labour they support? 
In other words, the PSCs’ account of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices 
faces a version of the problem I identified in chapter 2. If socialisation works the way the PSCs say 
it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also be socialised into practices that should 
help them correct their ideology. If so, however, then it is unclear how they can be in the grip of 
ideology at all, and how ideology can explain the entrenchment of dominating practices. 
 
III. THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON 
SOCIALISATION (1) 
As a first approximation of a solution to this problem, in this section I draw on an important line of 
Marxist thinking about ideology. I suggest that socialisation does not quite work the way the PSCs 
suggest it does because of the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation. Those 
 
58 Indeed, as we saw Celikates emphasise (in chapter 2), we should bear in mind Raymond Geuss’s famous claim that ‘a 
society of happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a nightmare, not a realistic view of a state of society which is at 
present possible’ (1981, 83–84, quoted in Celikates 2016, 20). 
59 In particular, recall from the previous chapter, one of Giddens’s ‘leading theorem[s]’ is that ‘every social actor knows 
a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member’ (1979, 5, emphasis 
removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319). The PSCs draw on Giddens, via Sewell (1992). 
  52 
 
who are in the grip of ideology do not correct the latter, I argue, to the extent that structural 
domination, as a historical process exemplified by the division of labour and racial segregation, has 
divided them into two kinds of groups – dominant groups and dominated groups – who do not 
frequent each other’s milieux. Returning to Haslanger’s example, I suggest that white professionals 
do not correct the schema that their black employees are unreliable simpliciter because, as whites and 
as professionals, they do not actually depend (as much) on public transport, they do not work 
surrounded by children, and they do not hold more than one job. 
As noted in section I, much of the inspiration behind the PSCs’ critique of ideology comes from 
the Marxist critique of ideology. Yet the PSCs seem to neglect the fact that for Marx ideology has its 
tainted origin not simply in dominating practices, as they suggest, but rather in the division between 
the practices of the dominant group and those of the dominated group that is imposed by structural 
domination. 
If agents ‘mystify themselves’, on the Marxist view, it is because their ‘intellectual horizon’ 
‘reflects’ the limits to their ‘practical universe’ that are ‘imposed by the divisions of society into 
classes’, as Etienne Balibar puts it (2014, 95–96; my translation, here and below).60 If the members 
of the dominant class are epistemically mistaken about the members of the dominated class, it is 
largely because intellectual labour has ‘become their privilege and speciality’ and manual labour the 
exclusive burden of the members of the dominated class (ibid., 94). 61  If, for instance, ‘those 
evaluating a worker’s performance’ are ‘often not competent to evaluate [it]’, Young suggests, it is 
because ‘the division of labor in most large organizations means that [they] often are not familiar 
with the actual work process (1990, 203).62 
Though Marx focused on class divisions, this analysis has been generalised to sex and race 
divisions. As Young puts it, ‘[t]he sexual division of labor, for example, has created social groups of 
women and men in all known societies’, the ‘most common’ of which is ‘[t]he division between 
caring for babies and bodies, and not doing so (1990, 43, and 1994, 730). This has ‘consequences for 
 
60 As Balibar writes, Marx’s theory of ideology is ‘a theory of the classist character of consciousness, which is to say of 
the limits of its intellectual horizon as it reflects or reproduces the limits to communication which are imposed by the 
divisions of society in classes (or in nations, etc.)’ (2014, 92; my translation, here and below). Such ‘boundaries of 
communication’, he adds, refer to each class’s ‘practical universe’ (ibid.). 
61 By dominant and dominated classes I mean not only capitalist and working classes but also what is commonly known 
as the middle and working classes. As Young insists: ‘While it is false to claim that a division between capitalist and 
working classes no longer describes our society, it is also false to say that class relations have remained unaltered since 
the nineteenth century. An adequate conception of oppression cannot ignore the experience of social division reflected in 
the colloquial distinction between the “middle class” and the “working class”, a division structured by the social division 
of labor between professionals and nonprofessionals’ (1990, 56). Nor can an adequate conception of structural domination 
and its entrenchment ignore this experience (see Young 1990, 76–81). On the difference between oppression and 
domination for Young, see the first chapter of this thesis. 
62 This generalises outside of work. To quote Young again: ‘Though based on a division of labor between “mental” and 
“manual” work, the distinction between “middle class” and “working class” designates a division not only in working 
life, but also in nearly all aspects of social life […] The two groups tend to live in segregated neighborhoods or even 
different towns [and] to have different tastes in food, decor, clothes, music, and vacations’ (1990, 57). 
  53 
 
epistemology’, Nancy Hartsock insists, insofar as ‘the opposition between feminist and masculinist 
experience and outlook is rooted’ in this division (2004, 40 and 43). In particular, men’s outlook is 
that of ‘abstract masculinity’ to the extent that this division removes them from ‘female life activity’ 
(ibid., 44). 
The same goes for the division between whites and blacks. As Charles Mills notes, the ‘white 
domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of de jure segregation’ also has 
‘consequences […] for the social cognition of these agents, both the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged’ (2005, 175 and 169). According to Elizabeth Anderson, for example, the de facto 
segregation that followed still ‘is a fundamental cause of stigmatization’ (2010, 65).63 As ‘[s]patial 
segregation entails that whites will […] interact mostly with other whites’, for instance, ‘[t]he shared 
interpretations of the social world that they build with their peers will tend to exclude blacks’ 
experiences’ (ibid., 46–7).64 
There is more to this broadly Marxist analysis. Its insistence on the fundamental origin of ideology 
in the divisions of society is enough for my purposes, however.65 For it suggests a solution to the 
problem from the previous section. The problem, recall, was that if socialisation works in the way the 
PSCs say it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would 
help them break free from it. What the above analysis suggests, however, is that socialisation does 
not work in the way the PSCs say it does. This is because structural domination has a segregating 
influence on it, such that agents do not frequent the milieux of the relevant dominated group or those 
 
63 Anderson also suggests that ‘[segregation] causes the inequalities that form the basis of racial stereotypes […]’ (2010, 
65). This is what we saw Haslanger suggest in section I. My point here is that segregation also prevents agents from 
correcting these stereotypes and therefore explains how they can find themselves in their grip.  
64 Anderson lists six biases ‘put into play by segregation’ (2010, 65). The first is ‘ethnocentrism’, which ‘is the bias people 
have in favor of members of groups to which they belong’. The second is the ‘shared reality bias’, which ‘leads individuals 
to align their perceptions and judgments with those of in-group members, especially if the group is based on personal 
affiliation’. Next comes the ‘illusory correlation bias’, which ‘disposes people to form stereotypes about a group with 
which they have little contact on the basis of unusual events, such as sensational crimes, connected to that group’. Another 
is the ‘stereotype incumbency bias’, which ‘inclines people to form a stereotype of an effective job-holder as having a 
particular ascribed identity (as of race, gender, or ethnicity) if the incumbents in that job overwhelmingly share that 
identity’. The fifth is the ‘power bias’, which ‘inclines people in positions of power to stereotype their subordinates, and 
to actively maintain these stereotypes’. The sixth and last is the ‘system justification bias’ which ‘inclines people to 
interpret their social world as just, because the thought of living in an unjust world is intolerable’ (2010, 46). I focus 
instead on the process of socialisation as the PSCs understand it, and so on the way segregation keeps whites away from 
the milieux of blacks and vice versa. The biases Anderson mentions reinforce this process, but they are not my focus. 
65 Two features of this view are worth emphasising in this context. First, ideology on this view refers specifically to the 
idealisations in which the dominant groups can indulge, as they do not frequent the ‘nonideal realities’ of the dominated 
groups that would disprove them (Mills 2005, 175). Second, ideology for Marx is (also) inculcated to the dominated 
groups by the dominant groups themselves, insofar as the division of intellectual and manual labour has afforded the latter 
a relative monopoly on intellectual production (see Balibar 2014, 92–100, Mills 2005, 175, and Marx 1965, 61 in Scott 
1985, 315). I do not endorse these two claims here, however. To start with the second: just as we saw in section II that it 
was unclear why any agent would fail to correct their ideology if they could frequent milieux that would disprove it, it is 
unclear why the members of the dominated groups would buy idealisations that are by definition disproved by their own 
milieux (see also Abercrombie et al. 1980 and Scott 1985). I will return to this argument in chapter 5. As to the first claim, 
Marx’s conception of ideology as idealisations is much narrower than the PSCs’ understanding of ideology’s epistemic 
deficiency: not every false or incomplete schema makes the world out to be better than it is. 
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of the relevant dominant group depending on which group they are ‘born into’ (Young 1994, 727).66 
‘Society “imposes” dominant and subordinate identities on members of both groups’, as Haslanger 
herself writes in another context (2004, 107n14; see also Mills 2000, 448), and this, I suggest, is an 
important reason why they can find themselves in the grip of ideology.67 
To return to our example, this is the reason why white professionals do not correct the schema 
that their black employees are unreliable simpliciter: as whites and as professionals, they do not enact 
the same practices, or frequent the same milieux, as their black employees. In particular, they do not 
actually depend on public transports (or not as much), work surrounded by children, or hold more 
than one job. They may sometimes take public transport, but they also will have their own cars or at 
any rate can call a taxi when public transport is interrupted or the journey too complicated. Similarly, 
they can afford childcare or babysitters, and they make enough money from their primary job that 
they do not need to take another on the side. But as a result of all this, they fail to complete their 
schema that black employees are unreliable with the structural reasons that explain the possible 
occurrence of this phenomenon.  
As a first approximation, then, the reason why those who are in the grip of ideology do not correct 
it is that structural domination, as a historical process exemplified by the division of labour and racial 
segregation, has divided them into two groups – a dominant group and a dominated group – who do 
not frequent each other’s milieux. This is only a first approximation, however. As we will see in the 
next section, we should rather say that the members of a dominant group and the members of a 
dominated group do not frequent each other’s milieux unless they need to; and the members of the 
dominated group, I will argue, more often need to cross the divide. 
 
IV. THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION (2) 
Put differently, the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, I argue in this 
section, affects the members of dominant groups more strongly than it does the members of 
dominated groups. For while the members of dominant groups can afford to remain among 
themselves, the members of dominated groups need to frequent the milieux of the dominant groups, 
because they depend on their members (hooks 1992, Graeber 2015). To return to our example, blacks 
need to frequent white workplaces if they are to find professional jobs. White professionals, by 
 
66 As Young puts it: ‘A person is born into a class in the sense that a history of class relations precedes one, and the 
characteristics of the work that one will do or not do are already inscribed in machines, the physical structure of factories 
and offices, the geographic relations of city and suburb’ (1994, 727). 
67 Haslanger does not emphasise the way in which such divisions sustain ideology in this paper, or anywhere else to my 
knowledge. In her 2017a, she mentions ‘residential segregation’, as we saw above, but she does not emphasise its crucial 
role in explaining why whites and blacks can be in the grip of ideology (2017a, 16–17). In her 2017b, she insists on the 
role of ideology in reproducing segregation, but not on the role of segregation in reproducing ideology (at least not on the 
role of the kind of segregating processes I focus on here, as opposed to segregation understood more broadly as the general 
situation of blacks in contemporary USA, see 2017b, 151–3). 
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contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they really have to take public 
transportation, work surrounded by children, or work several jobs. So while white professionals fail 
to correct their schema that their black employees are unreliable simpliciter, their black employees 
know, from their experience of working for white professionals, that their apparent unreliability in 
this milieu has a structural explanation. 
To begin with, note that while class society – or gender or race society – imposes dominant and 
subordinate identities on agents, agents do ‘negotiate and transform them’ in turn (Haslanger 2004, 
107n14; see also Mills 2000, 448). And since these identities are ‘differentiated by cultural forms, 
practices, and ways of life’ (Young 1990, 43), as we saw above, this entails that agents sometimes 
frequent the milieux that are organised according to the practices (cultural forms, ways of life) of the 
other group. 
Both groups, however, have different behaviour in this respect. While the members of a dominant 
group seldom frequent the milieux of the dominated group, the members of a dominated group, by 
contrast, often navigate the milieux of the dominant group. For while the members of a dominant 
group can afford to remain among themselves, the members of a dominated group need to frequent 
the milieux of the dominant group to the extent that they depend on its members (e.g., for jobs, as in 
the example I have focused on). As a result, the members of a dominated group tend to be less 
vulnerable to the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, and, therefore, to 
ideology. 
David Graeber makes the point particularly well regarding sexism:  
 
[I]n American situation comedies of the 1950s, there was a constant staple joke: 
jokes about the impossibility of understanding women. The jokes (told, of course, by 
men) always represented women’s logic as fundamentally alien and incomprehensible. 
“You have to love them”, the message always seemed to run, “but who can really 
understand how these creatures think?” (2015, 69)  
 
Women, by contrast, did not seem to misunderstand men much. As Graeber continues:  
 
The reason is obvious. Women had no choice but to understand men. In America, the 
fifties were the heyday of a certain ideal of the one-income patriarchal family, and among 
the more affluent, the ideal was often achieved. Women with no access to their own income 
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or resources obviously had no choice but to spend a great deal of time and energy 
understanding what their menfolk thought was going on. (ibid.)68  
 
More generally, it is a matter of standpoint, as many have noted (e.g., Harding 2004; see also 
Wylie 2003, Hartsock 2004, Mills 2005, Graeber 2015, Jugov and Ypi 2019). Standpoint theory 
comes in different versions, but according to its original, Marx-inspired formulation, the point is that 
‘women’s labour, like workers’ labour, give them access to a privileged perspective on social reality’ 
(Saul 2003, 241).69 On Hartsock’s version of the theory, this is due to the particularly concrete nature 
of their labour, which prevents them from losing touch with necessity (2004, 41 and 43). This might 
be right, but here I want to follow Graeber’s (not necessarily competing) suggestion instead. On his 
view, if women – or workers – have access to a privileged perspective on social reality, it is because 
they are dominated into crossing the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group. After all, they 
depend on it.  
In Graeber’s example, women need to frequent men’s milieux because they depend on them for 
income. But this would seem to generalise to anything the members of a dominated group depend on 
the members of a dominant group for, from coping to survival. For instance, as bell hooks insists, 
‘[a]lthough there has never been any official body of black people in the United States who have 
gathered as anthropologists and/or ethnographers to study whiteness, black folks have, from slavery 
on, shared in conversations with one another “special” knowledge of whiteness gleaned from close 
scrutiny of white people. Deemed special because it was not a way of knowing that has been recorded 
fully in written material, its purpose was to help black folks cope and survive in a white supremacist 
society’ (hooks, 1992, 165, quoted in Graeber 2015, 71). 
Though black employees may not depend on white professionals for anything so radical as 
survival, for instance, they still depend on them for escaping the ‘lower-level, poor-paying jobs’ to 
which they are ‘disproportionately assigned’ as blacks (Anderson 2010, 27). For this reason, they 
need to overcome segregation and travel across town to white-dominated professional environments. 
White professionals, by contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they really 
need to take public transportation, hold more than one job, or work surrounded by children.70 They 
have every reason to be content with the income, status, and authority attached to professional 
 
68 Here one is reminded of Betty Draper of the TV series Mad Men, who trespasses into her husband’s home office while 
he is away to understand what he is up to (2009, season 3, episode 11). 
69 As Mills notes, ‘[t]he thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable 
plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map 
nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group’ (2005, 175). In Wylie’s helpful argument, plausible versions of 
this thesis offer non-essentialist definitions of the relevant groups and do not take the epistemic privilege of the dominated 
groups to be automatic (2003, 28). 
70 As Anderson reports, ‘89 percent of black-owned firms have workforces that are at least 75 percent minority’ (2010, 
26). 
  57 
 
employment, and have no need to engage in the low-paying, unrespectable, and servile tasks at the 
lower end of the division of labour (see Young 1990, chapter 7). The result is that while white 
professionals fail to correct their schema that black employees just cannot meet deadlines, their black 
employees may learn from their own experience of working for white professionals that, when they 
are unreliable, there are structural reasons for this: for instance, the office is not well-connected to 
their neighbourhood, it does not offer affordable childcare, or it does not pay enough for them to give 
up their other sources of income.71 
Since the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to cross 
the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group, the account of the segregating influence of 
structural domination must be modified accordingly. Those who are in the grip of ideology do not 
correct it, I argue, to the extent that, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group, they 
do not frequent each other’s milieux unless they need to. Insofar as the members of a dominated 
group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to frequent the milieux of the other group because 
they depend on its members, this entails that the segregating influence of structural domination is 
weaker on their socialisation than it is on that of the members of the dominant group. As a result, they 
are less vulnerable to ideology than the members of the dominant group. 
This, I conclude, is how we should conceive of the segregating influence of structural domination 
on socialisation. The PSCs should emphasise this influence. If my argument is correct, this influence 
is necessary to explain how socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural 
domination. 
 
V. OBJECTION AND DEFENCE 
At this stage, one might raise the following objection. One might think that it is unclear how agents 
can be in the grip of ideology at all insofar as they have likely thought about what would help them 
correct it, even if they have not experienced it first-hand. One might wonder, for instance, how white 
professionals can hold the schema that black employees are unreliable simpliciter, when their black 
 
71 To be more precise, on this qualified account of the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, 
black employees may either hold the ideological schema in question before correcting it or they may never hold it in the 
first place. While in the case of the schema that black employees just cannot be trusted with deadlines the second option 
may be more plausible, black employees’ schemas of the white etiquette prevalent in corporate environments may afford 
a good illustration of the first option. As Anderson reports, ‘if what most blacks see as ordinary frankness is interpreted 
by whites as confrontational, the straight-talking black worker in the white-dominated environment will be labeled as 
having an “attitude,” and her career will suffer accordingly’ (2010, 37). In other words, she will contribute to reproducing 
the biased hiring practices that dominate her. Yet because they often need to enter these environments, blacks quickly 
correct their schemas of white etiquette. Indeed, like Michelle Johnson, a black employment lawyer with a great deal of 
ethnographic knowledge of such environments, they too act as informants for others on how to avoid what whites would 
consider a faux pas (2004, mentioned in Anderson 2010, 36). (I should add that blacks’ schemas of white etiquette are 
epistemically deficient not because white etiquette is universally valid — as Anderson notes, there is no ‘panculturally 
valid standard’ of etiquette (ibid.) – but because it is valid specifically in the white-dominated corporate environments 
which blacks often need to frequent if they are to rise in the division of labour). 
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employees have no doubt told them that when they happen to be unreliable it is for the structural 
reasons which they have learnt working for them. The answer, I suggest, is the following: frequenting 
a milieu is necessary to challenge a schema that is backed up by frequenting another. Since, as we 
saw above, white professionals do not really depend on public transports, nor work surrounded by 
children or hold more than one job, the explanations of their black employees will not change their 
mind, or only in a superficial way ready to give under pressure (Lai et al. 2016; see also Anderson 
2010, 50). 
The problem, recall, was that if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then those 
who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them break free from it. 
The solution, I argued above, is that socialisation does not work in the way the PSC say it does, 
because structural domination has a segregating influence on it. This influence is such that agents, as 
members of a dominant group or of a dominated group, do not frequent the milieux of the other group 
unless they need to. Insofar as the members of a dominated group often need to, because they depend 
on the members of the dominant group, this influence does not affect them as much as the members 
of the dominant group. All this, however, turns on the claim that in order to correct one’s ideology, it 
is necessary to frequent a milieu that disproves it. Yet one might want to question this claim, and my 
entire argument with it. Why is it not sufficient to hear, read, watch, or, more generally, only think 
about what would help them correct ideology, without experiencing such correctives first-hand? 
After all, this kind of cognitivist approach is the favoured modus operandi of many psychological 
studies of implicit biases. Lai et al.’s recent comparative analysis of different methods of reducing 
implicit racial preferences testifies to this (2014). None of the seventeen methods under examination 
involved going into the field. Some ‘led participants to engage with others’ perspectives […] by 
having participants imagine the thoughts, feelings, and actions of Black individuals’ (1769, my 
emphases here and below). Another assigned them ‘to fictional groups with positive Black ingroup 
members and/or negative White outgroup members’. Yet others ‘appealed to egalitarian values […]’, 
for instance ‘having participants think about multicultural values’ (ibid.). One operated ‘by inducing 
a positive emotion (elevation)’ as participants ‘watched an elevating video’ (1769 and 1774). The last 
provided participants with ‘strategies to override or suppress the influence of automatic biases’, such 
as ‘saying to themselves silently, “I definitely want to respond to the Black face by thinking ‘good’”’ 
(1769 and 1775). 
It is unclear, then, how agents can be in the grip of ideology at all, insofar as they are likely to 
have been prompted to think about what would help them correct it by what they read, watch, or hear 
from others, even if they have not experienced it first-hand. To return to Haslanger’s example, one 
might wonder, for instance, how white professionals can hold the schema that black employees are 
unreliable simpliciter when their black employees have no doubt told them that, when they happen to 
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be unreliable, it is for the structural reasons which they have encountered when doing deadline-
sensitive work for them. 
The answer, I suggest, is that in order to question a schema that is backed up by frequenting a 
social milieu, it is necessary to frequent another (contradictory) milieu. Put differently, only a milieu 
can challenge the epistemic support afforded to a given schema by another milieu. For this reason, 
newspapers, documentaries, or indeed employees offering detailed excuses for their inability to meet 
deadlines are all insufficient to help agents correct the ideologies they have learnt from the milieux 
to which the segregating influence of structural domination limits them. Such cognitive tools may 
help reinforce a challenge born out of the frequentation of a milieu that contradicts the schema in 
focus, but they will not prove useful by themselves. 
The reason for this claim is, as Sewell puts it, that the schema in focus is repeatedly ‘validated’ to 
agents by the milieu in which they enact the practice it guides (1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 
2017c, 22). As a result, even if a newspaper article, a documentary, or a conversation with others 
changes their mind at the time, their everyday social and material environment will soon re-establish 
the schema in focus.72 Indeed, this is precisely what happens after the kind of lab-based reductions of 
racial implicit biases achieved by cognitive psychologists, as another study by Lai et al. convincingly 
demonstrates (2016). The study ‘tested 9 interventions (8 real and 1 sham) to reduce implicit racial 
preferences over time. In 2 studies with a total of 6,321 participants, all 9 interventions immediately 
reduced implicit preferences. However, none were effective after a delay of several hours to several 
days’ (1002; see also 1011). 
Nor do longer intervention make any difference to racial prejudices in the long run (ibid., 1013). 
What does, by contrast, is actual, real-life contact between whites and blacks in a milieu that disproves 
prejudices because it ‘incorporates or actualizes’ cooperation and equality instead, as Sewell would 
put it (1992, 13). This, in fact, is the central claim of the famous and widely-supported contact theory 
that originated with Robin Williams’s The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict (1947).73 According to 
the contact hypothesis, face-to-face contact between members of different groups can reduce 
prejudice between them, especially when their environment favours ‘intergroup cooperation’ with an 
‘equal status’ (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006 for an overview, e.g., 752). On this view, going into the 
field is necessary to correct epistemically mistaken schemas. 
 
72 Not to mention the fact that, in Anderson’s words, ‘[c]ognitive biases tend to kick in when people need to make 
decisions under time pressure, when they are tired, distracted, cognitively overloaded, or under stress’ (2010, 50), and 
that these are often the conditions in which social practices are enacted. 
73 Contact theory originates from social psychology, first with Williams (1947), and then with Gordon Allport’s often 
cited The Nature of Prejudice (1954). The theory is also referred to as ‘intergroup contact theory’ or ‘the contact 
hypothesis’. The most frequently cited work on the idea is Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), where they review over five 
hundred studies to prove Allport's basic insight. As Anderson remarks, this and other ‘[r]ecent metanalyses of hundreds 
of studies show strong support for the contact hypothesis as applied to numerous group divisions – including racial groups 
– and contact settings’ (2010, 125). 
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This, of course, is also something that anthropologists have long emphasised.74 The practice of 
fieldwork testifies to it. As Anastasia Piliavsky has pointed out (see Iqtidar and Piliavsky 2019), the 
point of doing fieldwork is to lead to this crucial moment where the researcher’s schemas about a 
situation she used to merely think about, rather than face, are rendered obsolete by her actual dealing 
with it. Actually, even political theorists are increasingly convinced. As Lisa Herzog and Bernardo 
Zacka (2017) have insisted, an ‘ethnographic sensibility’ would be welcome in political theory for 
precisely this reason (see also Gutnick-Allen 2019). Indeed, the PSCs themselves are committed to 
this claim, to the extent that it is implied by their account of socialisation in general and ideology in 
particular. As Haslanger puts it, ‘[w]hat’s often needed [to correct ideology] are new experiences that 
highlight aspects of reality that were previously masked or obscured’ (2017a, 10). 
I suggest, then, that we should push back against the objection. Agents can be in the grip of 
ideology even if they have thought about what would help them correct it, provided that they have 
not experienced it first-hand. For it would seem that frequenting a (contradictory) milieu is necessary 
to challenge a schema that is backed up by frequenting another. White professionals do hold the 
schema that black employees are unreliable simpliciter, for instance, even though their black 
employees no doubt tell them that, when they are unreliable, it is for the structural reasons they have 
learnt working for them. Since, as we saw above, white professionals do not tend to experience what 
explains their black employees’ apparent unreliability, the explanations of the latter will not change 
their mind. Or if they will, it will be only in a superficial way, liable to give way in practice. 
If agents can be in the grip of ideology despite having likely heard, read, or watched TV about 
what would help them correct it, then, it is because ideology is actualised or incorporated by the 
milieux in which the practices it guides are enacted – and, crucially, because the segregating influence 
of structural domination on socialisation prevents them, as members of dominant groups or of 
dominated groups, from accessing the milieux that actualise or incorporate correctives to it. As we 
saw above, this is more likely for the dominant groups than for the dominated groups. But the point 
at this stage is that only (contradictory) experience seems capable of countering (ideological) 
experience, not distanced cognitive processes such as reading or watching TV. 
This concludes my argument for the first amendment to the PSCs’ account of ideology in terms 
of socialisation into dominating practices. I have not defended the PSCs’ account of ideology against 
competing accounts in the literature. Nor have I attempted a detailed exegesis of Marx’s evolving 
account(s) of ideology. I have only argued that the PSCs neglect the segregating influence of 
 
74  At least since the reflective turn away from Althusser’s (and before him Durkheim’s) emphasis on a deep 
‘epistemological break’ between social science and social consciousness (see Althusser 1996, 33-47, 182-84; see also 
Durkheim 1968, xxxvii, 15, 31, and Celikates 2006 for an illuminating overview).  
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structural domination on socialisation, despite its being necessary to explain how ideology, 
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CHAPTER 4 
FETISHISM AND THE STANDARDISING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL 
DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION 
 
 
I begin once more with a summary of my argument so far. In chapter 1, I offered an account of 
structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In chapter 2, I 
turned to the view advocated by the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment (the 
PSCs) that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into 
dominating practices. I argued that while this view is promising, the account of socialisation the PSCs 
rely on needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. In chapter 
3, I built on the PSCs’ reading of socialisation in terms of ideology to amend their account in light of 
the literature on this topic. I suggested that sometimes socialisation can only entrench structural 
domination because structural domination has a segregating influence on it. 
In this chapter I argue that this solution is not the whole story. As socialisation into the market 
testifies, structural domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation. But the 
PSCs understand socialisation into the market as the ideology of the market, or fetishism, and I avail 
myself of this reading to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic.75 Drawing on 
those who, unlike the PSCs, understand fetishism not as the ideology of the market but as the 
impersonal domination both capitalists and workers suffer in the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 
2017, Vrousalis 2017), I argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination 
on socialisation. In this case, however, it is because this influence is standardising, not segregating, 
that socialisation can entrench structural domination. 
I argue as follows. I start with the PSCs’ account of fetishism, showing that like the analytic 
Marxists (e.g., Cohen 2000, Elster 1986) they see it as the ideology of the market, but that since they 
understand ideology in terms of socialisation, they understand fetishism in terms of socialisation into 
the market.76 On this view, to fetishise the market is to keep commodifying things in the workplace 
 
75 I focus on the market, but perhaps the same analysis can be extended to gender. Gender, after all, is also a pervasive 
practice (see e.g., Lahire 2001, MacKinnon 1982), and as we will see, pervasiveness is crucial to my argument. Also 
central, however, is the fact that structural domination is responsible for its pervasiveness, so this would have to be 
demonstrated before my analysis can be extended to gender. The market is a particularly good example, however, both 
because it is the traditional focus of the analysis of fetishism and because its domination is more obviously responsible 
for its pervasiveness than may be the case with gender. 
76 More precisely: for the PSCs, ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised 
into them (e.g., Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016), so on their view fetishism refers to the schema of the market insofar 
as agents are socialised into it. Note that not all the PSCs follow Haslanger (2004) in suggesting that the practices do the 
dominating themselves. Einspahr (2010) would rather say that they only cause the domination of the dominant group, for 
instance, because her conception of structural domination is republican. As we saw in chapter 1, however, I follow 
Haslanger in assuming a radical conception of structural domination, on which the practices themselves dominate social 
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because the schema which things actualise and teach in this milieu is just that they are commodities, 
not that they are commodities because we commodify them, nor indeed that they are inherently 
commodities, as the analytic Marxists’ theory-focused account has it.   
Yet this account of fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market, I argue in the next section, 
faces the problem which, I argued in chapter 2, affects their view of socialisation in general. If 
socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, I argue, then the schema which things will 
actualise and teach should be the commodity schema with employers and clients, but the gift schema 
with friends or family, and the favour schema with neighbours: a fragmentation from which only 
Garfinkel’s ‘judgmental dopes’ (1984) would not learn that things in the market are commodities 
because they are treated as such in this milieu. Given this fragmentation, it is unclear why, insofar as 
they are not judgmental dopes, they fail to correct their commodity schema. 
At this stage, one might think of bringing to this problem the solution based on the segregating 
influence of structural domination on socialisation that I offered in the previous chapter. But this, as 
I we will see in section III, will not do. Structural domination does not have the same segregating 
influence on socialisation into the market that it has in other cases, I argue, since dominant groups 
and dominated groups are only segregated from one another: not from the friends, family, or 
neighbours with whom things actualise and teach the gift schema, or the favour schema (as opposed 
to the commodity schema). As a result, I conclude, it remains unclear why the commodity schema 
omits the fact that things are commodities at work because people commodify them. 
As an attempt to solve this problem, in section IV I draw on those who argue that fetishism is not 
the ideology of the market but the impersonal domination both workers and capitalists suffer in the 
market. Based on their analysis, I suggest that structural domination has another influence on 
socialisation into the market: not a segregating one but a standardising one. This influence is such, I 
argue, that things tend to actualise and teach the commodity schema not just at work, but also with 
friends and neighbours, if not quite (yet) with family: this deprives agents of the discrepancies 
between milieux that would enable them to include in the commodity schema the fact that things are 
commodities at work because people commodify them. What explains this influence and the resulting 
pervasiveness of the commodity schema, I claim, is the one feature of the domination of the market 
that those who define fetishism as this very domination agree on, despite their disagreements as to 
who is to be held responsible for it and whether it is arbitrary: namely, that it leads both capitalists 
and workers to maximise profit. 
In section V, finally, I defend this analysis against the objection, from the proponents of the 
domination conception, that fetishism is not the ideology of the market. This objection is grounded 
 
groups. Hence my definition of the PSCs’ view of ideology as ‘the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are 
socialised into them’, rather than, say, as ‘the schemas of unjust (e.g., dominating) practices…’. 
  64 
 
in the two claims that the commodity schema which things actualise and teach at work is neither 
epistemically deficient, since things appear as what they are to those who hold it (Roberts 2017), nor 
relevant, since fetishism is about activity rather than theoretical understanding (Ripstein 1987). To 
the first claim, I answer that things may indeed appear as what they are to those who hold the 
commodity schema, but that it does not follow that things appear as everything that they are to them. 
This means that while the commodity schema may not be epistemically deficient by inclusion of 
something which commodities are not, as it is on the analytic Marxist view, it may be epistemically 
deficient by omission of part of what commodities are, as it is on my view and that of the PSCs. To 
the second claim, I respond that fetishism may indeed not be about theoretical understanding, but that 
it does not follow that it is not about understanding at all. This means that while fetishism may not be 
about the kind of theoretical understanding the analytic Marxists focus on, it may be about the kind 
of practical understanding involved in activity that the PSCs and I focus on. 
Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for an amendment to the PSCs’ version of the ideology 
conception of fetishism. In particular, I do not argue that the proponents of the domination conception 
are mistaken to focus only on domination, or even that the analytic Marxists are mistaken to hold a 
theoretical view of the ideology of the market, though both claims may be implied by my argument. 
I only argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination on socialisation, 
but that in this case it is its standardising, not segregating, influence that explains how socialisation 
can entrench it in turn. 
 
I. THE IDEOLOGY CONCEPTION OF FETISHISM 
I start with the PSCs’ account of fetishism, showing that like many analytic Marxists they see it as 
the ideology of the market, but that since they understand ideology in terms of socialisation, they 
understand fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market. On this view, to fetishise the market is 
to keep commodifying things in the workplace because the schema which things actualise and teach 
in this milieu is just that they are commodities, not that they are commodities because we commodify 
them, nor indeed that they are inherently commodities, as the analytic Marxists’s theory-focused 
account has it. 
To set the scene, let me begin with class domination, move on to the market that supports it, and 
from there turn to commodification and fetishism. Class domination refers to the situation of the 
worker who, forced to some extent to sell her labour power to some member of the capitalist class to 
make a living, finds herself more or less unable to exit a relationship in which the relevant capitalist 
can get her to do what she wants her to do for as long as she has bought her ability to work (see e.g., 
Gourevitch 2018). Class domination depends on the market, which organises the systematic transfer 
of resources from workers to capitalists that impairs the ability of the former not to work for some 
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capitalist or other. As such, the market explains why there can be class domination without any legally 
or normatively sanctioned class distinctions (see e.g., Young 1990, 47).77 
The market is a social practice of commodity production and exchange, that is, a collective 
solution to a collective problem: the problem is that of making a living without central planning, and 
the solution the market exchange and competition generated by the commodification of things (Cohen 
2000; Roberts 2017, e.g., 78n97; Sewell 1992; Vrousalis 2012). People commodify things – from 
means of production to products to people’s own ability to produce – by reducing them, by means of 
money and other measuring devices, to units which can be counted, added, compared, and converted 
into one another, which enables and encourages them to produce and exchange things not as favours 
or gifts, but as commodities, viz. in such a way that no one gives more than exactly what she gets 
(Graeber 2001, 56, 2011, chapter 5, and Sewell 1992, 12–13; see also Ripstein 1987, 736, Heinrich 
2012, chapter 3, and Marx, Capital I (1976), 1).78 
With this in mind, we can move on to fetishism. In the analytic literature, the dominant conception 
is the analytic Marxist conception put forward most famously by Gerald Cohen (2000) and Jon Elster 
(1986). On this view, fetishism is the ideology of the market.79 The PSCs share this view, but since 
they understand ideology in terms of socialisation, their version has a more practical, less theoretical 
twist than the dominant version. Much is common between the two versions, however, and I begin 
with this. 
According to the three features of the Marx-inspired definition of ideology we saw in the previous 
chapter, to define fetishism as the ideology of the market is to define it as an epistemically deficient 
schema of the market, which agents infer from the way things appear to them, and which leads them 
to reproduce the market and entrench class domination (Cohen 2000, 115, Geras 1971, 78–79, 
Celikates 2016, 14; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c).80 The schema in question is, at the most general 
level, epistemically deficient insofar as it does not alert agents to the fact that the things they exchange 
with their employers and clients are commodities because they themselves commodify them (cf. 
 
77 I focused on this fundamental aspect of class domination in chapter 1. It is this aspect that enables individual capitalists 
to wield more or less arbitrary power over the workers who have signed a labour contract with them. Before any such 
contract is signed, however, the power of capitalists over worker is not arbitrary but aleatory (see Filling unpublished). 
In section IV we will encounter another kind of market domination, one which, unlike class domination, both workers 
and capitalists suffer from, viz., impersonal domination. 
78  Sewell speaks of ‘interconvertibility’ as the key feature of commodities, and Ripstein of their ‘exchangeability’ 
(respectively 1992, 26, and 1987, 736). As we will see, it is important to notice that their interconvertibility or 
exchangeability has a mathematical, monetary character, lest we fail to distinguish commodity exchange from exchanges 
of favours and exchanges of gifts, and therefore assume the pervasive character of commodification instead of conceiving 
it as the surprising fact that it is. As Sewell insists, it is ‘by means of money’ that each commodity ‘can be converted into 
any other’, the circuit being one of ‘monetised exchange’ which does not as such have the same claim to pervasiveness 
as exchange in general (see Sewell 1992, 26, and Ripstein 1987, 735). (For an argument that this claim to pervasiveness 
is unwarranted even in the case of exchange in general, insofar as ‘communist’ gift exchange in the family or among 
friends may not really be exchange at all, see Graeber 2011, chapter 5.) 
79 This view extends beyond the analytic Marxists, as Sobel notes (2016), but I focus on them here. 
80 Together with the impersonal domination from which both workers and capitalists suffer in the market, which I will 
introduce in section IV.   
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Cohen 2000, 116, Elster 1986, 57). This epistemically deficient schema, however, is not like a 
‘hallucination’ attributable entirely to a failure of perspicacity on the part of agents, but is rather ‘like 
a mirage’, insofar as the external world itself is misleading (Cohen 2000, 115, see also Elster 1986, 
56 and 177, Geras 1971, 78–9). In particular, the ‘foundation’ of exchange-value ‘in labouring 
activity is not [visible]’ (Cohen 2000, 116). This schema, finally, explains why agents fail to change 
the market, thus entrenching class domination: agents will not even think of organising production 
and exchange differently if they fail to realise that things are commodities only because they 
themselves commodify them. Thus, as Cohen puts it, ‘[f]etishism protects capitalism’ (2000, 129). 
This much is common to the PSCs and the analytic Marxists. The difference between them lies in 
the exact way in which the ideological schema at issue is epistemically deficient. According to the 
analytic Marxists, the view is epistemically deficient not merely by omission of part of what 
commodities are, viz. their being commodities because agents commodify them, but by inclusion of 
something which commodities are not, viz. their being commodities ‘as an inherent property’, or 
‘autonomously’ (Elster 1986, 57 and Cohen 2000, 116, respectively). Insofar as including 
explanations of this kind is the mark of a theoretical mode of engagement with the world, one on 
which agents have the time and need to flesh out their views of things by contemplating them, we 
may say that for the analytic Marxists the ideological view in question is a theoretical view.81 
For the PSCs, by contrast, the ideological view at issue is much more practical. Since the PSCs 
understand ideology in terms of socialisation, on their view fetishism can be understood in terms of 
socialisation into the market. More precisely, since, for them, ideology refers to the schemas of 
dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them, fetishism refers to the schema of the 
market insofar as agents are socialised into it. According to their account of socialisation, this means 
that to fetishise the market is to keep applying the commodity schema to things, because in this milieu 
things ‘actualise’ or ‘incorporate’ this schema, and so ‘teach’ or ‘inculcate’ it in turn (Sewell 1992, 
12–13, quoted in Haslanger 2017c, 22; see also Einspahr 2010).82 But socialisation helps agents enact 
social practices, so the schemas at issue, being geared primarily to helping them bring these collective 
solutions to their collective problems, often focus on what things are, without suggesting anything as 
 
81 David Ricardo’s labour theory of value is the paradigmatic example of this theoretical view (there are others; see Cohen 
2000, 127–29). On any labour theory of value, we can calculate the amount of labour invested in a given product as a 
proportion of the total labour of a given society, and this is its value for this society (Cohen 1979, 339, Roberts 2017, 78, 
Graeber 2001, 55). On Marx’s version of the theory, we can only do this under capitalism, because it is the only society 
in which labour is commodified, i.e., reduced to units – of time, reflecting the fact that capitalists pay workers an hourly 
wage – which can be counted, added, and compared. On Ricardo’s version of the theory, by contrast, labour is always 
reducible to ‘man-hours’, no matter the mode of production we are in (Ricardo, 1951 [1817], see Graeber 2001, 55). Thus 
Ricardo’s view is mistaken by inclusion of this un-historicised claim (see also Sobel 2016).    
82 For instance: people’s ability to work is remunerated by the hour, as evidenced by their payslips (Graeber 2001, 55), 
and products have a price tag and a standardised aspect that actualise in the material world their monetary 
interconvertibility. 
  67 
 
to why they are what they are (cf. Torrance 1995, 46–47).83 This is why the commodity schema, for 
the PSCs, is that things are commodities full stop, not that they are commodities autonomously or 
not, any such explanation being outside the immediate concern of agents aiming to make a living.84 
In other words, the commodity schema is epistemically mistaken not by inclusion of something which 
commodities are not, as it is for the analytic Marxists, but instead by omission of part of what they 
are. As Haslanger puts it, it ‘leave[s] out’ the fact that commodities are such because we commodify 
them, and as such ‘obscure[s] [their] social dimension’ (Haslanger 2012, 18 and 467; see also 
Celikates 2016).85 
This distinction will prove important in section V, when it comes to defending my amended 
version of the view of the PSCs. Before we get to that, however, I must explain why this view needs 
amending. So what I want to emphasise to conclude this section is that on this view, to fetishise the 
market is to keep commodifying things in the workplace, because the schema which things 
incorporate and teach in this milieu is just that they are commodities, not that they are commodities 
because we commodify them, nor indeed that they are inherently commodities, as the analytic 
Marxists hold. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM 
With this is in mind, I now begin the argument that this account of fetishism in terms of socialisation 
into the market needs amending, which will take us to section IV. In this section, I argue that as an 
application of the PSCs’ account of socialisation, it faces the problem I identified with this account 
 
83 In Marxist theory, ‘what things are’ is referred to as the appearance of things, ‘why they are what they are’ as their 
essence (see e.g., Torrance 1995, 44). Thus the distinction between appearance and essence should not be understood as 
a distinction between appearance and reality. It is not the case that appearances are what is not real and essences are what 
is real: both are two parts of what is real, ‘such that knowledge of one, the essence, explains why the other is as it is’ 
(ibid.). I do not use this vocabulary since the PSCs do not, but their account is manifestly influenced by Marx. On another 
note, it is worth pointing out that Richard Sobel has recently made a similar distinction between two views of fetishism, 
calling ‘essentialist’ the version I call theoretical and ‘constructivist’ the version I call practical (2016). Sobel, however, 
has the same theoretical understanding of ideology as the analytic Marxists, and for this reason fails to realise that the 
practical understanding of ideology can be seen as a version of the ideology conception of fetishism, rather than as an 
opponent to this view (specifically, one on which the relevant schema is not epistemically deficient in any way). 
84 Haslanger at times suggests that the ‘hegemony’ of the relevant schema is necessary to explain its epistemic deficiency 
(see e.g., 2012, 467; cf. Sewell 1992 (discussed in section V below), whom indeed she draws on). But as she does not 
make it clear that domination is necessary to explain the hegemony, this suggestion conflicts with her claim that schemas 
are not normally hegemonic. It is this conflict that is at the heart of the problem I emphasised in chapter 2 (see section II 
below). Note also that to my knowledge she does not focus on capitalist issues strictly speaking, but her account and that 
of the PSCs more generally is obviously inspired by Marx and related analyses.   
85 Contrast the commodity schema which agents infer from the things they exchange with their employers and clients, to 
the ‘goalpost’ schema, which people will infer from the bags they use as goalposts when playing an informal game of 
football in a park. The commodity schema is that the things agents exchange with their employers and clients are 
commodities full stop, and leaves out the fact that they are commodities because agents use them as such. By contrast, 
we should expect the ‘goalpost’ schema not to leave out the fact that the bags are goalposts because people use them as 
such. The bags and the milieu are such that the ‘goalpost’ schema does not omit this crucial fact, while commodities and 
the market are such that the commodity schema does do so. What exactly it means for the market ‘to be such’ is the focus 
of what follows. To anticipate, it means that the market is a pervasive practice, because of the standardising influence of 
structural domination on socialisation.  
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in chapter 2. If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, I argue, then the schema that 
things will actualise and teach should be the commodity schema with employers and clients, but the 
gift schema with friends or family and the favour schema with neighbours — from which only 
‘judgmental dopes’ would not learn that things on the market are commodities because we use them 
as such in this milieu but not in others, and correct their commodity schema accordingly. If so, 
however, then it is unclear how the commodity schema can explain how agents entrench class 
domination. 
To begin with, recall from chapter 2 that, according to the PSCs, agents are socialised into a 
multiplicity of social practices, some of which are not capitalist. As we saw Sally Haslanger insists 
in previous chapters, ‘[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology [e.g. capitalist 
schemas] functions as a total system governing society as a whole’ (2017b, 161). Indeed, remember 
Robin Celikates’s insistence that we should bear in mind Geuss’s famous claim that ‘a society of 
happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a nightmare, not a realistic view of a state of society 
which is at present possible’ (1981, 83–84, quoted in Celikates 2016). In other words, we should 
expect ideological schemas to be actualised in things in some of the milieux which agents navigate, 
but not in others. Yet if so, crucially, we should also expect agents to learn that things actualise a 
schema because they themselves incorporate it in things in some milieux but not in others. They are 
‘knowledgeable’ agents, after all (Giddens 1979, 5; see also Celikates 2006, Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006), who should be expected to realise that if things actualise different schemas in different milieux, 
it is only because they themselves apply different schemas to them.86 
This is particularly clear with the commodity schema. If socialisation works in the way the PSCs 
say it does, we should expect this schema to be incorporated in things when people exchange them 
with their employers or clients, but not when they exchange them with their neighbours, friends, of 
family. As Graeber (2011) and Cohen (2009) insist, commodity exchange is very different from the 
kind of exchange that in principle occurs between neighbours, friends, or family. The schema of 
commodity exchange is not just ‘give as good as you get’, as in neighbourly exchange, but rather 
‘give exactly as good as you get’, price being the expression of this mathematical equivalence made 
possible by the reduction of things to countable units (Graeber 2011, chapter 5). The discrepancy is 
even more striking with close friends and family. There, the schema is the ‘baseline communist’ one, 
‘to each according to their needs and from each according to their means’ (Graeber, ibid.; cf. Cohen 
2009, 39–45). Thus, in principle, the things which agents exchange with neighbours, friends, or 
family do not actualise the commodity schema, but the favour schema or the gift schema (as the case 
 
86 As I have already emphasised in the course of this thesis, one of the ‘leading theorem[s]’ advanced by Giddens is that 
‘every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member’ 
(1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319). 
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may be). When plumbers fixe the bathroom of their relatives for free, for example, their ability to 
work does not incorporate the commodity schema. It is not standardised but personalised, and the 
plumbers’ relatives are not presented with a bill. 
Yet, crucially, if, as I just argued, the things which agents exchange with their neighbours, friends, 
and family do not incorporate the commodity schema in the way that the things which they exchange 
with their employers and clients do, then it is unclear how the commodity schema can leave out the 
fact that these things are commodities because people commodify them. People, after all, are not 
‘judgmental dopes’, to return to Garfinkel’s famous phrase (1984, 75, in Celikates 2006, 30; see also 
Roberts 2017, 95), and if things incorporate different schemas in different milieux, the discrepancies 
between things or milieux should help them realise that they do the incorporating themselves.87 When 
a plumber fixes her neighbour’s kitchen sink because he previously babysat her children and she owes 
him one, or repairs her parents’ bathroom for free, she can hardly fail to infer that if her ability to 
work is a commodity at work, it is because she commodifies it by selling it to her employer or clients 
for an hourly wage.88 In other words, we should expect her commodity schema to include the fact 
that her ability to work is a commodity at work because of herself and her employer, just like we 
should expect her gift schema and her favour schema to include, respectively, the facts that her ability 
to work is a gift in family milieux because it has been made so by herself and her parents, or that its 
being exchanged as a favour in neighbourly spheres is due to her and her neighbours’ making it so. 
If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then, we should expect things to actualise 
the commodity schema with employers and clients, but the gift schema with family and friends and 
the favour schema with neighbours. But this suggests in turn that we should not expect agents’ 
commodity schema to limit itself to the fact that things at work are commodities, omitting the further 
fact that, if they are so, it is because agents themselves commodify them in this milieu. If so, however, 
then it is unclear how the commodity schema can prevent agents from changing the market for the 
 
87 As Celikates notes (2006, 30n38), Garfinkel’s point was originally directed at Talcott Parsons. This point is emphasised 
by many sociologists keen on distancing themselves from what we might call the epistemological elitism of earlier social 
science, including by those who provide much of the inspiration for the PSCs’ account of socialisation, like Giddens (via 
Sewell). See Celikates 2006 for a helpful survey. 
88 Indeed, by being dominated into selling it. On the PSCs’ view, the fact that workers and capitalists are dominated into 
commodifying their ability to work in the workplace is irrelevant when it comes to explaining the epistemic deficiency 
of their schema of commodities: on their view, it is their socialisation in the workplace that explains its persistent epistemic 
deficiency, and it would remain deficient even if agents were not dominated. But this has them run into the problem I 
highlight in this section, which we met in chapters 2 and 3, and which it is my goal here as it was there to try to solve. As 
should be clear by now, my strategy is to pay more attention to structural domination and its various influences on 
socialisation than the PSCs do. Here in particular I will focus on what I call its standardising influence. Still, on my view 
as well the fact that agents are dominated into commodifying things at work is not paramount to explaining the epistemic 
deficiency: as we will see, what matters in this respect is the fact that they are dominated into commodifying other milieux 
beyond work. 
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better, and lead them to entrench class domination as a result.89 Put differently, since ideology, for 
the PSCs, refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them, 
their account of fetishism as the ideology of the market runs into the problem that affects their view 
of socialisation.  
 
III. NO SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION INTO 
THE MARKET 
Similar problems calling for similar solutions, one might think of bringing to this problem the solution 
that I offered in the previous chapter, which was based on the segregating influence of structural 
domination on socialisation. But this solution, I argue in this section, will not do. Structural 
domination does not have the same segregating influence on socialisation into the market that it has 
in other cases: dominant and dominated groups are only segregated from one another, not from the 
friends, family, or neighbours with whom things actualise and teach the gift or favour schemas. 
Therefore, I argue, it remains unclear why the commodity schema omits the fact that things are 
commodities at work because people commodify them. 
Since the PSCs’ account of fetishism as the ideology of the market faces the problem I identified 
in chapter 2 with their view of socialisation, and since we already encountered a version of this 
problem in chapter 3, one might want to suggest an explanation of the kind I offered in the latter 
chapter. But this kind of explanation does not work in this case, I argue now, since socialisation into 
the market is not under the segregating influence of structural domination. As we will see in the next 
section, it is instead under its standardising influence. 
The key to the solution I offered in the previous chapter, recall, is the segregating influence of 
structural domination, which separates social groups from the milieux that would enable them to 
correct their epistemically deficient schemas. To return to the example I offered there, white 
professionals live such different lives from their black employees, who due to lack of childcare and 
long commutes might be unreliable at work, that they never correct the generalisation they infer from 
this. Here, likewise, one might think that people in general, including the same professionals, are 
distanced from the milieux where things do not incorporate the commodity schema, and so from the 
 
89 Michael Heinrich also notices that if agents are to fetishise commodities in this ideological sense, they must fail to 
realise that they are doing the commodifying themselves (2012, 74–75). This mistake is ‘unconsciously produced’, as he 
puts it (ibid.). But because he examines, with Marx, ‘a fully developed capitalism’ (2012, 32, his emphasis), and so a 
capitalism that has become more or less total, he can only conceive of the relevant social contexts historically (e.g., 
feudalism before, communism afterwards) rather than simultaneously (e.g., friends, the family, neighbours). For this 
reason, he fails to see that standardisation is the explanation of such unconsciousness. A similar drawback can be found 
in Catharine MacKinnon’s analysis. She also emphasises the importance of such unconsciousness for fetishism (1982, 
541), but does not insist enough that the relevant social relations are not total, but instead cohabit with other relations with 
which they are often inconsistent (see e.g., 540–42). Both also mention structural domination, but neither highlight its 
exact mechanism as I try to do here. 
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discrepancies that would enable them to realise they are doing the commodifying themselves. This, 
in turn, would explain why the schema they infer from the things they exchange at work omits the 
fact that these things are commodities because they themselves commodify them. 
But this solution cannot apply here, I argue now: domination does not have such a segregating 
influence on socialisation on the market. Agents are not segregated from the milieux in which, if 
socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, we should expect things to not incorporate the 
commodity schema. White professionals, for instance, are segregated from the milieux that would 
help them understand why their black employees might be unreliable at work, but they are not 
segregated from the milieux in which they meet their own friends or family. So if the things white 
professionals exchange with their friends, say, embody the gift schema rather than the commodity 
schema, as we should expect if socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does, then their schema 
of the things they exchange with their employers and clients should tell them not just that these things 
incorporate the commodity schema full stop, but that they do this because they themselves incorporate 
it in them. Once again, agents are not judgmental dopes: if things are gifts with their friends, but 
commodities with their employers and clients, it would be surprising that they should infer from either 
that they are gifts or commodities full stop, rather than because they themselves make them gifts with 
their friends and commodities with their employers and clients. 
A solution to the problem that appeals to the segregating influence of domination on socialisation, 
then, is unsatisfying in this case. But the general form of the solution, I argue in the next section, is 
not. In this case as well socialisation does not work in the way the PSCs say it does, and here as well 
their mistake is due to their neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. The 
difference is that when it comes to fetishism, the influence of structural domination on socialisation 
is not segregating but standardising, such that the schema which things actualise and teach is the 
commodity schema not just at work, but also with friends and neighbours, if not quite (yet) with 
family. This solves the problem, I argue, insofar as it deprives agents of the discrepancies between 
milieux that would enable them to include, in the commodity schema, the fact that things are 
commodities at work because agents commodify them themselves. 
 
IV. THE STANDARDISING INFLUENCE OF DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION  
To make the claim that, in this case, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because 
structural domination has a standardising influence on it, I draw on those who argue that fetishism is 
not the ideology of the market, but the domination of the market instead. What explains the 
pervasiveness of the commodity schema and its consecutive incompletion, I suggest, is the one feature 
of market domination which the proponents of this alternative view agree on, despite their 
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disagreements as to who is to be held responsible for this domination and whether it is arbitrary in 
some sense: namely, that it leads both capitalists and workers to maximise profit. 
While the ideology conception of fetishism remains the dominant one in the analytic literature, it 
has recently come under sustained pressure. Roberts (2017), in particular, has built on Ripstein (1987) 
to argue that ‘[f]etishism ought to be understood as a form of domination rather than a form of false 
consciousness’ (2017, 85), and Vrousalis has followed suite in his review of Roberts (2017). I will 
consider their objections in the last section, when I push back against the latter on behalf of my 
amendment of the PSCs’ version of the ideology conception. Before that, however, I need to flesh 
out this amendment. To this end, I focus on what I take to be the central insight of the domination 
alternative. 
On this alternative view, fetishism is the impersonal domination both workers and capitalists 
suffer on the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 2017, Vrousalis 2017). To be clear, this domination is 
different from, even if it influences, the class domination I described in section I. As Roberts insists, 
‘the dominant class in modernity, the class of capitalists, is as subject to impersonal domination as 
are the laboring classes’ (2017, 102). Vrousalis agrees: Roberts, he writes, is right that ‘capitalist [or 
impersonal] domination is not equivalent to class domination’ (2017, 379). Ripstein also concurs: 
according to him, the central feature of this domination is that ‘the options of all are limited by the 
market’, not merely those of workers relative to capitalists (1987, 747). 
Class domination, we saw, refers to the situation of the worker who, forced to some extent to sell 
her labour power to some member of the capitalist class to make a living, finds herself more or less 
unable to exit a relationship in which the relevant capitalist, for as long as they have bought her ability 
to work, can get her to do more or less what they want her to do (see e.g., Gourevitch 2018; see also 
Filling, unpublished). The domination in focus, by contrast, is the domination from which both 
workers and capitalists suffer in the market because of competition, be it to sell one’s labour power 
or one’s commodities in general (see Roberts 2017, 88 and Vrousalis 2017, 379). 
The complete definition of this impersonal domination is the object of some debate between 
Roberts and Vrousalis, who disagree as to who is to be held morally responsible for it, and whether 
it is arbitrary in some sense (see Roberts 2017 and Vrousalis 2017).90  But let me bypass these 
 
90 Vrousalis (2017) argues that capitalists can be held morally responsible for the domination at issue, and he insists that 
this domination is in an important sense non-arbitrary since it influences class domination in such a way that capitalists 
cannot interfere as they please with their workers: they must have them maximise profit, on pain of bankruptcy. Roberts 
(2017), by contrast, claims that no one can be held morally responsible for the domination at issue, and he emphasises the 
arbitrariness of market fluctuations (these two points enabling him to conclude, on the republican-inspired view he 
attributes to Marx, that the domination at issue it that of the market). In line with these disagreements, Roberts and 
Vrousalis take the domination at issue to be impersonal in different senses: for Vrousalis, it is impersonal in the sense 
that it prevents capitalists from giving a personal flavour to their domination over their workers; for Roberts, it is 
impersonal in the sense that no one can be held morally responsible for it. On the view I defend, this domination is 
impersonal in both senses, but Vrousalis’s sense has the advantage of emphasising the profit-maximising logic that is 
crucial to my argument (and which Roberts also recognises, as I argue below). 
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disagreements to focus on what both Roberts and Vrousalis agree on, and Ripstein as well. This is 
that both workers and capitalists are dominated into maximising profit. As Vrousalis insists, market 
competition affects radically the power of the capitalist class over the working class. Without 
competition, each capitalist can act as a kind of ‘absolute monarch’ over their workers, relatively 
unconstrained in the wage they offer and in what they ask them to do. But as soon as they face 
(perfect-enough) competition, they can no longer determine wages arbitrarily, or have workers do 
whatever takes their fancy: at this point ‘[each] is constrained, on pain of competitive disadvantage, 
to maximise profit, which in turn requires paying [workers] a market-clearing wage’, and, I add, 
exploiting them (2017, 380–81). Roberts concurs, writing for instance that ‘[t]he capitalist, dominated 
by market imperatives, is compelled thereby to exploit labor’, which by definition entails making a 
profit (2017, 102). Ripstein agrees as well, emphasising both that the worker ‘must make himself 
marketable and once sold, direct his activity to whatever his employer demands’, and that ‘[t]he 
employer’s options are broader but still limited: On pain of bankruptcy, this demand can only take a 
single form: produce what is profitable’ (1987, 748). 
In other words, all the proponents of the domination conception of fetishism agree that in an 
important respect the domination at issue is ‘non-arbitrary’ in the sense of ‘regulated’ – indeed, 
regulated by one key rule: ‘maximise profit’ (Vrousalis 2017, 381).91 If Roberts downplays this 
aspect, it is only to emphasise that this domination is in another sense arbitrary, viz. whimsical. For 
the two aspects seem to clash, and it is on this apparent clash that Vrousalis insists when he uses the 
term ‘non-arbitrary’ to characterise this domination. But the clash is only apparent, as it is quite 
compatible for the domination that on each view constitutes fetishism to be both arbitrary and non-
arbitrary in these senses. The market may have movements that are quite difficult to anticipate and, 
at the same time, still channel capitalists (and workers in their wake) in one definite direction: that of 
making profit. As Sewell emphasises, what characterises capitalism is precisely both a ‘chronic 
instability or unpredictability’ and ‘a continuous dynamic of capital accumulation […]’ (1992, 25–
26).92 
Now, Vrousalis also insists, against Roberts, that the agents of this domination are not ‘markets 
or market imperatives’, but ‘[c]apitalists who dominate each other by jointly constituting the “external 
coercive necessities confronting the individual capitalist”’ (2017, 3, quoting Marx 1976, 381). Here 
 
91 Frank Lovett, for instance, defines non-arbitrariness in this way: there are rules that constrain the way in which the 
dominators can use their power over others, so that they cannot get them to do just anything that takes their fancy (see 
Lovett 2010). We saw in chapter 1 that insofar as workers have to work for some capitalist rather than a specific capitalist, 
no capitalist has arbitrary power over workers in this respect. After they have signed a labour contract, however, things 
are different: bosses enjoy more or less arbitrary power over their workers in various respects (Filling unpublished, 
Gourevitch 2018). But there is one crucial, indeed, overarching respect in which their power is not arbitrary: they have to 
maximise profit. It is this aspect that should be emphasised here. 
92 Vrousalis himself notes that ‘[t]his competition causes long-term prices to fluctuate […] to maintain profit’ (2017, 380). 
As we will see shortly, Sewell sees in ‘the commodification of things’ the core of this dynamic (1992, 25). 
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I do not engage in this debate, however, for it would take us too far afield.93 Instead, I focus on the 
profit-maximising logic that I have described above. For it offers a solution to the problem identified 
in section II. 
The reason it does, in a nutshell, is the following. If capitalists and workers are dominated into 
maximising profit, then they are dominated into incorporating the commodity schema beyond the 
workplace, in as many milieux as competition requires. This in turns deprives them of the 
discrepancies between milieux that could help them realise that they themselves are incorporating the 
commodity schema in things, and explains how this schema can fail to include this fact. For as Sewell 
emphasises, ‘the commodification of things’ is at the core of the ‘continuous dynamic of capital 
accumulation’ and profit maximisation we saw him mention earlier (1992, 25). Capitalists, on pain 
of competitive disadvantage, have a strong incentive to ensure that as many things are commodified 
as possible, and so, therefore, do their workers. Only commodities are ‘opportunities for profit’ after, 
all, and competition requires capitalists to maximise profit. This is why, in Sewell’s words again, ‘the 
commodification of things’ has become ‘pervasive’, that is, ‘present in a relatively wide range of 
institutional spheres, practices, and discourses’ (ibid., 25 and 22): the ‘chain of commodity exchange’ 
remains ‘vast’, he writes, as ‘the commodity form […] organizes a virtually universal intersection of 
resources’ (ibid., 26). In this respect, it is no surprise that Marx’s first description of capitalism in 
Capital is as ‘an immense collection of commodities’ (1976, chapter 1). The domination identified 
above turns commodity exchange into a practice that is pervasive in a way few practices ever are.94  
Now, Sewell seems to take such pervasiveness to result from the fact that the commodity schema 
is ‘exceptionally transposable’ (1992, 25), rather than from the profit-maximising logic of the 
domination which Ripstein, Roberts, and Vrousalis insist on. Sewell nowhere mentions domination, 
but instead insists that the commodity schema itself ‘knows no natural limits’ as ‘it can be applied 
not only to cloth, tobacco, or cooking pans, but to land, housework, bread, sex, advertising, emotions, 
or knowledge […]’ (ibid., 25–26). But this seems to me mistaken. Exceptional transposability is not 
exceptional transposition, and a motivating force – ‘a force that requires it’, as MacKinnon puts it 
 
93 A word on this debate. Roberts argues that workers and capitalists are dominated by the market because the myriad 
agents, both workers and capitalists, who enact this practice, or more generally who fail to change it, cannot be held 
morally responsible for its arbitrary effects since they cannot be expected to foresee them. Vrousalis objects that it is not 
the market but the capitalists who do the dominating, and that they do it by jointly constituting the external necessities 
confronting each individual capitalist (and, through them, their workers). In these conditions, one can take the debate to 
centre on whether the capitalists can be expected to foresee the effects of the market after all, and if so whether they could 
cease, by themselves, to jointly constitute the external necessities confronting each individual capitalist. Those siding 
with Roberts would deny one or both of these claims; those siding with Vrousalis would defend both. But both groups 
would agree that the domination at issue has a profit-maximising logic, whether it is domination by the market or by the 
capitalist class. 
94 Sewell mentions language as another example of a pervasive practice (1992, 22). But most languages are confined to 
states or regions, and even within a linguistic region, different social groups have different dialects. In addition, even the 
most transnational languages (e.g., Arabic, English, Spanish) are not as global as the ‘language’ of the commodity. A 
better example, following MacKinnon (1982) and Lahire (2000), is gender. 
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(1982, 540) – is crucial for the actual rather than merely virtual pervasiveness of the chain of 
commodity exchange. This motivating force is the domination with a profit-maximising logic that 
affects both capitalists and their workers on the market.95 
Thus while capitalists and workers might try to keep the things they exchange with their family 
uncommodified at all costs, they will often expand the commodity schema to the things they exchange 
with friends and neighbours. The magazine Plumbing Connection provides a telling example of this 
phenomenon in an article entitled ‘The Deal with Mates Rates’, by Brad Fallon (2014). Fallon begins 
by noting that ‘people with trade skills are always faced with the old ‘mates rates’ dilemma’. He 
frames the dilemma as follows: ‘with a client […] I just roll off the invoice – job well done’; 
‘however, add a stressed friend, relative or neighbour into the scenario – someone who I see all the 
time, whether in my street, at school, or socially – and suddenly, I have this overwhelming need to 
become the not-for-profit, happy to spend my weekend plumbing “for free” emergency plumber’. 
And so he goes on to offer ‘some of [his] most helpful tips for ensuring that [people with trade skills] 
are adequately paid for the work [they] do’. The tips can be grouped in two categories: making 
excuses and commodifying, the only exception being the family (‘Obviously […], if it is your Mother-
In-Law knocking on the door, throw all the rules out and do the job straight away for free’). One good 
tip, in particular, consists in ‘booking the job in during standard work hours with one of [your] staff 
members’. As Fallon emphasises, this ‘change[s] the dynamic of the relationship back from a personal 
favour to a professional plumbing service’. Other tips go in the same direction.96 As this example 
illustrates, capitalists and their staff members are dominated into extending the commodity schema 
beyond the workplace to as many milieux as competition requires – even with their friends, if not 
with their mother-in-law.97 
 
95 In fact, this domination and its logic might even be sufficient for the pervasiveness of the commodity schema. There 
are at least two reasons for this. First, it seems that if agents are motivated enough to transpose a schema, they will 
transpose it even if it is not as easy to transpose as the commodity schema. If so, however, then it is the motivating force 
that is doing the explanatory work, not the schema’s exceptional transposability. Second, and more fundamentally, 
whether the transposability is exceptional or not does not depend on the schema alone, but on its relation to the resource 
to which it is applied, and therefore on its relation to the schema that is already applied to this resource and which it 
purports to replace. If friends are used to exchanging some things as favours, for example, then transposing the commodity 
schema to these things may not be as easy as Sewell seems to suggest, and only agents under the competitive pressures 
making up the impersonal domination I want to emphasise may be motivated enough to carry out the transposition. 
96 Another tip is particularly telling. ‘One last option for working with friends and family’, Fallon writes, ‘is setting up an 
exchange system for services’: ‘we set an agreed hourly rate for each of our services upfront and then we keep a tally of 
the hours we both work for each other’ so that ‘when I think [one of them has] spent too much time helping me, I will 
pay [them] for some of the work’. If this tally was not itself convertible in money, or if they did not keep such exact track 
of their hours, this practice might stand apart from the market and constitute a counter-practice, one on which agents can 
draw to question the market. But the tally is convertible into money, as Fallon notes, and the practice has little disrupting 
potential as it stands.  
97 The intensity of this domination varies both historically and depending on the specific worker or capitalist in focus. 
Regarding the first kind of variation, neoliberalism is the most recent example of the renewed extension of the market to 
as many spheres of life as possible (e.g., Harvey 2005, e.g., 2, Brown 2015, e.g., 28, Stedman Jones 2012, e.g., 2, 15; see 
also Foucault 2010). Regarding the second, a capitalist who has already made a lot of profit is forced to some degree to 
keep doing so if she is to maintain her position on the market, but less so than if she was struggling to avoid bankruptcy, 
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But this standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, crucially, offers a 
solution to the problem affecting the PSCs’ account of fetishism in terms of socialisation into the 
market. The problem, recall, was that if things incorporate different schemas in different milieux, 
which they should do if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then the discrepancies 
between these milieux should prompt agents to realise that they do the incorporating themselves, and 
include this fact in their commodity schema. If our plumber fixes her neighbour’s kitchen sink 
because he previously babysat her children and she owes him one, or her parents’ bathroom for free, 
we should expect her schema of her ability to work in the workplace to tell her that it is commodified 
by herself and her employer. Brad Fallon is a case in point: he complains that ‘because I like to “help” 
my friends’, […] it feels wrong to charge them’ (2014). But the standardising influence of structural 
domination offers a solution to this problem. For if the plumber, or any other market agent, is 
dominated in such a way that she does not, with her neighbours or friends, exchange her ability to 
work as a favour or as a gift but as a commodity, in just the same way as she does with her employer 
and customers, then the move from one milieu to the next will be so natural that it will blunt her 
critical consciousness: specifically, she will not realise that she herself is actualising the commodity 
schema in her ability to work, and her version of the schema will not include this fact.98 Fallon’s 
version of the schema, because he has reflected on it, may be sufficiently critical, but he is an 
exception. Indeed, he insists, ‘most friends, neighbours and relatives […] don’t actually want a 
discount or preferential treatment’. In fact, usually they do not even ask him ‘to discount [his] prices’ 
(ibid.).99 Unlike him, they may well fetishise commodities. 
More generally, I want to suggest the following explanation of the mirage at the heart of fetishism. 
If the commodity schema is incorporated not just in the things agents exchange with their employers 
and customers, but also in the things they exchange with their ‘friends, relatives or neighbours’, as 
Fallon puts it, then the schema they infer from the commodities they exchange with their employers 
and customers will leave out the fact that they themselves are responsible for the commodification of 
 
and even less so than if she was a worker struggling to make ends meet. This is important, because it means that a capitalist 
in the first situation has more power to improve things, and so bears more forward-looking responsibility in this respect, 
than a capitalist in the second situation, and both more than the worker (cf. Young 2011). Any of them can only start 
acting in this way, however, if they do not fail to realise that they are doing the commodifying themselves: in other words, 
if they are not too socialised into the market because the latter is pervasive across the milieux they navigate. 
98 The same argument could be made about the goods and services which were previously produced by the welfare state 
and which agents exchanged as citizens, such as care services in hospitals. This form of exchange does not involve the 
keeping of exact accounts: it allows for deficits and debts that (at least before neoliberalism and austerity) do not need to 
be repaid to the last penny. For this reason, it is close to the way in which neighbours exchange favours. In this respect, 
Boris Johnson’s decision to ask British citizens to ‘protect the NHS’ by staying at home during the Covid-19 pandemic 
(rather than to decommodify care services by liberating the NHS from the burden of its growing debt) may be an example 
of commodity fetishism. 
99 Indeed, there is a risk that the ‘exchange system for services’ that Fallon has set up with some of his friends will slowly 
commodify his relations with them in time, so that eventually he himself might no longer notice that he and they are doing 
the commodifying themselves. They keep an exact track of the hours they work for one another, after all, and the tally of 
these hours is convertible into money. 
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commodities. For when a schema is pervasive in this way, there are no hitches between the spheres 
of activity agents navigate, and they stop noticing that they are applying it themselves: as Sewell puts 
it, schemas that are incorporated in a relatively wide range of milieux tend to become ‘relatively 
unconscious, in the sense that they are taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedures 
that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them’ (1992, 22; see also 24 
ff.). Agents in such a standardised environment are deprived of the prompts that could have helped 
them realise that they are following the standard, and end up doing so without thinking (cf. Graeber 
2005, 431).100 One might say that the commodity schema, in particular, is reflected back to them by 
so many things that they become ‘naturals’ relative to it, applying it ‘naturally’ to the things that 
reflect it, aware only that they are exchanging them as commodities, not that they are commodifying 
them as they do. Their critical consciousness is blunted. 
The commodity schema does not alert capitalists and workers to the fact that it is because they 
commodify them that the things they exchange are commodities, and it does not alert them to this 
because they incorporate this schema in things without thinking. They do this, in turn, because they 
are dominated into incorporating this schema in things, not just in the workplace, but pervasively, for 
instance in friendly reunions and neighbourly encounters, if not in family settings. In other words, the 
impersonal domination at issue deprives them of the standpoints from which to realise that they are 
constructing social reality in such a way that they entrench, in a vicious circle, their own domination 
(see MacKinnon 1982 and Lahire 2001).101 
The PSCs, I conclude, neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation. 
In this case, however, this influence is standardising, not segregating. Fetishism, or the ideology of 
the market understood in terms of socialisation into the market, entrenches structural domination 
because structural domination, in the form of the impersonal domination Vrousalis, Roberts and 
Ripstein emphasise, and of the class domination it affects, has a standardising influence on 




100 As Graeber puts it, ‘[t]he key factor [that explains the mistake] would appear to be […] whether one has the capacity 
to at least occasionally step into some overarching perspective from which the machinery is visible, and one can see that 
all these apparently fixed objects are really part of an ongoing process of construction’ (2005, 431). In my view, this 
overarching perspective is attained by navigating different, non-standardised milieux, in which things incorporate 
different schemas. Graeber does not emphasise here that domination is responsible for agents’ incapacity to reach this 
perspective, but he elsewhere (e.g., 2009, 516ff) insists on the loop between domination and consciousness (or 
imagination, in his terms). 
101 Bernard Lahire – Bourdieu’s ‘academic heir’ in France – also emphasises the connection between pervasiveness and 
unconsciousness in the context of gender differences (2001). In fact, one might make the same argument about these 
differences, where fetishised gender differences would be analogous to fetishised commodities, provided men and women 
are dominated into gendering themselves in this way (see MacKinnon 1982 and Rubin 1975 for clues as to how this might 
work). 
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V. OBJECTIONS AND DEFENCE 
Let me finally defend this analysis against the objection that fetishism is not the ideology of the 
market. The proponents of the domination view ground this objection in the two claims that the 
commodity schema that things actualise and teach at work is neither epistemically deficient, since 
things appear as what they are to those who hold it (Roberts 2017), nor in fact relevant, since fetishism 
is about activity rather than theoretical understanding (Ripstein 1987). In response, I draw on the 
distinction I made in section I between practical and theoretical understanding to argue that, while 
this objection affects the analytic Marxist view, it misses the mark as an objection to the view I defend. 
More precisely, I argue as follows. To the first claim, I answer that things may indeed appear as 
what they are to those who hold the commodity schema, but that it does not follow that things appear 
to them as everything they are. This means that, while the commodity schema may not be 
epistemically deficient through the inclusion of something which commodities are not, as it is on the 
analytic Marxist view, it may yet be epistemically deficient by omission of part of what commodities 
are, as it is on my view and that of the PSCs. To the second claim, I respond that fetishism may indeed 
not be about theoretical understanding, but that it does not follow that fetishism is not about 
understanding at all. This means that while fetishism may not be about the kind of theoretical 
understanding which the analytic Marxists focus on, it may be about the kind of practical 
understanding involved in activity which the PSCs and I focus on. 
I owe the first objection to Roberts (2017). The objection goes as follows. To define fetishism as 
ideology is to say that the commodity schema that things actualise and teach at work is epistemically 
deficient, as we saw above. But this schema is not epistemically deficient, Roberts argues, since things 
appear as what they are to those who hold it. As he puts it, this view ‘trips over Marx’s explicit claim 
that, in fetishism, “the social relations between [the producers’] private labours appear as what they 
are”. Where social relations are mediated by commodities, exchanges are the real relations between 
the producers of commodities’ (Roberts 2017, 86–87, quoting Marx, Capital 1 (1976), 166, to which 
he adds the emphasis). 
But from the fact that things do appear as what they are to those who hold the commodity schema, 
it does not follow that things appear as everything that they are to those who hold this schema. 
Everything that they appear to be is true of them, but some facts about them may be left out. Put 
differently, Roberts’s objection applies to the analytic Marxist view – to which it is directed, in fact 
– but not to my amended version of the view of the PSCs, or indeed to that view itself. For the key to 
escaping the objection is to characterise the epistemic deficiency of the ideology of the market not as 
a theoretical deficiency, as the analytic Marxists do, but as a practical one, as I do following the PSCs. 
On the theoretical reading of Cohen and Elster, recall from section I, the commodity schema does not 
alert agents to part of what commodities are (viz. their social aspect) not just by omission of it, but by 
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inclusion of something which commodities are not (viz. ‘autonomously’ commodities (Cohen 2000, 
116), or commodities ‘as an inherent property’ (Elster 1986, 57)). Now, to those who hold this 
schema, things at work do not appear as what they are, since on this schema they appear to be 
inherently commodities while really they are commodities by social construction. The objection 
therefore applies to the analytic Marxists’s theoretical reading of the ideology of the market, or 
fetishism. But it does not apply to the practical reading of the PSCs and myself. On this reading, we 
saw that the commodity schema is epistemically mistaken not by inclusion of something commodities 
are not, but only by omission of part of what they are, their ‘social dimension’ (Haslanger 2012, 467; 
see also 18; see also Celikates 2016). To those who hold the schema understood in this way, 
commodities do appear as what they are, if not as everything that they are. Therefore my amended 
version of the view of the PSCs, unlike the analytic Marxist view, escapes the first objection. 
The same goes for the second objection, viz. that the commodity schema that things actualise and 
teach at work is irrelevant, since fetishism is about activity rather than theoretical understanding. This 
objection is raised by Ripstein, who insists, against Cohen and the proponents of the ideology 
conception, that fetishism ‘is the failing associated with practical involvement in the world, not with 
the virtue of knowledge’, because activity and understanding are distinct modes of engagement with 
the world, and fetishism is about activity, not understanding (Ripstein 1987, 743).  
But from the fact fetishism is not about theoretical understanding, it does not follow that fetishism 
is not about understanding at all. Fetishism is not about the kind of theoretical understanding the 
analytic Marxists focus on, but it can be about the kind of practical understanding that the PSCs and 
I have in mind. For Ripstein’s distinction between activity and understanding is too stark: it misses 
the fact that activity involves understanding in the form of the schemas which, according to the PSCs, 
enable agents to enact social practices in general and the market in particular. Put differently, from 
the fact that ‘all social life is essentially practical’ (Marx, Eighth Thesis on Feuerbarch, quoted in 
Torrance 1995, 45, original emphasis), we should not conclude with Ripstein that fetishism ‘is the 
failing associated with practical involvement in the world’ (1987, 743) rather than with any kind of 
understanding. Instead, we should conclude with Torrance and the PSCs that ‘what people observe 
and how they experience and describe their surroundings depends on their purposes and the problems 
they face’ (Torrance 1995). Enacting a social practice consists in bringing a collective solution to a 
collective problem, and it is understandable that the schemas agents use to solve these problems may 
not alert them to more than they strictly need to understand in order to do so (cf. 1995, 47) – at least 
when structural domination segregates agents from other practices, or indeed when the practice in 
question is as pervasive as the market because of the standardising influence of structural domination. 
Thus while fetishism is not about the kind of theoretical understanding the analytic Marxists have in 
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mind, it can be about the kind of practical understanding involved in activity which the PSCs and 
myself insist on. Therefore my amendment of the view of the PSC escapes the second objection. 
Since, as we saw above, both also escape the first objection, I conclude, contra Roberts and 
Ripstein, that fetishism can be understood as the ideology of the market – provided that ideology is 
understood practically rather than theoretically, and provided that we can solve the problem I have 
focused on as I have suggested we should. 
Let me end by replacing my argument within the broader argument of this thesis. The problem on 
which I have focused here is a version of the general problem which, I argued in chapter 2, affects 
the PSCs’ account of socialisation. The problem, recall, is that it is unclear how socialisation, 
understood as the PSCs suggest we should understand it, can entrench structural domination. In 
chapter 3, I argued in response that socialisation can do that when structural domination has a 
segregating influence on it. But structural domination does not always have such an influence on 
socialisation, we saw in section III. To solve the problem in this case, here I have built on the PSCs’ 
understanding of socialisation into the market as the ideology of the market, or fetishism. In light of 
the literature on this topic, I have suggested another amendment to their account of socialisation: 
socialisation can entrench structural domination not just when structural domination has a segregating 
influence on it, but also when it has a standardising influence on it. 
In other words, I have suggested an amendment to the PSCs’ version of the ideology conception 
of fetishism. I have not argued that the proponents of the domination conception are mistaken to focus 
only on domination, or even that the analytic Marxists are mistaken to hold a theoretical view of the 
ideology of the market, though both claims are implied by my argument. I have only argued that the 
PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation – but that in this case 
it is its standardising, not segregating, influence that explains how agents can fail to question 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ‘DOUBLE FUNCTIONING’ OF IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES AND 




Let me begin this final chapter as I began the others: with a quick recap of my argument so far. In 
chapter 1, I offered an account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by 
social practices. In chapter 2, I turned to the problem of the entrenchment of structural domination, 
and more precisely to the view, put forward by the proponents of the socialisation conception of 
entrenchment (the PSCs), that it is largely the socialisation of agents into dominating practices that 
leads to the entrenchment of structural domination. I argued that while this view is promising, the 
account of socialisation on which the PSCs rely needs to be amended if it is to explain the 
entrenchment of structural domination. In chapter 3, I built on the PSCs’ reading of socialisation in 
terms of ideology to amend their account in light of the literature on this topic. I suggested that in this 
case socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a 
segregating influence on it. But this solution is not the whole story, I noted in chapter 4: structural 
domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation, as socialisation into the 
market testifies. So I then built on the PSCs’ understanding of socialisation into the market in terms 
of ideology of the market, or fetishism, to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic. 
I suggested that in this case, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural 
domination has a standardising influence on it. 
In this final chapter, I argue that this is not the whole story either: sometimes structural domination 
has neither a segregating nor a standardising influence on socialisation. The socialisation of the 
dominated groups, which we saw in chapter 3 is less affected by the segregating influence of structural 
domination, testifies to that. So here I build on the PSCs’ account of the socialisation of the dominated 
groups as disciplined through ideological state apparatuses, in order to amend their account in light 
of the literature on this third topic. Drawing on Althusser’s remark about the ‘double functioning’ of 
ideological state apparatuses, ‘predominantly by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression’ (2014 
[1970], 251), I suggest that the PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on 
socialisation. In this case, I argue, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because 
structural domination has a repressive influence on it. This repressive influence is such that the 
dominant groups, by means of physical repression, may repress (psychologically) what the dominated 
groups learn from their own milieux that would help them challenge the dominant culture at issue. 
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I argue as follows, focusing on sexism (in philosophy) as my main example. I start in section I 
with the PSCs’ reading of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in ideological state 
apparatuses. We saw in chapter 3 that the dominated groups are less vulnerable than the dominant 
groups are to those operations of ideology that depend on large-scale divides, such as the division of 
labour or racial segregation. But drawing on Louis Althusser’s analysis of ideological state 
apparatuses (2014 [1970]; see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that the dominant 
groups ideologically regulate the socialisation of the dominated groups in turn, through such 
institutions as the law, the media, the arts, and of course schools and universities (Haslanger 2019, 
2014; see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). Return, for example, to the female 
students in hyper-masculine philosophy departments whom we met in chapters 1 and 2. Unlike most 
male students, they can be expected to attend both sexist parties and women’s studies classes, and 
therefore draw insight from the latter to criticise the former. But the sexist sexual jokes of male staff 
and students, among other interventions, function to prevent female students from leveraging this 
insight by reinforcing the expectation that men have a right to their bodies (Haslanger 2019; see also 
her 2008, Saul 2013). 
This focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses goes some way to remedy 
the PSCs’ neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. But, I argue in the next 
section, it does not go far enough to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2. On the analysis of 
regulation on which the PSCs rely, regulation only works on those who already accept the ‘context’ 
of regulation, i.e., the schemas in the cultural background of the schemas to be regulated (Lessig 
1995, 958–59; cf. Haslanger 2014, 124–25). Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday 
‘resistance’ of subordinate groups, and as the PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the 
dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices (see e.g., Sewell 2005, 54; 
cf. Celikates 2016, 19). As Haslanger herself reminds us, in the context of hyper-masculine 
philosophy departments, for instance, women meet men’s sexist sexual jokes with counter-jokes 
which ridicule men (see 2008, 8). Because of this, however, female students should be expected not 
to let the sexist sexual jokes of male staff and students hinder their ability to question the law of male 
sex-right. 
At this stage, one might think that the solutions I offered in the two previous chapters could apply 
here, and so rescue the PSCs’ focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses. In 
line with chapter 4, one might think that the dominated groups’ own milieux actualise, not their 
subordinate culture, but the dominant culture, because of the standardising influence of structural 
domination. Or in line with chapter 3, one might think that these milieux have not been so 
standardised, but that the dominated groups do not frequent them as a result of the segregating 
influence of structural domination. Either way regulation would work, even if the standardising or 
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segregating influence of structural domination would do the bulk of the work. Yet I argue in this 
section that neither of these solutions apply here. Starting with the second suggestion, and as we saw 
in chapter 3, the segregating influence of structural domination segregates the dominant groups from 
the milieux of the dominated groups, but it does not segregate the dominated groups from their own 
milieux. Female philosophy students are not segregated from women’s study classes in the same way 
that most male students are, for instance (see e.g., Miriam 2007, 223). As regards the first suggestion, 
I point out that the standardising influence of structural domination is limited to anti-market practices 
and does not affect other subordinate practices. In women’s studies classes, for example, feminist 
philosophy practices have not been replaced by hyper-masculine ones (see ibid.). 
It remains unclear, therefore, how the dominated groups can fail to use what they learn in their 
own milieux to question the schemas of dominating practices. To solve this problem, I draw on 
Althusser’s remark about the ‘double functioning’ of ideological state apparatuses: ‘predominantly 
by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression’ (2014 [1970], 251, my emphasis). I argue that the 
dominant groups not only regulate but also repress, through ideological apparatuses, the socialisation 
of the dominated groups in their own milieux. Female philosophy students are a case in point. Their 
experience, during ‘[sexual] encounters with a male partner who often intimidates, humiliates, and 
uses physical force against them’, of ‘the “corporeal perception” […] that men have a right to sexual 
access to them’, Miriam suggests, represses the ‘analysis of the relation between rape, male power, 
and women’s oppression’ that they learn from ‘women’s studies classes’ (2007, 221–23). If they fail 
to name these encounters ‘rape’ or ‘abuse’ and question the law of male sex-right, in other words, it 
is because, in some cases, physical repression may lead to psychological repression. 
At this final stage, one might object on behalf of the PSCs that it is unclear whether they really 
neglect what we saw Althusser call the ‘double functioning’ of ideology. So I dedicate the last section 
to this objection. One might think that Haslanger does not, after all, neglect the fact that ideological 
state apparatuses also function by repression, since she suggests that education coercively inculcates 
social meanings (2014, 125). But this, I argue in this final section, would be mistaken. For in the 
relevant passage Haslanger is not using ‘inculcates’ in the relevant way. Specifically, she does not 
mean that the dominated groups come to endorse, or absorb, what they are taught or inculcated. She 
only means that they become aware of it as something to be grudgingly reckoned with. Put differently, 
she does not consider the ideological effects of repression, but abandons the terrain of ideology for 
that of repression. Thus my argument escapes this objection. 
Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for an amendment of the PSCs’ account of the 
socialisation of dominated groups as disciplined in ideological state apparatuses. I do not attempt an 
extended exegesis of Althusser’s account of state apparatuses. Nor do I claim that the analysis of the 
repressive influence of structural domination I build from it exhausts, with the segregating and 
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standardising influences I focused on in the previous chapters, the set of influences which structural 
domination can have on socialisation. I only argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of 
structural domination on socialisation, though here to a lesser degree than in their account of ideology 
or fetishism: they do take account of the non-violent, regulative influence which structural domination 
has on socialisation, but here it is primarily its violent, repressive influence on socialisation that 
enables the socialisation of the dominated groups to entrench structural domination. Only if more is 
made of what Althusser calls the ‘double functioning’ of ideological state apparatuses can their 
account of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in such apparatuses explain the 
entrenchment of domination. 
 
I. THE SOCIALISATION OF THE DOMINATED GROUPS AS DISCIPLINED IN 
IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 
I begin with the PSCs’ reading of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in 
ideological state apparatuses. We saw in chapter 3 that the dominated groups are less vulnerable than 
the dominant groups are to the operations of ideology that depend on large-scale divides such as the 
division of labour or racial segregation. But drawing on Louis Althusser’s analysis of ideological 
state apparatuses (2014 [1970]; see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that the dominant 
groups in turn ideologically regulate the socialisation of the dominated groups, through such 
institutions as the law, the media, the arts, and of course school and colleges (Haslanger 2019, 2014; 
see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). I return to the example of female students in 
hyper-masculine philosophy departments, which we encountered in chapter 1 and 2. Unlike most 
male students, they can be expected to attend both sexist parties and women’s studies classes, and 
therefore draw insight from the latter to criticise the former. But sexist sexual jokes from male staff 
and students, for instance, function to prevent them from leveraging this insight, by reinforcing the 
expectation that men have a right to their bodies (see e.g., Haslanger 2019; see also her 2008, Saul 
2013). 
The first thing to note is that, for Marx and many Marxists, ideology operates on at least two 
levels, one of which runs deeper than the other. On the deeper level, ideology results fundamentally 
from the division of labour as ‘the historical condition’ of the ideas of the dominant classes (Balibar 
2014, 96). On the other, more superficial level, ideology is inculcated to the dominated groups by the 
dominant classes and their ideological apparatuses, insofar as the division of labour has afforded them 
a relative monopoly on intellectual production (see Balibar 2014, 92–100, Mills 2005, 175, and Marx 
1965, 61; see also Freeden 2003, chapter 1 passim but especially 6). In chapter 3, I focused on the 
deeper level. Here I turn to the more superficial level and its ideological apparatuses: it too plays an 
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important role in the entrenchment of domination. In particular, I suggest, it makes up for the 
dominated groups’ lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology.  
I argued for the dominated groups’ lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology in 
chapter 3. As I suggested there, the dominated groups, unlike the dominant groups, often need to 
cross the large-scale divides on which these operations depend, which affords them a critical eye on 
dominating practices. I concentrated on black employees, but we can run the same analysis for the 
female philosophy students I want to focus on in this chapter. On the socialisation conception of 
entrenchment, these students fail to challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department 
largely because the behaviour of their fellow male students at college parties confirms this law to 
them. Recall for instance the former first-year student from Jennifer Saul’s blog on women in 
philosophy who reports how ‘one of [the] grad students [who had organised such a party] came up 
behind me and grabbed my breasts’ (2021).102 Yet unlike most male students, who are segregated 
from women’s studies classes, female students such as this one can be expected to attend women’s 
studies classes as well as college parties (see Miriam 2007, 212–13 and 221–22). This in turn enables 
them to draw insight from the latter to criticise the law of male sex-right actualised in the former 
(ibid.). 
The dominated groups’ lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology, however, does 
not mean that the dominated groups escape ideology altogether. We already saw in chapter 4 that 
they do not escape it when it comes to the ideology of the market, and I will return to this claim in 
section III below. But there is more. For drawing on Louis Althusser’s analysis of ideological state 
apparatuses (2014 [1970], see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that on the second, 
more superficial level of ideological operations, the dominant groups ideologically regulate the 
socialisation of the dominated groups, through such institutions as the law, the media and the arts, or 
schools and universities (Haslanger 2019, 2014; see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). 
The kind of hyper-masculine philosophy departments I want to focus on in this chapter is one such 
apparatus, where male students and staff regulate the socialisation of female students. 
Consider Haslanger in particular, whose ‘starting point for understanding ideology is Louis 
Althusser’s work’ (2019, 2). ‘Althusser’, she notes, ‘distinguishes repressive state apparatuses 
(RSAs) and ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)’. ‘RSAs include the “government, administration, 
army, courts, prisons,” which “function by violence” or “massively and predominantly by 
repression”’. By contrast, she continues, ‘ISAs, including religion, education, the family, the legal 
system, the political system, trade unions, communications/media, and culture (“literature, the arts, 
 
102 As I mentioned above, the story is accessible at https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/on-
being-groped/ (last accessed 09/04/2021). In such cases, as I noted in chapter 2, female students ‘see themselves as making 
decisions in a situation where one factor seems to have been (tacitly) decided on in advance and is thus nonnegotiable, 
namely, men’s right to have sex with them’ (Miriam 2007, 222). 
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sports, etc.”) “function massively and predominantly by ideology”’ (ibid., quoting Althusser 2014 
[1970], 249-51). ‘A crucial difference between an ISA and an RSA’, Haslanger insists, ‘is that 
individuals are hailed into a subject position by an ISA, rather than violently forced into it; and it is 
characteristic of those “good subjects” who respond to the hailing that they take up the norms as 
binding on themselves. As a result, they do not need to be coercively managed; they work “all by 
themselves”!’ (ibid., quoting Althusser 2014 [1970], 272). 
Haslanger’s most thorough discussion of an ideological state apparatus, however, is to be found 
in Studying while Black (2014), where she draws on Lawrence Lessig’s analysis of the regulation of 
social meaning to examine the way in which school, as ‘a site of intense socialization’, ‘creates kinds 
of individuals through a process of discipline, in particular, individuals who […] voluntarily enact 
the social structures that are to be perpetuated’ (110).103  There she focuses on ‘the process of 
racialization that […] prepares African Americans for the subordinate status they can expect to 
occupy […]’ (ibid.). But let me follow her 2019 (and 2008) example and focus on sexism instead: in 
particular, on the ‘graduate student women’s groups and individual women’ who have asked her to 
‘help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their programs, problems that 
include alleged sexual harassment’ (2008, 211). 
There are three key aspects to the analysis of Lessig which Haslanger draws on. First, the 
regulation of meaning operates on the range of social meanings which are embodied by resources as 
they are used in social practices. Thus the kind of ‘violent, and hurtful and really scary’ sexual 
encounters with male students which female students reported to social psychologist Lynn Phillips 
(2000, 149, in Miriam 2007, 221) signifies a variety of things to them, from ‘rape’, to ‘abuse’, to sex 
in which ‘let’s just say that things went badly’, to unpleasant but normal sex, even to ‘wanted’ sex 
(Miriam 2007, 221–22). The same goes for women’s studies classes, and feminist philosophy more 
generally, which can mean a variety of things from ‘waste of time’ to ‘interesting but less so than 
other topics’, to ‘cutting-edge philosophy’ (see Haslanger 2008). Second, according to Lessig the 
regulation functions either via the ‘ambiguation’ of the range, or via its ‘disambiguation’ (1995, 
1009–10).104 To disambiguate the relevant range is to emphasise one meaning over the others. To 
ambiguate it, by contrast, is to maintain or create a convenient blur as to what a resource means. 105 
In hyper-masculine philosophy departments, the range of meanings that violent sexual encounters 
can have is ambiguated so that its understandings as ‘rape’ or ‘abuse’ are understood as no more apt 
 
103 The term ‘discipline’ is often associated with Foucault as well as Althusser, and Haslanger mentions both. But since 
she repeatedly insists that ‘[her] conception of ideology is Althusserian’ (2019, 5, 2020b, 8), here I focus on Althusser.  
104 Lessig writes: ‘Sometimes semiotic techniques function by disambiguating a particular action or status —naming 
it, if you will. (This is tying.) Sometimes they function by giving the action a second meaning. (This is ambiguation)’ 
(1995, 1010). 
105 Recall that on this view resources are things of all sorts, valued (e.g., by male students) or disvalued (e.g., by female 
students), and including agents themselves (e.g., male and female students). 
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than any other understandings within the range, such as ‘unpleasant but normal sex’, or even ‘wanted 
sex’ (see e.g., Saul 2013). Likewise, in such milieux ‘women’s studies’ is often disambiguated, along 
with ‘feminist philosophy’ more generally, as of lesser value than other philosophical topics (see 
Haslanger 2008, passim). 
Third, and finally, both ambiguations and disambiguations can be done in two ways. Each can 
either operate on the range of meanings directly, or operate indirectly by first aiming at the resources 
that actualise these meanings. Lessig calls the first way ‘semiotic’, and the second ‘behavioural’ 
(1995, 1008). In philosophy departments both kinds obtain. To start with behavioural interventions, 
it is for instance through such ‘rituals’ as having one’s feminist journal submissions ‘routinely sent 
back without having been considered by a reviewer’ that, on this view, the lesser value of women’s 
studies is disambiguated in the mind of female staff and students (Saul, quoted in Haslanger 2008, 
215; the term ‘ritual’ is Lessig’s: see his 1995, 215).106 Likewise, on this view we should see the 
various sexist sexual jokes common in hyper-masculine philosophy departments as semiotic 
interventions, which also function to prevent female students from leveraging what they learn in 
women’s studies classes to criticise the expectation that men have a right to their bodies. Think for 
instance of Jennifer Saul’s story of ‘the male philosopher joking about dripping hot wax on his 
[female] undergraduate student’s nipples […] in front of a table full of [laughing] faculty members’: 
‘it made the student feel that the joke was acceptable and that she was oversensitive’ (2013).107 Or 
again, to consider another ritual: the ‘common practice’, in Miriam’s words, of ‘get[ting] the girls to 
make out just to get into the door of frat parties’ functions as a behavioural intervention that 
disambiguates the meanings of sexual encounters (including lesbian sexual encounters) ‘in terms of 
men’s access to women’ (2007, 212–13).108 
Thus while female philosophy students, unlike most male philosophy students, can be expected 
to attend both sexist environments and women’s studies classes, and draw insight from the latter to 
criticise the former, on this view the regulation of their socialisation by (sexist) male staff and students 
prevents them from leveraging this insight. In this, they are representative of the dominated groups 
more generally, whose socialisation, the PSCs suggest, is ideologically regulated by the dominant 




106 Although Lessig does not mention Althusser (only Foucault: see 1995, 1027n281), his focus on rituals seem to follow 
on from Althusser’s insistence on ‘ideological rituals’ in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (2014 [1970], 
passim; see also Pallotta 2015). 
107 Or consider Haslanger: ‘I’ve witnessed plenty of occasions when a woman’s status in graduate school was questioned 
because she was married, or had a child (or took time off to have a child so was returning to philosophy as a “mature” 
student), or was in a long-distance relationship’ (2008, 2). Here as well the law of male sex-right is semiotically reinforced, 
even if in this case the relevant male access is primarily procreative and only secondarily sexual.    
108 I use Lessig’s vocabulary to analyse Saul’s and Miriam’s claims. They themselves do not use it. 
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II. THE PROBLEM 
This focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses goes some way to remedy the 
PSCs’ neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. But, I argue in this section, 
it does not go far enough to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2. On the analysis of ‘regulation’ 
on which the PSCs rely, regulation only works on those who already accept the ‘context’ of 
regulation, i.e., the schemas in the cultural background of the schemas to be regulated (Lessig 1995, 
958–59; cf. Haslanger 2014, 124–25). Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday ‘resistance’ 
of subordinate groups, and as the PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the dominated 
groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices (see e.g., Sewell 2005, 54; see 
Celikates 2016, 19). As Haslanger herself suggests in the context of hyper-masculine philosophy 
departments, for instance, women meet men’s sexist sexual jokes with counter-jokes which ridicule 
men (see 2008, 8). For this reason, I argue, female students should be expected not to let the sexist 
sexual jokes of male staff and students hinder their ability to question the law of male sex-right.  
On the PSCs’ view, we saw above, the dominated groups do not use the schemas they learn in 
their own milieux to challenge the schemas of dominating practices for the following reason: their 
socialisation is regulated by the dominant groups through what Haslanger, following Althusser, calls 
ideological state apparatuses. This focus on regulation, however, is insufficient to avoid the problem 
I identified in chapter 2. As Lessig insists, the regulation of socialisation works only on those who do 
not contest the schemas that make up the background, or ‘context’, of the schema to be regulated 
(1995, 958–59). But the dominated groups, I argue now, learn in their own milieux to contest the 
cultural background of the dominant groups. Thus it remains unclear how exactly a socialisation that 
is contradictory can entrench structural domination, even when it is regulated through ideological 
state apparatuses. 
As I just suggested, the first thing to note in this connection is that the regulation of socialisation 
is powerless on those who contest the schemas that make up the background, or in Lessig’s words the 
‘context’, of the schema to be regulated (1995, 958–59; see also Haslanger 2014, 124). As Lessig 
puts it, ‘actions yield social meanings [just] because they rely for their source upon expectations or 
understandings not themselves (then) in question – not, as I will use the term, contested’ (1995, 959). 
To adapt one of his examples, consider TfL’s campaign against beggars on the London Overground 
rail network.109 This is a semiotic regulation of commuters’ schema of giving beggars what they ask 
for. The best way to help, the posters and announcements say, is not to give to beggars on the train, 
but to donate to the relevant charity instead. Importantly, this intervention assumes the background 
 
109 Lessig’s example is the New York Train service (1995, 1040). I adapt it to what I have experienced myself. On TfL, 
see, e.g., https://londonist.com/london/transport/begging-announcements-tfl-trains-tube-stopped (last accessed 
09/04/2021). The posters seem to be gone, but there are still vocal announcements, as the Londonist article’s author points 
out. 
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schema that only the end matters, not the means. Only helping beggars matters, it implies, not how 
one does it. As a result, however, the regulation will fail to convince commuters who care about the 
means by which they help beggars. Those who would prefer to engage in solidarity rather than charity, 
for instance, will not be convinced. More generally, the regulation of socialisation only works on 
those who do not contest the shared schemas that make up the background, or context, of the schema 
to be regulated. 
Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday ‘resistance’ of subordinate groups, and as the 
PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural 
background of dominating practices. As Young argues, their ‘subordinate culture’ helps them not 
only to ‘maintain a sense of positive subjectivity’, but also to ‘assert their own subjectivity’ in the 
face of the dominant schemas (1990, 60 and 63). Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, and in Sewell’s 
words, ‘current scholarship is replete with depictions of “resistance” by subordinated groups and 
individuals […], particularly o[f] resistance of a decentered sort – those dispersed everyday acts that 
thwart conventions, reverse valuations, or express the dominated groups’ resentment of their 
domination’ (Sewell 2005, 54–55). Witness James Scott, who ‘detects “hidden transcripts” that form 
the underside of peasants’ deference in contemporary Malaysia’ (ibid., 54, referencing Scott 1985; 
see also Celikates 2016, 19). Closer to home, North American philosophy, despite being ‘more 
overwhelmingly male than even mathematics’, is no exception (Saul 2013). The various testimonies 
and critiques gathered on Saul’s ‘What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy’ blog testify to this 
(2021). So do the ‘graduate student women’s groups and individual women’ who, we saw Haslanger 
report, have asked her to ‘help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their 
programs’ (2008, 211). Jokes, in particular, are prominent tools of such cultural resistance (Scott 
1990, xiii; see also Scott 1985, 41), and women in philosophy tend to make much use of them. As 
Haslanger herself describes, ‘[i]t is a familiar joke [in such milieux] that (male) philosophers are 
poorly socialized’ and emotionally unintelligent (2008, 217). 
If in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating 
practices, however, then we should expect them to resist the regulation of their socialisation into the 
schemas of these practices. This is particularly clear in the case of the jokes that ridicule men in 
philosophy, which I just mentioned. Encouraged by these jokes about male philosophers’ 
awkwardness and lack of emotional intelligence, female students should be expected not to let male 
philosophers’ own sexist sexual jokes hinder their ability to question the law of male sex-right. By 
ridiculing them as socially inept, such counter-jokes undermine the background understanding of 
male staff and students as endowed with the authority necessary for their sexual jokes, or other sexist 
remarks, to function as the ideological (semiotic) regulation of female students’ socialisation. Put 
  90 
 
differently, these jokes themselves function as ‘ideological insubordination’ (Scott 1990, xiii, 
emphasis removed).110 
While in this case ‘resistance’ is grounded in mockery, another important strategy is to question 
the very epistemic grounds on which the dominant groups stand. For as Lessig suggests, acceptance 
of any schema, background or not, largely depends on whether it can be represented as knowledge: 
as he puts it, drawing on Foucault, after a schema ‘is represented as knowledge, individuals must 
choose whether to become “unreasonable” by ignoring it, or conform’ (1995, 1027n281; see Foucault 
1979).111 Yet just as it is common for the dominated groups to learn and tell jokes about the dominant 
groups in their own milieux, so do they often learn in the same milieux to contest the representations 
as knowledge of the schemas into which they are to be disciplined. Indeed, it is an important part of 
dominated subcultures that their structural position can afford them a privileged epistemic standpoint 
on this structure, including on knowledge production (see e.g., Wylie 2003, Hartsock 2003, Haslanger 
2017b, Graeber 2009). Thus the routine rejection of feminist publications should not be expected to 
hinder female students’ ability to leverage what they learn in women’s studies classes to criticise the 
law of male sex-right: this ritual depends on the background understanding that the male reviewers 
of mainstream journals are relevantly knowledgeable to adjudicate the value of feminist publications; 
but this is just what women’s studies, grounded as they are in women’s experience as women, teach 
female students to contest. 
Indeed, this is precisely what happens with the other ritual I mentioned above, where female 
students are asked by male students to kiss each other in order to be granted access to fraternity parties 
(Miriam 2007). This behavioural intervention is premised on a context where male students can 
influence female students, but at least some of female students reject this background understanding 
and turn to their women’s studies teachers for help. Miriam herself is a case in point, who achieved 
her ‘insight into sexual culture on a university campus’ from ‘[s]everal women students’ of hers (ibid., 
212).  
It seems, therefore, that if the dominated groups do not use the schemas which they learn in their 
own milieux to correct the schemas of dominating practices, it is not because their socialisation is 
regulated by the dominant groups through what Haslanger, following Althusser, calls ideological state 
 
110  David Graeber makes similar comments on activists’ jokes, and specifically on the role of ‘giant puppets’ in 
demonstrations: these ‘ridiculous effigies’, he writes, ‘are a mockery of the very idea of a monument, and of everything 
state monuments represent: [their] unapproachability, monochrome solemnity, above all permanence, the state’s 
[…] attempt to turn its principles and history into eternal verities’ (2009, 490). As they show this ideological operation to 
be ‘ultimately somewhat ridiculous’ (ibid.), they help protesters and their audience resist the state’s apparatuses. 
111 And in modern societies, Lessig’s implicit premise goes, most agents have in some shape or form the background 
understanding that to be ‘unreasonable’ is something to be avoided. See his discussion of ‘[t]he second wave of smoking 
regulation [which] got its social “authority in the research of medical science”’: ‘This authority itself is a form of social 
meaning. It flows not directly from “facts” of individual experience, but from an institution of science that can certify the 
“real” “character of smoking and health”’ (ibid., 1028, quoting Gusfield 1993, 54 and 57). 
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apparatuses. In other words, the PSCs’ focus on the regulation that takes place through these 
apparatuses is insufficient to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2.  
 
III. NO STANDARDISING OR SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL 
DOMINATION IN THIS CASE 
At this stage, one might think that the solutions I offered in the two previous chapters could be applied 
here, and so rescue the PSCs’ focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses. In 
line with chapter 4, one might think that the milieux of the dominated groups, as a result of the 
standardising influence of structural domination, actualise not their subordinate culture but the 
dominant culture. Or in line with chapter 3, one might think that these milieux have not been 
standardised in this way, but that the dominated groups do not frequent them as a result of the 
segregating influence of structural domination. Either way regulation would work, even if the 
standardising or segregating influence of structural domination would do the bulk of the work. In this 
section, however, I argue that neither solution applies in this case. Starting with the second suggestion, 
and as we saw in chapter 3, the segregating influence of structural domination segregates the 
dominant groups from the milieux of the dominated groups, but not the dominated groups from their 
own milieux. Female philosophy students are not segregated from women’s study classes in the way 
most male students are, for instance (see e.g., Miriam 2007, 223). As regards the first suggestion, I 
point out that the standardising influence of structural domination is limited to anti-market practices 
and does not affect other subordinate practices. In women’s studies classes, for example, hyper-
masculine philosophy practices have not replaced feminist ones (see ibid.). 
I start with the second suggestion, which appeals to the segregating influence of structural 
domination. But if the dominated groups who are socialised into the schemas of the dominant groups 
fail to correct these schemas, it is not because they do not frequent their own milieux as a result of 
the segregating influence of structural domination. The segregating influence of structural domination 
does not, of course, segregate within dominated groups. As we saw in chapter 3, it mainly segregates 
the dominant groups from them. If this is so, however, then the dominated groups are not (or at least 
are less) vulnerable to the deeper operations of ideology, which depend on such a segregating 
influence of domination. In particular, they can draw on their own milieux to criticise the schemas of 
dominating practices, including those in the background of the schemas targeted by ideological 
apparatuses for purposes of regulation. 
To return to our example, female students in philosophy are not segregated from the women’s 
studies classes I focus on. Nor indeed, more generally, are they segregated from other feminist 
communities organised around, for instance, journals or conferences. These subaltern milieux are the 
milieux of those who suffer from masculine domination. By contrast, men do tend to be segregated 
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from women’s studies classes, and from feminist journals and conferences. Not that women 
purposefully exclude them, though they sometimes do.112 Recall from chapter 3 that this is not the 
sense in which the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation operates. What 
keeps men from these milieux, rather, is the sexual division of labour, which separates women and 
men (or females and males) into distinct social groups such that men, unlike women, do not need to 
frequent the milieux of the other group (see e.g., Young 1990 and 1994). Nothing pushes male 
students to attend women’s studies classes, for example. By contrast, many female students with an 
interest in philosophy depend on hyper-masculine philosophy departments, and on fraternity parties 
if they want to be ‘popular’. The resulting ‘double consciousness’, to borrow W.E.B Du Bois’s 
famous phrase (1969 [1903]), has one advantage, however: they are less vulnerable to the deeper 
workings of ideology that depend on the sexual division of labour, and in particular to the background 
understandings of male staff and students as endowed with sufficient authority, influence, or 
knowledge to efficiently regulate their socialisation. 
The kind of segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation which I emphasised 
in chapter 3, therefore, does not seem to prevent the dominated groups from leveraging what they are 
taught in their own milieux to correct the schemas of dominating practices. Nor indeed does it prevent 
them from resisting the regulation of their socialisation through ideological apparatuses as a result. 
Or it does not, more precisely, provided that the dominated groups enact their own practices in 
their own milieux. For maybe they do not, one might think; and maybe this is as a result of the 
standardising influence of structural domination. Perhaps the milieux of the dominated groups 
actualise the schemas of the dominant groups, and so cannot provide the dominated groups with 
critical inspiration against the latter. But this too, I now suggest, would be mistaken. In general at 
least, structural domination does not have a standardising influence on the milieux of the dominated 
groups. This claim follows from the analysis carried out in chapter 4. There, I suggested that only 
socialisation into the market is under the standardising influence of structural domination. The reason 
was that the kind of structural domination which agents suffer from as market agents is the only kind 
to have the expanding logic necessary for standardisation. For this reason, structural domination 
affecting agents as blacks and/or as women (rather than as workers, say) does not have any 
standardising influence on the corresponding subaltern cultures. In particular, what Haslanger calls 
‘the masculinisation of philosophy spaces’ (2008, 219) is not pervasive in the way we saw 
commodification is. There are many women’s studies classes – indeed, there are whole gender studies 
departments – and no hyper-masculine practice is enacted there, let alone the law of male sex-right. 
 
112 One such model of feminist milieu is the famous Italian autocoscienza groups documented by Nancy Hirschmann 
(2006). In these groups, women would first build themselves an enclave free of sexist schemas by excluding men from 
the groups, which would enable them in turn to mutually raise each other’s consciousness of the sexist schemas they were 
taught in men-dominated milieux (2006, 220; see also Filling 2014). 
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Because of this, however, female philosophy students can indeed draw critical insight, in the form of 
counter-jokes or alternative epistemic standpoints, from the subaltern cultures of such milieux.113  
The exception, of course, is the market case. Market domination has a standardising influence, 
spreading the practice of commodification across a relatively large number of milieux, some of which 
are those of the dominated groups. Not only are neighbourly and friendly milieux increasingly 
commodified, so are various subaltern communities as well. Many among the most radical unions 
sell the famous end-of-demonstration sandwich, after all. As a result, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the commodity schema obscures the social dimension of commodities, and so obscures the 
very fact that commodified exchange could be replaced by more neighbourly or friendly forms of 
exchange. Now, this exception is a significant one. Commodity exchange is a crucial prop of class 
domination. But it remains an exception, and in general structural domination does not have a 
standardising influence on the milieux of the dominated groups. 
Yet perhaps, one might object, the pervasiveness of commodification affects not just the anti-
capitalism of subordinate cultures, but also, for example, their anti-sexism. For as Sewell remarks, 
commodification tends to generate competition (1992, 25–26), which has been noted to favour the 
spread of sexist or racist schemas through what Elizabeth Anderson, following Charles Tilly (1999), 
has called ‘emulation’ (Anderson 2010, 8). Thus one might think that if hyper-masculine philosophy 
departments enjoy a competitive advantage on the academic market, then competing departments will 
tend to copy this proven model and therefore spread it, as Anderson puts it, ‘in neo-Darwinian 
fashion’ (ibid.). As a result, the number of milieux ‘where women philosophers […] are in the 
majority’ or ‘where feminist philosophy […] is valued’ may dwindle, the objection goes, and become 
too few for women to draw critical insight from them (the phrases are Haslanger’s; see 2008b, 219). 
This would in turn render them vulnerable to the semiotic and behavioural interventions characteristic 
of ideological apparatuses. 
  But this objection, I argue, would be mistaken. The emulation described by Tilly and 
Anderson is indeed an important mechanism of the spread of schemas supporting structural 
domination, but it does not apply here. Or so the evidence suggests. If hyper-masculine philosophy 
departments did enjoy a competitive advantage on the academic market at some point in the past, 
they no longer seem to. Jennifer Saul (of all people, as she herself remarks), is encouraging in this 
respect, in particular because ‘the prestigious Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has 
 
113 In chapter 4, I argued that agents’ socialisation into gender might also be under the standardising influence of structural 
domination, provided it can be shown that agents are structurally dominated into performing traditional gender roles 
across as many milieux as they can. If this were the case, my claim that structural domination does not have a standardising 
influence on the milieux of the dominated would admit another exception. This, however, would not affect my general 
point, nor indeed my main example: gender schemas run deeper, in Sewell’s terminology, than the kind of hyper-
masculine schema at issue here, so that one might be socialised as a man without being socialised into the law of male 
sex-right (cf. Sewell 1992, 22). 
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[recently] instructed authors and editors to ensure that women and members of other underrepresented 
groups are cited’ (2013). Or because ‘the American Philosophical Association has established a 
mentoring program, a task force on sexual harassment, and a site visit program to help departments 
improve their climates for women’ (ibid.). Even through emulation, then, structural domination does 
not have a standardising influence on women’s milieux in philosophy, and as a result does not favour 
the regulation of their socialisation. 
Neither the segregating nor the standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, 
then, prevents the dominated groups from leveraging critical insight from their own subaltern milieux 
to question the schemas of dominating practices. Nor, therefore – insofar as these schemas make up 
the context necessary for the ideological regulation of their socialisation to function – does it stop 
them from resisting in turn the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses. 
 
IV. THE REPRESSIVE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON 
SOCIALISATION 
It remains unclear, therefore, how the dominated groups can fail to use what they learn in their own 
milieux to criticise the schemas of dominating practices. So in this section I draw on Althusser’s 
remark about the ‘double functioning’ of ideological state apparatuses – i.e., ‘predominantly by 
ideology, but […] secondarily by repression’ (2014 [1970], 251, my emphasis) – to suggest that the 
dominant groups not only regulate, but also repress the socialisation of the dominated groups in their 
own milieux through ideological state apparatuses. Female philosophy students, I argue, are a case in 
point. Their experience, during ‘[sexual] encounters with a male partner who often intimidates, 
humiliates, and uses physical force against them’, of ‘the “corporeal perception” […] that men have 
a right to sexual access to them’, Miriam suggests, represses the ‘analysis of the relation between 
rape, male power, and women’s oppression’ that they learn from ‘women’s studies classes’ (2007, 
221–223). If they fail to name these encounters ‘rape’ or ‘abuse’ and in doing so question the law of 
male sex-right, in other words, it is because physical repression may lead to psychological repression. 
Neither the segregating nor the standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, 
we saw above, prevents the dominated groups from leveraging critical insight from their own 
subaltern milieux to resist the regulative operations of ideological apparatuses, and question the 
schemas of dominating practices. But then how can their socialisation through ideological state 
apparatuses explain why they entrench these practices, as the PSCs suggest? To solve this problem, I 
suggest that we return to Althusser’s Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (2014 [1970]). 
As we saw Haslanger remark above, Althusser there distinguishes ideological state apparatuses 
(ISAs) from the repressive state apparatus (RSA). While each of ‘the government, the administration, 
the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, etc.’ that make up the repressive state apparatus ‘functions 
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by violence’, by contrast, the law, the family, the media, the arts, or the various schools and 
universities he counts as ideological state apparatuses ‘function “by ideology”’ (2014 [1970], 249-
50). 
As Haslanger puts it, ‘in modern society, the ISAs are the dominant mode of social management 
(2019, 2). In particular, they ‘very effectively’ prepare the dominated groups ‘for the subordinate 
status they can expect to occupy’ (2014, 110).114 On this I agree with her, and with the PSCs more 
generally. But as Haslanger emphasises that a ‘crucial difference between an ISA and an RSA is that 
individuals are hailed into a subject position by an ISA, rather than violently forced into it’ (2019, 2), 
she does not do justice to a qualification which Althusser insists ‘it is essential’ to make: the 
‘determination of the double “functioning”’ of each kind of apparatus, and of ideological apparatuses 
in particular (2014 (1970), 251).115 
For after remarking that ‘[t]here is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus’, since ‘[f]or 
example the army and the police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and 
reproduction, and in the “values” they propound externally’, Althusser emphasises that ‘[i]n the same 
way but inversely, […] [t]here is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus’ (2014 [1970], 250–
51): ‘it is essential to say’, he insists, 
 
‘that for their part the [ISAs] function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they 
also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very 
attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. […] Thus schools and churches use suitable methods 
of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to “discipline” not only their shepherds, but also their 
flocks. The same is true of the family … The same is true of the cultural ISA (censorship, among 
other things), etc.’ (ibid., 251, my emphases)  
 
Of course, Haslanger does not ignore this qualification entirely. She does note in passing that ‘[n]o 
state apparatus is purely one or the other’ (2019, 2). But the distinction she chooses to insist on, here 
and elsewhere, is that ‘between oppression that is repressive […] and oppression that is ideological’ 
(2017b, 149). Indeed, it is typically through this distinction that the PSCs more generally introduce 
their focus on ideology, and on socialisation more generally (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 20–21). 
Important as it is, however, this distinction should not detract the PSCs from Althusser’s ‘essential’ 
 
114 As noted in section I, Haslanger makes this latter claim specifically about schools and African Americans in the US. 
115 Althusser’s text is most famous for his reconceptualisation of ideology as material (or caught up in symbolic-material 
loops, as the PSCs would put it) so that ‘[one’s] ideas are [one’s] material actions inserted into material practices governed 
by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive [one’s] ideas’ 
(2014 [1970], 265). Hence the PSCs’ interest in Althusser. But something else is worth noticing: that such ideological 
rituals function secondarily by repression (ibid., 251). 
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qualification (2014 [1970]). For this qualification, I want to suggest, can help us solve the problem at 
issue. 
More precisely, Althusser’s remark that ideological state apparatuses function ‘predominantly by 
ideology, but […] secondarily by repression’ can help us clarify how the dominated groups can fail 
to use what they learn in their own milieux to criticise the schemas of dominating practices. For while 
these milieux enable the dominated groups to resist the regulation of their socialisation in ideological 
apparatuses, they do not enable them to resist the repression of their socialisation which the same 
apparatuses are also capable of: semiotic and behavioural interventions may have little impact on the 
critical insights the dominated groups can draw from their subordinate communities, but physical 
repression, by contrast, does sometimes have psychologically repressive effects.116 
To see more precisely how even ideological state apparatuses ‘use suitable methods of punishment 
[…] to “discipline” […] their flocks’ (2014 [1970], 251), in Althusser’s phrase, return for example to 
female students in philosophy. We saw above that they should be expected to resist the regulation of 
their socialisation into the law of male sex-right. In particular, we saw, their reports to their teachers 
of the making-out ritual of fraternity parties bears witness to their ‘resistance’ to the regulative 
functioning of ideological apparatuses. But conversely, I argue now, their failure to report – indeed, 
to conceptualise – the ‘abuse’ or ‘rape’ from which they suffer testifies to their vulnerability to the 
physically and psychologically repressive functioning of these apparatuses. 
Drawing on social psychologist Lynn Phillips’ Flirting with Danger: Young Women’s Reflections 
on Sexuality and Domination (2000), Miriam suggests that ‘one of the more significant questions 
Phillips’s study raises’ is as follows: ‘Why do these young women consistently resist labeling their 
sexual encounters as rape or even abuse when they also describe these as encounters with a male 
partner who often intimidates, humiliates, and uses physical force against them?’ (2007, 221–22). In 
other words, why do they fail to question the background expectation that men have a right of sexual 
access to their bodies? 
 
116 It seems to me that Foucault makes just this point (despite his dissatisfaction with the concept of repression, which he 
took to obscure the productive aspects of modern power) when he develops Althusser’s account in Discipline and Punish 
(1979) (without acknowledging him; see Pallotta 2015, 139). While Haslanger suggests that ‘[d]iscipline, as Foucault 
explicates it, works primarily through surveillance, first the surveillance of others, and then self-surveillance’ (2019, 2–
3), in Discipline and Punish Foucault also insists on correction through bodily punishment. Thus as Frédéric Gros has 
remarked, in addition to ‘surveillance’, Foucault also emphasises the normalising ‘micro-penalty’ which our society that 
‘incarcerates’ has substituted for the ‘ordeal’ prevalent in ‘the societies that mark for life’ (2017, 72 and 61, my translation, 
here and below; see also Bert 2016, 47). Far from having disappeared, Gros continues, in disciplinary society 
‘[punishment] is a question of chastising the rebellious body, the indocile body […] for corrective purposes’ (2017, 67). 
The sexual intimidation, humiliation and physical force which the female students interviewed by Lynn Phillips suffer 
during heterosexual intercourse are micro-penalties of this kind. So are the other forms of sexual abuse reported on Saul’s 
blog (2021). And if, as Jean-François Bert puts it, ‘in the dark isolation of the penal universe […] it is [also] a matter of 
torture, humiliation, food deprivation’ (2016, 47, my translation), then even rape should count as normalising punishment 
in Foucault’s sense (see also Mara Marin’s claim that ‘[…] violence against women […] is a statement on and a 
consolidation of their inferior social status’, unpublished, 4). 
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If I read Miriam correctly, the preliminary solution is to follow Carole Pateman’s analysis of the 
sexual contract, this ‘principle of social/sexual association’ we briefly encountered in chapter 1 
(Miriam 2007, 222; see also Pateman 1988, 5). On this suggestion, ‘the liberal ontology of the 
[contracting] individual’ is confirmed to female students by sexual encounters in which they find 
themselves ‘“negotiating” and “managing”’ sex. This in turns ‘reinforc[es]’ (and is itself reinforced 
by) ‘men’s sex-right’, as it ‘mystif[ies]’ the ‘relations of power that precede [their] decision to consent 
to unwanted sex’ (Miriam 2007, quoting Phillips).117 In other words, ‘[a]s women and girls are 
increasingly positioned as the autonomous negotiators of or decision makers in heterosexual relations, 
men’s sex-right becomes less intelligible at an explicit level (Miriam 2007, 225).  
But this is only preliminary, I take Miriam to suggest, ‘because, as Phillips lets us know, the 
women students interviewed by her are largely self-defined feminists, many of whom have taken 
women’s studies classes and have some analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and 
women’s oppression’ (2007, 223, Miriam’s emphasis). ‘Indeed’, she adds, ‘male accountability 
reappears the moment that these women are asked to reflect on other women’s stories’: ‘[t]he same 
women who resisted the label “rape” for scenarios they themselves lived through do not hesitate to 
use the label for the very same scenarios if they hear it as someone else’s story’ (ibid., her emphasis, 
referencing Phillips 2000, 154–55, and chapter 6).118 
Rather, and crucially, the female students do not question the law of male-sex right despite the 
critical insights they learn from their women’s studies classes, Miriam suggests, because there is ‘a 
clear conflict between their overt feminist beliefs, on the one hand, and their pre-reflexive modes of 
feeling and knowing, on the other’ (2007, 223) – a conflict which is won by their pre-reflexive modes 
of experiencing physically abusive sexual encounters. ‘[M]ale accountability disappears in these 
women’s stories’, Miriam concludes, ‘to the extent that living through the heterosexual encounter 
includes, for these women, the “corporeal perception” in contrast to the propositional claim or belief, 
that men have a right to sexual access to them’ (ibid., her emphasis). 
In other words, female students’ experience during ‘violent and hurtful and really scary’ sexual 
encounters of ‘the “corporeal perception” […] that men have a right to sexual access to them’ 
represses, Miriam seems to suggest, the ‘analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and 
women’s oppression’ that they learn from ‘women’s studies classes’ (2007, 221–23). If, put 
 
117 Put differently, while ‘their freedom [from this law]’ requires a capacity to transfigure this situation’, Miriam suggests, 
‘[…] freedom in this sense is foreclosed by the meaning of agency in the sexual situations so far described. These women 
experience agency not as an ability to transform and co-create a social/sexual situation in its very historicity; they 
experience agency only as the ability to negotiate the terms of a situation they take to be inevitable, namely, a situation 
defined by men’s implicit right to have sexual access to them’ (2007, 224). But this begs the question: why do they not 
use their experience of women’s studies classes to challenge this experience of abused agency?  
118 Thus it remains unclear why they do not challenge, thanks to these women’s studies classes, the ‘liberal ontology of 
the individual’ and its experience of agency ‘as the ability to merely negotiate the terms of a situation they take to be 
inevitable’ (Miriam 2007, 222 and 224). 
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differently, they fail to name these encounters ‘abuse’ or ‘rape’ and question the law of male sex-
right, it is because physical repression on the part of ‘partners who are wholly absorbed in their own 
gratification and completely oblivious to the women’s nonverbal cues – non-linguistic expressions of 
pain, discomfort, or desire for pleasure’ – may sometimes lead to psychological repression (see ibid., 
223). 
As Althusser suggests, such physical-cum-psychological repression ranges from full-blown 
violence to ‘very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic [forms of repression]’ (2014 [1970], 251). 
Male students’ ignorance of female students’ ‘discomfort or desire for pleasure’ are concealed, 
symbolic forms (Miriam 2007, 223). When their partner ‘intimidates’ or ‘humiliates’ them, repression 
is more overt, but somewhat attenuated compared to the kind of ‘violent and hurtful and really scary’ 
sexual encounters reported by one of Phillips’s interviewees (Miriam 2007, 222 and 221, quoting 
Phillips 2000, 149). Either way, however, the result is the same: the psychological repression of the 
critical insights female students draw from women’s studies classes. ‘I don’t think I could ever call it 
rape’, says the student who experienced male repression at its most extreme (Miriam 2007, 221). 
Most do not even call it ‘abuse’ (ibid., 222). In fact, some even ‘ru[n] numerous and conflicting 
fantasies “in the head” in order to reinterpret unwanted sex as “wanted”’(ibid.). Whatever the 
‘suitable methods of punishment’, they end up ‘discipline[d]’ (Althusser 2014 [1970], 251).119 
Against Haslanger and the PSCs, then, it is not the regulative influence of structural domination 
that explains how the socialisation of the dominated groups can entrench structural domination. It is 
the repressive influence of structural domination.120 This third kind of influence complements the 
analysis of the segregating and standardising influence of structural domination I carried out in the 
previous two chapters. Here there are enough milieux to inform the dominated groups’ critical 
consciousness, and the dominated groups are not segregated from them, but the insights they draw 
from them are repressed by the dominant groups. 
 
V. OBJECTION AND DEFENCE 
 
119 One could mention other examples. Jennifer Saul’s blog on women in philosophy (2021) records several. But the 
testimony of the former first-year student I mentioned above is worth quoting at greater length. We saw her report that 
‘[a]s I was reaching to get my coat off the floor [at the end of a party], one of [the] grad students [who had organised 
it] came up behind me and grabbed my breasts’. She adds: ‘In shock, I didn’t move, I didn’t breathe’. […] For many 
years I internalized it as something I had no right to resent (‘On being groped’, February 2013, my emphasis). 
120 Or more precisely, this repressive influence does the bulk of this work. For it does not altogether replace the regulative 
operations of ideological state apparatuses on the socialisation of the dominated groups into dominating practices. Indeed, 
it often enables them. More precisely, repression may create the conditions of successful regulation, to the extent that it 
leads to a situation where the dominated groups do not contest the schemas in the background of the schemas of 
dominating practices. When female students’ violent corporeal perception that men have a right to sexual access to them 
represses the critical insights they learn in their women’s studies classes, for example, this paves the way for the regulation 
of their socialisation into the schemas that depend on this perception. 
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At this final stage, one might object, on behalf of the PSCs, that it is unclear whether they really 
neglect what we saw Althusser call the ‘double functioning’ of ideology. The objection builds on 
Haslanger’s suggestion that education coercively inculcates social meanings (2014, 125). It concludes 
that she does not neglect the fact that ideological state apparatuses also function by repression. But 
this would be mistaken. For in the passage in question, Haslanger is not using the verb ‘inculcate’ in 
the relevant way. Specifically, she does not mean that the dominated groups come to endorse, or 
absorb, what they are taught or inculcated. She only means that they become aware of it as something 
to be reluctantly reckoned with. Put differently, she is leaving the terrain of ideology for that of 
repression, rather than considering the ideological effects of repression. Thus my argument, I 
conclude, escapes this objection. Let us now consider this objection in more detail. 
We already saw how Althusser’s qualification regarding the double functioning of ideology does 
not quite escape Haslanger, even though she only mentions it in passing (2019, 2). But one might 
think that there is more to it than this. In the course of her discussion of Lessig’s analysis of the way 
in which the educational ideological apparatus reconciles the dominated groups with their 
subordination, doesn’t she insist on just the kind of secondary, repressive functioning of ideological 
state apparatuses, which I have argued she and the PSCs neglect? 
Haslanger writes as follows: 
 
Education, of course, not only conveys information and academic skills, but also 
socializes children into a culture. Culturally mandated responses become automatized 
through repetition, close monitoring, and correction. In other words, education teaches 
us – inculcates – social meanings. But by Lessig’s own lights, it (often) does so 
coercively, even in cases where the coercion is not represented or commonly viewed as 
such. Yet surely the inculcation is often experienced as coercive (“stupid,” “insulting,” 
and “painful”) to the student. (2014, 125) 
 
In this passage, it does seem that Haslanger is emphasising precisely the kind of psychological 
repression based on physical repression which I have suggested she neglected. But this appearance is 
misleading, I argue now. For in this passage, she is not using ‘teaches’ or ‘inculcates’ in the same 
way as she does when she follows Sewell’s (or Althusser’s) use of the term. Specifically, she does 
not mean that, out of coercion, the dominated groups come to endorse, or absorb, what they are taught 
or inculcated. It only means that they become aware of it as something to be reckoned with, 
grudgingly, because others, typically the dominant groups, endorse or absorb it. As she begins the 
relevant paragraph: ‘something can be socially meaningful in a context, and the meaning have social 
power, even if in the same context it is contested and recognized by some to be arbitrary’ (ibid.). In 
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other words, she is not considering the ideological effects of repression, but leaving the terrain of 
ideology for that of repression. 
Indeed, her point in this passage, in her own words, is that 
 
[a]lthough [she] agree[s] with Lessig that one way (perhaps an especially important 
way) that social meanings have force is by virtue of seeming “natural” or “necessary,” 
by existing “invisibly” and being “unnoticed” [that is, by relying on a background, or 
context, of other meanings that are not contested], another way is for the dominant 
group to take them for granted and impose them, even if they are not endorsed by 
everyone in the context, e.g., by those they are imposed upon. In such cases, the 
dominant can justify their actions by reference to social meanings, and such justification 
appears (and functions as) secure even if the subordinate reject the meanings and 
justifications in question. (ibid., 124–25, referencing Lessig 1995, 959–60; my 
emphases) 
 
Now, this might have ideological effects, as we saw above, to the extent that through such coercion 
the dominant groups may repress the critical insights which the dominated groups learn in their 
milieux, and thus inculcate the dominated groups, in the relevant sense of the term this time, the 
schemas of dominating practices. But Haslanger does not emphasise this, and we are back to the 
argument I have made in this chapter. It is the repressive functioning of the dominant groups’ 
ideological apparatuses, rather than their ideological functioning, that can explain how the 
socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined through these apparatuses can entrench structural 
domination.121 
In case further evidence were needed, let me mention the example used by Haslanger to illustrate 
the passage at issue. Throughout the paper under discussion, Haslanger draws ‘on anecdotes reported 
to [her] by students concerning relatively affluent Black students […]’ (2014, 110–11). One of these 
anecdotes describes the ‘clear patterns of [a white teacher] picking on […] Mustapha, an Egyptian 
student’ (112). When she first mentions this example, it is to emphasise the internalising of ‘epistemic 
mistrust’ by Jonathan, Mustapha’s friend (ibid.). But when she returns to it in order to illustrate the 
passage at issue, she has a different goal. Now she wants to insist that ‘when [the teacher] challenges 
his knowledge of Egypt’, Mustapha need not ‘accep[t] her imposed social meaning of his comments 
 
121 As to the ‘ideological’, primary functioning of ideological apparatuses, this suggests that it serves mainly to consolidate 
the dominant groups’ own ideologies (cf. Scott 1985, 320; see also Abercrombie et al. 1980, and indeed the remarks from 
Haslanger which I just quoted). 
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[…]’, but that ‘[n]onetheless, by virtue of her authority, she coerces his deference and he experiences 
her as coercive’ (125).  
In other words, the point is not that Mustapha comes to endorse, or absorb, the meaning that the 
teacher is to be deferred to. The point, rather, is that he is now aware of this schema as something to 
be reluctantly complied with because the teacher herself endorses it – and will ‘sen[d] him to the 
Dean’s office’ if he refuses to comply (which is what happens, when he ‘express[s] disbelief that she 
would disagree with him about [Egypt]’ (ibid., 112)). Despite appearances, then, Haslanger’s point 
here does not concern the ideological effects of repression. It concerns repression simpliciter, and the 
fear of repression, in their opposition to ideology. Thus from the fact that she suggests that education 
coercively ‘inculcates’ social meanings, we cannot conclude that she does not after all neglect the 
secondary, repressive functioning of ideological apparatuses. She does do so, to the extent suggested 
in this chapter. I suggest, therefore, that my argument escapes the objection.  
To conclude, let me emphasise once more what I have tried to do. I have not attempted a complete 
exegesis of Althusser’s account of such apparatuses. Neither have I claimed that the analysis of the 
repressive influence of structural domination which I have offered exhausts, together with the 
segregating and standardising influences I focused on in the previous chapters, the set of influences 
which structural domination can have on socialisation. I have only argued that in this case as well the 
PSCs neglect an influence of structural domination on socialisation, though here to a lesser degree 
than in their account of ideology or fetishism: they do take account of the non-violent, regulative 
influence which structural domination has on socialisation; but if my argument holds, here it is 
primarily its violent, repressive influence on socialisation that explains how the socialisation of the 
dominated groups can entrench structural domination. More precisely, more should be made of what 
Althusser calls the ‘double functioning’ of ideological apparatuses if the PSCs’ reading of the 
socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in such apparatuses is to explain the 















This brings us to the end of this thesis. If my argument is correct, we can rescue what I have called 
the socialisation conception of entrenchment – the widespread view that the entrenchment of 
structural domination is largely due to agents’ socialisation into dominating social practices – from 
the problem I identified at the outset. 
This problem, recall, is that, on the account put forward by the proponents of this view (Haslanger 
2017a, Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010), socialisation has a contradictory character, which should in 
principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change. If socialisation is contradictory 
– if agents should be expected to frequent not just milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating 
practices, but also milieux that challenge them – then it is unclear how exactly their socialisation into 
these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. 
To solve this problem, I have argued that we should pay closer attention than the proponents of 
this view have to the various influences that structural domination may have on socialisation. Though 
there may be many more, here I have focused on three of them specifically. I have argued that if 
socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination, it is because structural 
domination can have a segregating, a standardising, or a repressive influence on socialisation, 
depending on the case at hand.  
The segregating influence of structural domination came out in my analysis of the domination of 
black employees by the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy. I have argued that 
if the socialisation of white professionals into the vastly incomplete schema that black employees just 
are unreliable can entrench the domination of these practices, it is because this domination has divided 
black employees and white professionals into two groups who do not frequent each other’s milieux 
unless they need to. 
The standardising influence of structural domination was most apparent in the case of our 
socialisation into the commodity schema that lies at the heart of fetishism, the ideology of the market. 
Workers and capitalists fail to question the market, I have argued, because its domination encourages 
them to commodify across the board in order to maximise profit, which deprive them of the milieux 
that would help them notice that they are doing the commodifying themselves. 
Finally, it is in hyper-masculine philosophy departments plagued by the law of male sex-right that 
I argued we could notice the repressive influence of structural domination. Female students’ 
socialisation into this law can explain why they absorb it despite their socialisation in women’s studies 
classes, I argued, because their corporeal perception of this law during violent heterosexual 
encounters represses the critical insights they learn in these classes. 
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No doubt there are other influences of structural domination on socialisation beyond the three I 
have emphasised. There are also other entrenching factors beyond socialisation, from the fear of 
physical repression (rather than its psychologically repressive effects) to the silent compulsion of 
market relations (rather than its consequences on socialisation), through various co-ordination, co-
operation, and collective action problems (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21).  
It remains the case, however, that socialisation can play an important role in explaining the 
entrenchment of structural domination, at least when the critical potential that lies in its contradictory 
character is cancelled by the influence of structural domination. So if ‘the task [of critical theory] is 
to illuminate […] injustice in ways that provide a basis for resistance’ (Haslanger 2020b, 1), what 
such basis does my analysis suggest? Let me end with some tentative remarks in this connection.  
My critique of the socialisation conception of entrenchment has been an internal one, as I have 
noted, and, in my view as on that of the PSCs, socialisation into dominating practices remains the 
main target of the struggle against structural domination (see e.g., Haslanger 2017a). If what I have 
argued is correct, however, then challenging our socialisation into these practices will prove difficult 
unless we first minimise the various influences which structural domination can have on socialisation. 
So while socialisation should be the main target, these influences should be the initial target. 
In other words, our overall goal remains the ‘disruption of the very terms and concepts we use to 
understand the world’, as Haslanger puts it, achieved ‘by queering our language, playing with 
meanings, and monkey-wrenching or otherwise shifting the material conditions that support our 
tutored dispositions’ (2017a, 110). Yet the material conditions we should target first are not the 
milieux in which dominating practices are enacted, but rather the segregating, standardising, and 
repressive influences which structural domination has on our socialisation in these milieux. 
Does this mean that in order to challenge the entrenchment of structural domination by 
socialisation we must first challenge structural domination itself, which would defeat the purpose? 
Luckily it does not, insofar as challenging the various influences of structural domination on 
socialisation does not require challenging structural domination itself. 
Return for example to the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy. If my 
argument has some purchase, we should not confront socialisation into these practices head-on. 
Instead, we should start with the segregating processes that separate agents into two kinds of groups 
such that the dominant groups live such different lives from the dominated groups that they fail to 
correct the prejudices they form about them. 
How might we go about doing that? In her discussion of racial segregation, Anderson mentions 
Strive, a US-based job-training organisation that helps young blacks learn, in work-simulated 
environments, how to drop the ‘game face’ that they adopt ‘to ward off attacks in their crime-ridden, 
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segregated neighborhood’ (2010, 35).122 As I suggested in chapter 3, however, it is the members of 
the dominant groups, rather than the members of the dominated groups, who are most likely to be 
unable to correct the mistaken schemas they form. So we might want to do the opposite: organise the 
same kind of attitudinal training for white professionals instead. Specifically, we might simulate 
dangerous, segregated neighbourhoods, in order to help white professionals learn that what they see 
as an aggressive posture really is a defensive one. If white companies are as committed to racial 
equality as they often insist they are, they should welcome interested organisers with open arms. 
In chapter 3, however, I focused on another prejudice, the schema that black employees are 
unreliable simpliciter, which I argued that white professionals fail to correct because as whites and 
as professionals they do not experience what would enable them to do so, such as dependency on 
unreliable public transports, lack of childcare, or the stress of holding multiple jobs. How can we 
challenge these specific segregating processes? One might think of finding a way to prevent white 
professionals from jumping into taxis, or from working from home, whenever public transport 
malfunctions (hack their Uber account? cut off their internet connection?). But this might prove 
impractical. More realistically, here as well we might follow Strive’s example, and simulate the 
required environments for training purposes: we might organise mock-meetings where white 
professionals are asked to bring their children, for example. That would teach them a lesson.123 
The analysis of fetishism in chapter 4 suggests a similar basis for dis-entrenching the market. Here 
as well, I argued, we should not directly target socialisation into this practice, but first aim at the 
standardising, commodifying processes on which I focused: they are responsible for preventing 
workers and capitalists from thinking critically about the market, as they have them bring up to market 
standard the various milieux that previously escaped it, such a neighbourhoods or friendship groups. 
What can we do, concretely? Recall for instance the ‘exchange system for services’, which Brad 
Fallon, the plumber from chapter 4, set up with his friends. Since Fallon and his friends keep an exact 
track of the hours they work for one another, and since the tally of these hours is convertible into 
money, I noted there that this system may well end up commodifying their own friendly relations. 
But provided we do not precisely count our hours and refuse to convert them into money, such a 
system may have just the opposite effect: it may prove a useful way to transpose neighbourly, 
 
122 See also https://strive.org/national-programs (last accessed 09/04/2021). 
123 Of course, we might also campaign for the state to improve public transportation systems, fund childcare, and liberate 
blacks from the need to hold more than one job. Indeed, we might do this precisely on the ground that it might make them 
unreliable at work and reproduce their domination. Not only would this be welcome in itself, but it might also help white 
professionals correct their schema that black employees just are unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, by 
removing the hurdles that might make it hard for some black employees to always meet their deadlines. But chances are 
that this strategy puts the cart before the horse: in order to support such state policies, white professionals might have to 
correct this schema first. If they think that black employees are unreliable simpliciter, they might well consider them a 
lost cause. 
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uncommodified relations to currently commodified environments and, as a result, help agents realise 
that commodification is their own doing.124 
Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemics, for all its drawbacks, might hold similar promises for activists 
capable of seizing the moment. For the surge in uncommodified help it has caused – from extended 
furlough schemes to the crucial role played by the NHS – might also increase the uncommodified 
space from which to think critically about the commodity schema: agents exchange the goods and 
services produced by the welfare state very much like neighbours do, rather than as merchants 
repaying their debts to the very last penny. The same might be said of working from home, as people 
who no longer need to go to work every day may find it much easier to form, or join, neighbourly 
communities. 
Finally, what about the law of male sex-right in effect in some philosophy department? The same 
analysis obtains, it seems to me. Rather than aiming directly at this law, we should tackle first the 
physically-cum-psychologically repressive processes whereby the critical consciousness that female 
students develop in women’s studies classes falters. 
Thus, pushing for harsh departmental policies against the law of male sex-right, though necessary, 
might not be the first thing to do. It might serve us better to first focus on women’s studies classes: 
there, feminist teachers should not only give female students the conceptual resources to question this 
implicit law; they should also teach female students the basics of self-defence, so female students 
might in turn prevent the male students they have sex with from repressing the critical insights they 
learn from these classes. 
Feminist teachers might teach jujitsu, for example, a crucial part of the toolbox of feminist self-
defence since 1908, when Edith Garrud began training the suffragettes of the Women’s Social and 
Political Union (Dorlin 2020). The right to vote is no longer at issue, but – to borrow the title of the 
short consciousness-raising play where, in a swift move, the woman played by Garrud sobers up her 
drunk husband – this kind of martial art might well remain What Every Woman Ought to Know (1911, 
see Dorlin 2017).125 
This, then, is the kind of disrupting strategies one might think of, based on the above analysis of 
the role of socialisation in the entrenchment of structural domination. My suggestions are only 
tentative, however, and much more needs to be said before they can form a real basis for resistance. 
Until then, they only form a basis for further research. 
 
124 A similar system is in place in the ZAD (for ‘zone à défendre’, or ‘zone to be defended’) of Notre-Dame-Des-
Landes, France. Originally organised to oppose the building of an airport, this occupation protest is home to various 
charge-free practices such as free shops and ‘pay what you can’ events (see e.g., Pruvost 2017). 
125 Elsa Dorlin herself is a case in point: she offers practical classes of self-defence besides her theoretical work on the 
topic (see e.g., Xavier, Lugrin and Ralenti 2020, 132–4). 
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But at this stage it is no longer my turn to speak: to end with the words of a philosopher to whom 
I owe a great debt – Iris Marion Young (1990, 5) – this work is ‘addressed to others and awaits their 
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